

TRUTH AND COHERENCE

BY

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Printed at the University Press by

ROBERT MACLEHOSE & CO. LTD.

1911

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Truth and Coherence

[Adapted from Bk. II. Ch. IX. of the forthcoming 2nd edition of the author's "Logic."]

1. The main current doctrines of truth have been conveniently designated in recent discussion as the theory of Coherence and the theory of Correspondence respectively. I should hardly have thought it necessary to explain that I cannot for my own part conceive how the doctrine of Correspondence can be adopted as a serious theory, were it not that in an elaborate criticism¹ of the first edition of my logic it has been urged that I have myself adopted it.²

The genetic theorists have discovered the failure of the correspondence theory, and believing some of us to be old-fashioned, they attribute it to us and then attack it. But we think, or at least, I think, that no logician really of the first rank, such as those whom I follow, ever held it, and that our critics are belated in awaking to its impossibility. However, whether the misconception is my fault or my critic's, it will be well to make a short restatement of my view. The details of the criticism will all, I think, settle themselves if the radical misconception is explained. But I shall further take occasion to express my own interpretation of the present position in the philosophical world with reference to logical theory, which offers certain highly suggestive antitheses.

¹ Cf. "Bosanquet's *Theory of Judgment*" by Miss Thompson, Chicago Decennial Publications, 1903. I may note that for myself I entirely disclaim the epithet 'epistemological' which Professor Dewey frequently employs in his introductory essay. For I understand it to imply a theory of cognition in which truth and reality are treated as external to one another, in fact, some form of the correspondence theory. He is indeed discussing Lotze, and not any writer with whose views I am in agreement. But I am not sure how far his criticism is meant to stretch, and it is better to guard oneself.

² Under all the circumstances, this supposition recalls to me a vulgar story current in my youth, of a doctor who, finding himself unequal to treating the patient's actual ailment, proposed to inoculate him with a quite different malady, "for," he said, "I'm death on that."

(i) I will say at once that there is just one expression in my book which in my opinion may have given some sort of colour to what I must call my critic's fundamental error. It is the phrase in which I stated the relation of Reality, as the subject to be defined, to thought as the process of defining it. I said¹: "It is an essential of the act of judgment that it always refers to a Reality which goes beyond and is independent of the act itself." Such an expression, taken by itself, or in a treatise framed on wholly different lines from my *Logic*, would not have been inconsistent with a conception of reality as an existent world external to our thinking, in resemblance or dissimilarity to which lay the truth or falsehood of our ideas. But in criticising a work which takes for its watchword the saying that "The truth is the whole," offering this as the solution of the difficulty that a world outside thought cannot be laid hold of by thought, this does seem to me a gratuitous misconception. And further, I think it is one which not only every paragraph of the general theory, but still more the whole progress and structure of the book disowns.

Reality is independent of the judgment in two senses. There is, of course, an ultimate Reality; a higher experience than ours; we must postulate that, if we do not mean to accept *e.g.* all individuals' worlds of experience as separate and unconnected. When I spoke of this Reality as independent of our act of judgment, as it is in an enormous proportion, I did not mean to exclude the truth that our judgment, in an infinitesimal degree, contributes to sustain it, and forms an element in its life. Of course the two are in this sense not independent; but this has nothing to do with Correspondence.

This Reality then shows itself in our world of experience in a way which is independent of our act of judgment in a second sense. For our immediate experience, our feeling, our possession of a contact with a world, has individuality in a mode which as a mode of experience² our judgment cannot confer or originate, but can only attempt to restore by a secondary process when its unity is transcended. The contact in feeling has existence and quality together, and primarily is satisfactory and self-contained, though carrying a sense of diversity which challenges analysis in judgment, but is as such independent of interpretation through judgment.

¹ Vol. i. page 104.

² For its *content* is modifiable. See below, pp. 30 ff.

We construct our world as an interpretation which attempts to restore the unity, which the real has lost by our making its diversity explicit. This construction is our intellectual world. It is a form of reality, possessing some of its characters, and there are other forms, higher and lower. But none of them can be a world external to our thought and yet acting as its standard. The thing is a contradiction in terms, not because of the metaphor of externality, but because of the vital autonomy of the thought-system.

If we ask, how we know our interpretation to be true or false, to possess or not to possess the character of reality, so far as its discursive form allows, the answer comes from the principle of non-contradiction, which is only another form of words for the principle that the Truth is the whole. This could easily be shown at length.¹ The important point is that the principle of non-contradiction is positive and constructive; its force cannot be evaded by a logical quietism, by saying nothing. For you cannot get away from the world. If you try to say nothing you are in contradiction with a mass of experience, not with a presumed external world, but with what enters into your own being; and you further leave it in contradiction with itself.

(ii) Our doctrine of truth is therefore wholly immanent. There is no external standard, and, of course, no possibility of applying it if there were one. The criterion² identifies itself absolutely with that imposed by the doctrine of coherence.³ And the structure and nusus of the treatise is a simple embodiment of this principle. It is a progressive interpretation of the 'this'; the contact with reality in which we possess both existence and quality. It is an advance from one form of individuality to another; from individuality which has never gone beyond itself to individuality which has experienced

¹ I hope to go over this ground in much greater detail in a forthcoming work of a more metaphysical character.

² We have been warned that a criterion is properly a label, extraneous to the character which it indicates. But any such criterion in highly organised matters is a bad, *i.e.* highly fallible criterion. And it is well to insist that in such matters the only sound criterion is the character itself or some important element of it.

³ See the author's *Knowledge and Reality*, p. 331 (publ. 1885), for a criticism of the simile of the foundations of knowledge. This criticism is always decisive of a writer's attitude to the correspondence theory. Cf. Bradley, *Mind*, 71, 335.

contradiction and is being approximately restored as an explicit system of non-contradictory content. It is a product of the interest and purpose to explain all that you can ; to push the explanation further and further in response to the demand for removal of contradiction in the relative whole of experience at every stage. This interest and purpose is the clue pursued by the effort of judgment from beginning to end. It is the special and distinctive cognitive interest. And a treatise like the one in question endeavours to trace in its genesis the system developed by the action of this interest, which is of course inclusive of all more special stimuli and occasions. The whole interpretation, as referred to the individuality that appears solid, but therefore only implicit, in the 'this,' possesses the character of reality, viz. individuality, not perfectly, but in the degree in which the form of finite thought can achieve it.¹ We know this by the fact that this character, the character of a systematic whole, is the condition of our possessing a world of experience at all. If we let a contradiction stand, we possess so much the less of reality. Something cancels something, and we are the poorer and dissatisfied.

(iii) Immanence is the absolute condition of a theory of truth. It is this that makes the fundamental contrast between the coherence and the correspondence theory. As I said at the beginning of the *Logic*, truth is individual.² This is only another form of words for the principle of non-contradiction, the principle that the truth is the whole, and the doctrine that coherence is the test of truth and reality. Truth is then its own criterion. That is to say, it can only be tested by the more of itself. Your completest system at the moment cannot be further tested. You can only test it further when you are in a position to make it more complete. Then what interferes with its greater completeness must go.

Is it necessary to say a word about comprehensiveness? Sometimes we are told that our criterion is mere formal consistency. This can mean nothing but that the critic has not thought the matter out to the bitter end. By coherence or consistency we mean the consistency, so far as attainable, of the whole body of experience with itself. Nothing

¹ Need I say that errors in the personal thought-process are expected and admitted?

² Vol. i. p. 3.

less would satisfy the law of individuality or the necessity of non-contradiction. But in this interpretation of consistency comprehensiveness is obviously included.

(iv) One word more about correspondence. If an identical principle operates in different worlds—*e.g.* in the experiences of different spiritual beings, the products are likely to correspond. And I notice a tendency¹ to aid the process of inoculating us with the malady which is not ours, by insisting on this obvious truth. If the fundamental principle of reality is operative in the sphere of finite thought, of course this sphere will show a character that possesses certain common features with those of other spheres or of the ultimate real. But if correspondence,² *i.e.* identity in certain characters of a system, must result, that is no argument that correspondence is the criterion for either system. If two men add up a sum right and therefore the same, that does not mean that the sums are right because they are the same, or that one man has copied from the other. Of course, there is a reality which is more than an individual's thought. There is, at least, the thought of other individuals. And undoubtedly these will correspond, *i.e.* will show a structure identical in principle but different in details. But that is nothing against the character of both being immanently determined.

I shall return in a later section to the question in what sense the coherence theory fails.

2. I will now venture to state what I believe to be the cause and tendency of the peculiar logical movement of to-day.

(i) It is plain that the last half century has brought to philosophy in general a great revival of interest. This revival has coincided with a marked increase of the tendency, traceable in European thought ever since Rousseau, to emphasise the philosophical value of feeling, of practice and action in the plainest meaning of the words, and of what has come to be called, in an almost technical sense, "life" and "living." The movement has conceived itself as a sort of democratic revolution in the things of the mind,³ and is obviously connected with the change

¹ See even Joachim in *The Nature of Truth*, p. 174.

² On the nature of this correspondence see *Essentials of Logic*, p. 18.

³ Cf. the author's *Philosophical Theory of the State*, Ed. 2. Introd. Nietzsche represents perhaps the "Saviour of Society" who attends upon some democratic movements.

of affairs in society and politics. A supposed aristocracy of intellectualist principles is to be dethroned. Truth is to become more vital, more accessible, its touchstone more obvious and more easily applied. Life, one may say, is to be substituted for thought as the central object and impulse of philosophy.

All this has had and is having the usual effect of revolutionary demands in philosophy.¹ The new theorists are insisting on something which was really vital in the older tradition, and the result of their movement will probably be a certain alteration of balance and emphasis in the formulation of that tradition. One can hardly suppose that a movement so widespread and so popular will bring with it no elements of gain at all. If it brought nothing but its adherents' interest in philosophy it would already have brought a good deal.²

(ii) But the movement itself, I am sure, is conducted under a misapprehension. It has hold of something very partial, and consequently sees and, as I have pointed out, further produces by its assumptions, a fundamental opposition where there is really nothing but a part unduly contrasted with its whole.

Let us particularise. Genetic Logic—the treatment of thought as a system, or at least an aggregate, of adaptations evolved in response to the needs of practice, has in principle adopted and popularised the coherence theory of truth. This doctrine, being as we have seen a doctrine of immanence, is essential to all vital philosophy and logic, and, to the best of my belief, no other has in fact been held by any leader of European thought from Plato downwards.³ But by restricting the coherence which is to be the standard, to the coherence of adaptation with external action, at first (as no one can doubt) in the purely normal and everyday usage of the latter term, it has on the one hand voiced a popular demand, but on the other has precluded a real understanding by itself of its own philosophical position. And so it

¹ Cf. the analysis, *Logic*, ii. pp. 228 ff., of the relation of epochs of empiricism to the traditional distinctions of Logic.

² As will appear, I believe this to be far the greater part of the gain it will bring.

³ See, for example, my remark on Aristotle, *Logic*, ii. p. 222. I know that this has been adversely criticised, but I believe that when we consider the full meaning of apprehension by *νοῦς* as the sort of insight which comes, for instance, by "induction," my view will be seen to hold good. Cf. for example, Burnet's *Ethics of Aristotle*, pp. xxxvii and xlii. I may say in general that I should have guarded myself much more emphatically against the correspondence theory if I had ever imagined that it could by any mischance be imputed to me.

strongly tends, as we saw, to assume that in the older philosophy, which it feels to be in some way its antithesis, the view opposed in principle to its own, that of correspondence to an external standard, must be the prevailing one. And it conducts its controversy on this basis, reinforcing its attitude by utilising another popular demand, that for actual individual endeavour and modification of things, which it is unable to unite (the great and ultimate test of a philosophy) with the belief in a perfect and timeless real. And the completer form of its own logical view, the coherence theory of truth, it is apt to stigmatise as a mere formal consistency.¹

(iii) Thus in a very able statement² of the contrasted positions of genetic and the older philosophical Logic, I seem to myself to find three connected misconceptions at the very basis of the whole representation.

First, there is Dualism. Thought is from the beginning conceived in contrast to its occasions. It is taken as reflective, as what arises now and again when we set ourselves consciously to "think." That is to say, this is the limitation of the thought with which the writer deals. Something called Constitutive thought is mentioned in contrast with it; but whether this is simply the working thought by which we carry on unreflective life, or some theoretical construction of a creative force in the universe, it seems impossible to tell. What is clear is this much, that not merely the limitation of thought as a distinctive form of reality which operates through ideas, but the special limitation of "pale reflective thought" as against "active endeavour," or of "abstract description" as against "living appreciation" are accepted as formulations for the object of the new conception of Logic.³ "Thought arises in response to its own occasion."

¹The controversy, I suggest, is thrown completely askew if you take Lotze as typical of philosophical Logic. The whole statement of the issue, as based upon the contrast of thought in general with reality in general (Dewey in *Introductory Essays to Chicago University Decennial Publications*, 1903) appears to me thus utterly falsified. If we want to deal with a master of philosophical Logic why not select Hegel or Plato, or even Green? That is, if one was not going to take the obvious course of considering Mr. Bradley's whole position with regard to Thought and Reality.

²Dewey, *l.c.*

³This takes us back to the conception of thought as decaying sense, which, whether right or wrong, is sharply opposed to the conception of it in the masters of Idealism. I should explain that Idealism, in the sense in which I use it for the philosophy, say, of Hegel, is the antithesis of what is called Rationalism. But I know of no other name that would carry the reference.

Then, by removing only the definiteness of the occasion, which ought to be retained, and retaining the dualism of nature between constructive and discursive thought, which ought to be removed, an antithesis is created against philosophical logic which assigns to it as its characteristic problem the relation of thought in general to reality in general, as the epistemological issue out of which its whole treatment springs.¹ And an apparent corroboration of this attitude is found by giving a predominant place to an analysis of Lotze's position.

This idea of the situation—I say it mainly to make my own conviction clear—seems to me wholly and utterly false. The relation—the nature of the antithesis—is in my view altogether different from this.

In Logic as I understand it, attempting to follow out at a long interval the practice of the masters, there is no epistemology in the sense supposed,² no treatment of thought in itself as opposed to reality in general, no question of a bridge from the one to other. In analysing the thought-world it holds itself to be analysing the structure of reality, the detailed and articulated responses by which the living body of experience exhibits its endeavour to approximate as a system of ideas to a non-contradictory whole. Of course all these phases could be construed as responses to the environment. But the environment for thought is not the sphere of external action, but the universe of experience. The occasions which evoke responses of thought within specific limitations are merely a fragment of this total environment. The genetic theory, so it seems to me, has merely insisted on an arbitrarily limited fragment of the genuine logical theory.

From this, therefore, it is separated in degree rather than in kind, by a further error involved in its naive Dualism; an error for which I can find no better name than Occasionalism. Thought, we are told, is always within the limits of a specific occasion, a specific purpose.

¹ *Ib.* p. 6, and cf. Green's refutation of this fallacy, *Prolegomena*, p. 27.

² The explanation on vol. i. p. 3 was intended to guard me against the appearance of dealing with "epistemology" or "a theory of cognition," by which I mean, an examination of the nature of knowledge as something apart from the reality which is then taken as its external standard.

It is charged against what is treated as general logical theory¹ that it disregards these limits, or only regards them as throwing light on the terms on which thought transacts its business with reality. "But in the end all this is incidental. In the end the one problem holds. How do the specifications of thought as such hold good of reality as such? In fine, logic is supposed to grow out of the epistemological problem, and to lead up to its solution."²

All this, as I see the situation, is the same old half-truth turned into a complete delusion. There is no discussion of a relation of thought in itself to reality at large. No question arising out of it determines the course of logical investigation. But it is perfectly true that thought (in a way, as we shall see, comparable to life, about which the same error is made) has in all its specific responses and adaptations the universe implicitly before it. Its adaptations, like those of an organ in an organism, are controlled throughout by a system of functions which is a response to something continuous in the nature of the environment—as in life, to the conditions of organic existence on our earth's surface; so in knowledge, to the condition of belonging to a universe. Occasionalism, the insistence on response to specific occasion as the condition of thought, thus misses its underlying and continuous character, as the active form of totality; the nature by which all experience strives of itself towards the whole. Thought is essentially the *nisus* of experience as a world to completion of its world. The intervals of conscious reflection are merely one of its forms of advance, and are not, in their paleness and meagreness, characteristic of thought, which is essentially organic, concrete and constructive. In its Occasionalism, again, the genetic theory is saying something so far true, but fragmentary, and is again taking it as the basis of an antithesis which has no existence, except as a relation of a partial to a more comprehensive view.

And lastly, Dualism and Occasionalism take shape in Adaptationism. This is more than a recognition—which would be justified—that all thought may be regarded as a response or adaptation to surroundings. It consists (*a*) in neglect of the character of thought as a system of functions adapted to the removal of contradiction through-

¹ It should be remembered that this is not accepted as a just title for philosophical logic.

² *Ib.* p. 6.

out experience and having always this complete systematic function operative in controlling specific responses or adaptations; and (b) in the suggestion that, considering the complete explanation of evolutionary growths to be only possible through regarding them as adaptations to their environments, each to each, the antithesis of origin and value ought to be treated as superseded, and psychology, for instance, should become, in its aspect of a historical science, a serviceable instrument in logical valuation.

(a) As to the former of these points, it is now I think recognised that to consider a living organism as a mere box of patent¹ contrivances, a collection of adaptations to particular situations of environment, is to consider it inadequately. Every adaptation is built on a system, and the system is determined by essential functions, which may be regarded if we like as a great general adaptation. But these functions, as a system, it must be borne in mind, constitute a large proportion of the environment for every specific adaptation. In every adaptation life is there as a whole, and has the whole nature of the environment in view, not as a general abstraction, but as a concrete whole that enters into every specific situation. So with thought. It is, if we like, all developed as responses; but it is inadequately considered if it is considered as a box of tricks. Thought never really forgets the universe. There is always more in it than its occasion brings, or rather, it makes its occasion more than it is.

(b) And the idea that evolutionary explanation has disposed of the antithesis between genesis and value seems to me more particularly to invert the real relation. It is true, of course, that natural history is much interested in natural selection; but the decisive point for logical theory is that natural selection is not in the smallest degree interested in natural history. One may fancy oneself pleading before the court of natural selection. "Only give me time, and I can explain everything! The fact is, I was not adapted to to-day's environment, but only to yesterday's. That is why I am not equal to the situation." But the court, I take it, replies "My dear sir, in the court of history that would be interesting, but in this court it is wholly irrelevant. We

¹ The Mendelian theory is not quite this. But even its way of regarding an organism, as, if I grasp the idea rightly, a group of more or less independent factors, seems difficult to accept without further explanation.

must ask you to deal with the situation of to-day, or——." It is being equal to the whole situation that is the criterion for Logic as for Morals. Past adaptations can justify no theory of to-day. Have we or have we not a system which gives the possible maximum of non-contradiction, in the construction which it puts upon the fullest conceivable experience. This is our standard for the present, and in it, for the past. And Professor Dewey says what seems to me equivalent to accepting this standard. "The historical point of view explains the sequence; the normative follows the sequence to its conclusion, and then turns back and judges each historical step by viewing it in reference to its own outcome."¹ Yes, but the sanction lies surely not with the history of adaptation, which shows a certain stage to be *de facto* the outcome; but with the court of natural selection, which applies the test of adequate or inadequate adaptation, that is, of power or impotence to deal with contradictions, taking the whole body of experience together as constituting the concrete situation. This is the test, the test of coherence and non-contradiction, which philosophical Logic accepts; the immanent test of the presence of the character of Reality within the thought-form as one of the many branches or appearances of the real.

(iv) Psychology, from anthropology upwards, beginning with a natural history conditioned by quite other environments, leads gradually up to a situation in which, as the proper character of mind emerges, the logical test by present adequacy of working supersedes the historical explanation by past adequacy of working in a less complete environment. "Working"; that is the apparent watchword, the name accepted on both hands for the test which might bring the two theories together. But to cover the problem of philosophical Logic it must take the environment as the widest conceivable experience, and must recognise the fact and right of cognitive interest.²

When once the ultimate criterion is accepted, with the extension of the supposed new view to its natural boundaries, that is from practical working to dealing adequately with experience, I cannot understand how the relation of Psychology to Logic should present a difficulty.

¹ *Ib.* p. 16.

² The true type of the relation of Psychology to Logic is in the relation of associated contents—impure universals—to pure logical connections.

I have observed above that the epistemological attitude which the new theory is attempting to force upon the old is nowhere, so far as I know, accepted by it.¹ And in fact the historical method, the explanation of past phases in the light of their environment, was not derived by philosophy from the historical or evolutionary sciences, but rather by them from it.² It is a notable characteristic of Plato, and could hardly have been more prominent than it is in Hegel's *Phenomenology* and in his *Philosophy of Mind*. It is unfortunate that there is really no word free from irrelevant suggestions for what we mean by Idealism when we apply it to the philosophy of Plato or of Hegel. But taking "Objective Idealism" as a more or less accepted equivalent, we may say that the history and estimate of thought-adaptation in relation to the environment has always been the peculiar pride and province of objective idealism. Only, the actual test of truth, of the character of reality in the thought-form, was by it always kept separate from the historical estimate of imperfect forms, the justification of which had shown itself, as we may say, doubly relative.³

(v) This, then, is one part of the logical situation as I feel obliged to conceive it. It is well to vindicate for Logic the sphere of Life and practice as against an imaginary heaven of ideas—to which, however, no master of thought has relegated it. It is well to bring the development of thought together with the conception of adapted response, and to apply to it the general idea of natural selection. It is well to vindicate for the individual mind a living share in the self-maintenance of Reality as against the idea which Plato repudiated of a statue-like immovable system. All these are attitudes of special emphasis due to the philosophical and semi-philosophical movement of the last fifty years. But if the reforming theorist limits practice to the sphere of external action, adaptation to the history of *de facto* success apart from the principle of its determination, and our living concern with Reality to effecting in it ultimate change, in a time which is ultimately real, then his view remains fragmentary, and he has failed to grasp the inheritance which is coming within his reach.

¹ I have explained why I think it misleading to take Lotze as a specimen for criticism.

² A remark of W. Wallace. I have not the reference.

³ "Relative" as falling short by the standard of our best experience; doubly relative because that standard is itself not absolute.

3. Complementary to the view of truth which I have just attempted to explain—the view for which thought is an adaptation, and truth along with reality is *bona fide* in process of being made—is the reassertion of Realism in the modern world. Realism, indeed, however opposed to the conception of a universe in actual genesis, belongs at bottom to the same impulse of modernism. The very same flowing tide which carries with it the demand that truth shall be a mere adaptation to vital needs, brings also the antagonistic requirement that truth shall lie in a relation to simple given fact. On both sides we have the demand for immediacy; here the immediacy of satisfaction, there the immediacy of apprehension. And the second, as we admitted of the first,¹ has doubtless, even from our point of view, contributions to offer. The first, we hoped, would bring about a correction of the confusion of idealism with rationalism, and destroy the conception of a pale and meagre thought, identified with decaying sense. The latter, we hope, will undo the unhappy connection with mere psychicalism or mentality,² and bring into prominence the more robust conceptions of a philosophy which admits true differences of kind within the whole.

I propose elsewhere to attempt an explanation of the attitude involved, in the theory of truth which has been followed through the *Logic*, to mental states and the claims of naive realism.

But here some remarks will be in place concerning a doctrine of truth which, as far as I grasp it, shares on one side only the position of naive realism and simple apprehension, while on another side committing itself to a special theory of existence with which naive realism has directly nothing to do.³ The doctrine of simple apprehension, and the true meaning of the principle that knowledge makes no difference in what is known, will be spoken of in another place.

(a) "The world is a world of many things, with relations which are not to be deduced from a supposed nature or scholastic essence of the related things. In this world, whatever is complex is composed of related single things. There is no identity in difference; there is

¹ p. 8 above.

² See e.g. Mr. Moore's *Refutation of Idealism*, cited and commented on in Joachim's *Nature of Truth*, 61 note.

³ I think that even in their theory of existence the two have an impulse in common, that of hardening into isolated existence purely relative objects.

identity and there is difference, and complexes may have some elements identical and some different, but we are no longer obliged to say of any pair of objects that may be mentioned that they are both identical and different.”¹

The core of the view, as is well known, is the rejection of what have been called “internal relations,” *i.e.* relations grounded in the nature of the related terms; and the assertion of mere external relations, *i.e.* as I understand, the assertion that relations either need not or cannot be so grounded.² The phrase “internal relations” seems to me not quite satisfactory, as suggesting relations between parts within a given term. At least the view which to me appears reasonable would be better expressed by some such term as “relevant relations,” *i.e.* relations which are connected with the properties of their terms, so that any alteration of relations involves an alteration of properties and vice-versa.

The following reasons for accepting a doctrine of relevant relations appear to me to be unimpeached.

(1) In a large proportion of cases the relevancy of the relations to the properties of the related terms involves a community of kind. You cannot have a spatial relation between terms which are not in space. You cannot have a moral relation between terms which are not members of a moral world. Why is it absurd to ask for the distance from London Bridge to one o'clock? Surely because the one is a term in space and the other in time. This is not a general argument that if the relation were other the terms would be other, from which any possible conclusion might follow.³ It is an analytic determination of a common positive element on which both property and relation depend.

¹ Russell, *Philosophical Essays*, p. 169. I do not think it is maintained on our side that relations can be deduced from the properties of single terms which are in relation. I understand the point of interest to be that you cannot explain one term of a complex without explaining the rest. By “explaining” I mean describing without self-contradiction. Every complex, it must be remembered, has a special quality of its own, and every term in it a quality relative to that quality. *Logic*, I. pp. 139-40.

² *Op. cit.* p. 161. It would be important to know whether it is maintained that they *cannot* be so grounded, because then we could ask for the author's explanation of the more obvious cases in which they appear to be so.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 166.

(2) There is further no case in which on philosophical scrutiny¹ the relevancy of relations to properties is not perceptible. I do not say that the relation can be reduced to a fact about the one object only together with a fact about the other object only.² The point of the relevancy of relations, as I understand it, is that each of two or more terms can only be understood if all are understood. "Father" and "Son" is a vulgar traditional instance. But I do not see that it is not a sound one. And in every case, I think, the basis of such a necessity can be shown. This or that observer may not possess the knowledge or the acuteness required to formulate the element which changes with the relation in precise detail. But it can always be shown what sort of thing must be relevant to the relation. So much so, that I cannot think this to be really and totally denied of so-called external relations. And I will pass on to a point of view which raises this question.

(3) Relations are true of their terms. They express their positions in complexes, which positions elicit their behaviour, their self-maintenance in the world of things. This is really the all-important argument. And I cannot believe that if the doctrine of mere external relations were completely stated, we should not find the same thing admitted by it, in one way or another.³ If the relations make no difference to the terms, it follows that things do not react or behave with reference to the complexes to which they belong. Yet if Charles I. had died in his bed, he must have died in a different bodily attitude from that in which he died on the scaffold.

(b) I do not understand relations to be adjectives of their terms. X
They are not adjectives, because they involve other terms which are as substantive as any of which we might be inclined to pronounce them adjectives. Relations cannot be reduced to qualities, nor ✓
qualities to relations. Relations are just the way in which discursive

¹ I have in mind Mr. Bradley's argument in *Appearance and Reality*, ed. 2, pp. 572 ff.

² Russell, p. 191.

³ As I understand the appearance of this is avoided by connecting the mind with the relation straight, so to speak, and not through the terms. But this seems to me simply a bold omission of a fact in the complex. Does not the conception of a "sense" in a relation like love necessarily admit this? The term A is different, according to the "sense" of the relation of love between A and B. Or take spatial relations in the visual field. When a new object is inserted in the field, every object in it becomes a member of a new pattern, and so necessarily exhibits a new quality.

thought represents the unity of terms which it cannot make adjectives of each other. As Mr. Bradley has said that they are a *modus vivendi* between predicates of the same subject whose unity we cannot really construe to ourselves, so it might be said they are a *modus vivendi* between terms in the same universe, of whose unity, in the imperfection of our experience, the same is true.

None of the objections which have been put forward appear to me to touch these points.¹

I quite understand that on the doctrine offered to us Identity in Difference must go. And I quite see for myself that it must go "in the end," that is to say, in any experience for which objects are self-contained and cease to transcend themselves. What our pluralist realists² are grasping at is therefore justly anticipated. Undoubtedly the Real is self-complete and self-contained. But I insist on the words "in the end," because it is their repudiation of them³ that I take to be the root of their failure. They are the extreme Absolutists. They are not content to have the Absolute "in the end," as we more modestly claim it, not meaning after a lapse of time, but in so far as what are fragments for us point out to us a completion beyond them. And there is surely a difference of completeness in different experiences. But they will have the absolute here and now; and to make it handy and adaptable for everyday use they split it into little bits. A universe of tiny Absolutes; that is really what they offer us.⁴ But if any of these Absolutes imply any term beyond themselves their absolutism breaks down. And we have tried to show that in all relations this is the case.

(c) As to error we have only to bear in mind that degree of partiality of the truth asserted must combine with a belief that it is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in constituting the degree of erroneousness. And also, for practical purposes and within certain limits, we let imperfect truth pass as absolute. A repudiation of the

¹ Of course I am following Mr. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, l.c., though he is not responsible for what I say.

² I do not wish to use a name that will be disliked. I merely invented an appellation that seemed to be fair, for shortness' sake.

³ Russell, 159, 163.

⁴ I suppose this is a familiar idea in the case of the Atomists and the Eleatics. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, ed. 2, p. 387.

phrase "in the end" denies these distinctions. But surely in denying them it denies nearly all the facts of life. Presupposing these reservations, what has been said in satire¹ is surely a plain truth, which only needs complete application to make it obvious. A man who accepts the view that all his judgments have only partial truth is certainly *pro tanto* less wrong in each of them than if he believed he had got in each the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. But obviously, in this form the principle is only a general warning, and cannot directly amend the actual partiality of what a man judges as truth. For this follows from determinate reasons, and in each case he must judge or not judge. A purely general warning cannot guide his judgment. But it can stimulate him to caution and criticism, and this is an obvious excellence in his whole cognitive system, which is excluded by the belief that partial truth can be absolute. A man who has grasped the warning that you must only believe about one half of written history is certainly *pro tanto*, i.e. if both have the same positive knowledge, nearer historical truth than one who thinks he may with safety swallow it all. And though this caution alone will, of course, not tell a man *which* half to believe, yet it will place his cognitive system in a much truer relation to the facts than that of a man who, making the same judgments as the other, believes them to represent absolute truth. It is the case, no doubt, that you cannot, out of caution, half make a judgment; you must make it or not. But it is further true that to make an additional judgment, "there is a good deal more to learn about" this or that character or incident, puts your positive judgments in a proportion to the facts which is likely to be much more in harmony with them than if you entertained no such critical principle.

(d) I believe the truth to be that the doctrine of which we are speaking gains its vraisemblance and its apparent clearness from clinging to just the region of so-called plain and simple fact, the illusory hardness and isolation of which—really a defect of low-grade knowledge²—it takes for absoluteness. And in this region it does seem *prima facie* absurd

¹ Russell, p. 155.

² Of course no one uses the whole of his own experience in his theories. He uses what for some reason has struck him and seemed typical to him. I do not think it is without precedent that men of very high attainments should rely theoretically on very naive types of experience. I think analogies for this are rather common.

to take error as partial truth. You must be, it appears, either right or wrong. The fact is fixed, and you are in relation with it or are not. There are no degrees of truth, and nothing which is truth in the beginning and not in the end, or in the end and not in the beginning. I will try to show the nature of this delusion, as it seems to me, by a few words on truth of fact and truth of system.

✓ "It is plain—that the truth or falsehood of a given judgment depends in no way upon the person judging [it is common ground that there must be a mind to judge], but solely upon the facts about which he judges." "Thus the judgment that two terms have a certain relation R is a relation of the mind to the two terms and the relation R with the appropriate 'sense' [direction of the relation from A to B, or from B to A]; the 'corresponding' complex consists of the two terms related by the relation R with the same 'sense.' The judgment is true when there is such a complex, and false when there is not. The same account, *mutatis mutandis*, will apply to any other judgment. This gives the definition of truth and falsehood. The complex, it is to be remembered, is composed of single related things."¹

I wish to explain, by a comparison of judgments differently related to "the facts," why it appears to me that, in the first place, truth and falsehood depend on the cognitive system in another and more vital sense than is here admitted, and not on the mere presence or absence of a complex of entities corresponding to the judgment, and that, in the second place, the facts themselves, though they are real, are not real in the way here asserted, as bits of reality, immediately accessible to apprehension, and corresponding each to each with the terms of our commonplace judgments.

(1) Let us begin with Charles Reade's mediaeval physician, who, having a grudge against a reluctant patient, tried to have him arrested, laying an information that he intended to fly the country. But "his sincere desire and honest endeavour to perjure himself were baffled by a circumstance he had never foreseen nor indeed thought possible. He had spoken the truth. AND IN AN AFFIDAVIT." For the patient *had fled*.

Here the doctor told a lie, but in telling it, he spoke the truth; if, that is, we judge by correspondence with the facts. One might urge

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 173, 184, 169.

that his assertion, being contrary to his belief, was not a judgment at all, but a form of words intended to produce action in another. This I think is true.¹ But it does not seem to me to destroy the point of the instance. Why could a form of words, corresponding with the facts, be in his mouth nothing but a lie? Because it was contrary to his belief? But what does that mean? Belief is not a chance thing, sprung from nowhere. It means that it was contrary to the system of his knowledge as determined by his whole experience at the time.

(2) Take another case—the so-called true conclusion from one or more false premisses. Here again we have truth, if judged by mere correspondence with the hard fact. For example, on a local railway I know, the signals are down all Sunday. A stranger unaware of this practice might infer that a train is due. And it might well happen, three or four times in the day, that at the moment of speaking a train was in fact due. Judging by hard fact this judgment would be true. But would the man be right in his judgment? It is a point on which probably his companions might wrangle with him *ad nauseam*. He seems to have got a truth which he had no business to have got. If he had known a little more—possessed a little more truth—he would not have got it. And the truth, as he possesses it, is felt to be unsatisfactory, and half or more a falsehood, because its dependence is wrong; that is, it is judged, as a truth, in part at least, by the system of judgment with which it is connected. And more than this; it is infected, in its own nature, by the faults of this system. Its logical stability is highly incomplete; it would be upset by a second trial ten minutes later, or by a most trifling bit of additional knowledge. But logical stability—incapability of being confronted with a contradictory experience—is, we shall see, the very core of truth.

In the closer tissue of a science, this defect amounts more obviously to actual falsehood. The “true” conclusion participates so definitely in the character of the system from which it issues. Those theorists who held that agriculture is especially and peculiarly a desirable industry held, in this view, I suppose, what corresponded to an indubitable fact. But when they deduced it from the view that wealth is not genuinely produced in any other occupation, they connected it with grounds which destroyed its value, and made it a dangerous

¹ See *Logic*, vol. i. p. 36.

falsehood, by including in it an unjustified presumption against other forms of industry.

Strictly speaking, there is no reason for dropping the premisses in stating a conclusion. And if they, being false, are retained, the falsehood of the conclusion, though apart from this corresponding with facts, is exhibited on the face of it. Here again, it is obvious that the truth or falsehood of a judgment depends not merely on correspondence to a complex, but on the completeness and comprehensiveness of the system with which it is connected in the mind.¹ Its truth is threatened, we have seen, both if it is at variance with the system, and if this system fails to give true connections, *prima facie* outside the judgment directly in question.

(3) Now let us take the strongest instance in favour of non-dependence on the cognitive system. This, it appears to me, is to be found in the current knowledge of facts currently admitted, forming the stock-in-trade of daily life and conversation, and considered out of the context of science or of any critical analysis.² "Charles I. died on the scaffold." This judgment most people would describe pretty much in the language cited at the beginning of this section. It is true, they would say, because it corresponds to a complex of terms and their relation, which are or were facts or things. There is or was such a complex of things and such a relation between them, and therefore the judgment which expresses the mind's relation to it is a true judgment. What the facts are or were is taken as a matter of general agreement; it would be held pedantic to ask where we get at them, how we apprehend them, what precisely they are or were, what meaning the judgment actually carries with it. Our intellectual outfit for everyday use consists of "facts" postulated in this way—the normal furniture of our mind; what Plato called the world of opinion. We take the material hurriedly from authority and tradition; or from negligent perception interpreted by authority and tradition.³ We do

¹ You may say there is nothing in this but that one judgment about one complex is true, while another about a larger complex including the first is false. Yes, but what is shown is that correspondence to *its* complex is not enough to make the first judgment true.

² It is such facts, I suppose, which another school would consider to have received Social endorsement, and to be made true by answering their purpose.

³ Could even a scholar, for instance, as a rule, exhibit a convincing argument that the works ascribed to the ancient authors were really written at such times and by such persons as is commonly supposed?

not pursue their context. We do not fix their limits or analyse their detail. Thus we let them shrink and harden into isolated counters dealt with by our thought, worn and defaced by rapid and careless exchange. And it is of these current counters that our world of fact is constituted, which we take to be self-existent, independent of our minds, each fact independent of the others, related to them but unaffected by their relation, complexes which are the standard of truth to our judgment. If our judgment corresponds to facts as presented to us in these current counters in which we commonly believe, that is all we ask.

(4) Now I am not suggesting that these facts are not actual, and that the judgments which correspond to them are not true, in a sense sufficient for their purpose. My contention does not tend to making less of the facts, *e.g.* to reducing them to mere ideas, but to making more of them, *i.e.* to showing that as realities they cannot stop at the arbitrary point we have adopted. And, no doubt, it follows that the mind has had much more to do with them already and must have much more to do with them as they proceed. As they stand, they are a selection out of reality for everyday use, carelessly handed down or observed, clipped, worn, their interconnection neglected. But they do well enough as a standard for everyday truth, and our judgments, which we take to "correspond" with them, do well enough as every-day truth.

But, even within this world of what we conceive as correspondence to hard fact, we do acknowledge differences of truth, or, if this language is preferred, degrees of correspondence to fact, according to the furnishing of the mind. "Charles I. died on the scaffold," we commonly assume, is not so true in the mouth of a child who has just learned it by heart as in the mouth of a school-boy who knows something of the history and significance of the 17th century. And in neither's mouth is it so true as in that of a historical student to whom the 17th century is a familiar world and a living interest. It is not a thing which is true or false by touching or not touching.¹ From the first, it is an appreciation of elements in a system, and of their determination by the system,

¹ See Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1072 b. 21. *θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν.*

and is a matter of degree. Our ordinary estimate of truth fully admits this to be the case.

We have been urging so far that the system of the judging mind is an element in truth, and also, in the last paragraph, we come in sight of an inference affecting the actual things or facts which are taken as the standard.

(5) I will pass to an instance which clinches both these points.

When we come to consider the knowledge of any leading historical authority on the period of Charles I., we find two remarkable things.

① First, quite undoubtedly, and in all common usage, such a man's judgment "Charles I. died on the scaffold" is far truer than that of the child or the schoolboy or the ordinary conversationalist. This shows how much depends on the mental system of the judging mind.

② Secondly, when at this level we begin to look for the single standard of fact which we are accustomed to rely on, it is not to be found.¹ At first sight it is absorbed into the great historian's knowledge. For us, something picked out of that knowledge is the standard. Our "facts" as we used to call them, now show as little bits or threads of reality, which we or others for us have selected out of the huge web of the world as known by such an authority as this. Of course the facts have not turned into any one's mere mental system. But they seem essentially continuous with mental systems. We do not mean to deny that they—as much of them as is warranted on good authority—are real facts. What we are saying can only mean that he helps us to get at them. That is all very true: but then, when we get at them through his knowledge they are hardly recognisable for what they seemed when we were readily passing them from hand to hand among each other. Now we see that even in their discovery they are not single or

¹ Compare with this the difficulty which the layman often has in asking a question such as a scientific man can answer. To the layman a fact appears simple or single which to the expert is full of distinctions and reservations. The writer once procured a meteorological record of temperature with a view to its bearing on a stoppage in the building trade. But he found, of course, different readings of several instruments under different conditions, and could not tell, without further enquiry, which of the temperatures was important for his purpose. The "fact" vanishes as you come nearer, as a headland breaks up into an intricate outline of planes and edges as you approach it in a boat.

independent. They depend for being discovered and warranted on an enormous constructive work of criticism, starting from present experience, and continued through heaps and heaps of testimony and evidence, all of which is instrumental to that view of facts which will give the highest degree of coherence to the system so constructed.¹ Yes, but "the facts," it will be urged. All this is *getting at* "the facts"; but the facts were there all the same, however hard to get at; and when got at, by whatever means, can be and are the standard of truth. Well; but we must consider the point that the facts, as we currently refer to them, are not to be found simple of themselves, as we incline to imagine in our everyday exchange of them. They are not and cannot possibly be the working standard of first-grade thought. You may copy them in your judgment, when the historian has found them out for you. But the working standard, which determines them, is not themselves, but his immense critical construction. Accounts of eye-witnesses *e.g.* are nothing but material; and, as a rule, very contradictory material.

The facts, then, though bits of reality, are mediated to us by an immense mental construction, and are not really separable from this. They are not and cannot be as simple and isolated as the first-hand statement of truth.² We may select certain results and make them up into a standard for a certain level of truth, *e.g.* one good enough for examination purposes, and that different for different examinations. But that is simply an artificial extract.

That is one point. The facts, in history at any rate, are not simply there, so that they can act as a given standard, correspondence to which is truth. The primary working standard is critical system, or, what is the same thing, scientific investigation.

(6) But then there is another thing. When we get our facts, our results, what we take to be real, it is something much beyond what we were wont to take as facts. It is a commonplace that in science we get away from what is called fact.³ We may say

¹ Cf. Bradley's *Presuppositions of Critical History*, Parker, 1874.

² See for an example of what is involved in a simple measurement, if it is to be precise, *Knowledge and Reality*, 330-1.

³ See *Logic*, I. pp. 143 ff.

that our current counters were fact; but they were neither the whole fact, nor nothing but the fact. What is the full significance and implication of the death of Charles I.? And could we seriously say that a judgment about it is true in which its full significance and implication is ignored, more especially as on the other hand the picturesque and immediate aspect of the event is certainly not affirmed? The facts are not "in the end" isolated and independent. There is a stage when they seem so, but you cannot arrest them at that stage. As coherence with a system is the standard by which we establish facts, so the part they play in a system of reality, their influence and importance in a historical context which imply a further transformation, is the standard by which we judge their degree of reality, and therefore the degree of truthfulness of the judgments that affirm them. Ultimately, these two systems are one, the system of experience, a critical system which is always transforming the facts, as we know and rank them, towards a higher logical stability.

Of course these remarks contain nothing that is new.¹ But I hope they clearly explain my view about the relative places of correspondence and coherence in the meaning of truth, and about the alleged independence, both as regards mind and as regards each other, of the things or facts of the real world.

4. The standard of system or coherence is a standard applicable to discursive thought. It is the standard of truth, which itself does not pretend to be the perfect or all-inclusive experience.²

A judgment is true, as I understand the term, when or in as far as its self-maintenance as a judgment is perfect. That is, in other words, when the whole system of the judgments, which experience forces upon the mind which makes it, contains less contradiction in

¹The line of the discussion is closely akin to that of Plato's discussion of trueness and reality, which agree in the character of logical stability. See Companion to Plato's *Republic*, 479 ff., 509 ff.

²It is perhaps hardly necessary at this time of day to say that I have now in principle adopted Mr. Bradley's view of the relation of thought to Reality, with which the ideas of my early work, *Knowledge and Reality*, were more or less in conflict. I shall refer below to a reservation on this view which I still entertain, and which I think is consistent with my present attitude. The point is merely that there is more analogy between the work of thought and solid and complete reality than Mr. Bradley, treating thought as solely discursive, seems to allow.

case of its affirmation than in case of its denial. Such a judgment is "true," because, on the whole, it cannot be denied—not, that is, till there is a change, other than its denial, in the body of experience.

(i) Stated in this way, which appears to me to be the right way, the doctrine that truth consists in the self-maintenance of judgments, which again consists in their systematic coherence, does not seem to me to fail quite in the way which has recently been imputed to it.¹ Judgment professes to express the nature of the real so far as it can be uttered in a system of predicates and relations. It does not profess or suggest, so far as I can see, that the real is another system of predicates and relations, which that constituted by judgment pretends to reproduce or to resemble. Therefore its failure is one and decisive, simply consisting in the fact that it is not, like the higher experience which we suppose to be the sum and substance of all Reality, solid and immediate as well as perfectly individual and non-contradictory. It does profess to qualify Reality, to tell us about the nature of Reality; and in as far as it arranges content in a non-contradictory system it does so tell us and qualify Reality. It sets out the content of the real in a shape of special interconnection and emphasis, the definiteness and varied accentuation of which in the diverse worlds of knowledge constructed from different centres, obviously proffers a side of the whole without which the perfect experience would in certain respects fall short of perfection. In the dissociation of the perfect experience involved in finiteness, this side appears alone.²

But, so far as thought is discursive, it does not profess to furnish any appearance of Reality but its own, and if it is said to be "about" the "other" of thought,³ that involves no claim to represent the fuller experience in its own character. Reality is operative *in* truth. The nature of the latter's self-maintenance as tested by the principle of coherence, non-contradiction, or individuality (all of them expressions for the same character), leaves no doubt of that. But the claim to have Reality at work in it, subject to special conditions, involves no appeal to correspondence, though correspondence in a sense must result.⁴ And, in my view, the fallacy above signalised—a sort of *post*

¹ Joachim, *Nature of Truth*.

² That is, markedly distinct in character. No side of experience is ever really alone.

³ Joachim, pp. 170-2.

⁴ See above, p. 7.

hoc ergo propter hoc—is involved in the assertion that “current Logic, consciously or unconsciously, employs the nature of truth as correspondence, and if that notion is challenged throws the burden of justification on metaphysics.”¹

The failure or limitation of the coherence theory of truth lies then, I urge, simply in the fact that it is a theory, *i.e.* that judgment, to which it belongs, is an appearance of reality in relational form, doing its best to attain individuality in that form, which up to a certain point it achieves,² but which, because it is relational and points endlessly beyond itself for completion, it can never thoroughly attain. But it possesses, as we have suggested, merits of its own, clearness, special interconnection, emphasis, apart from which it is easy to divine that the ultimate Reality would lack an element.

(ii) Thus I suggest that the enquiry I am referring to leaves its own true track in emphasising the impossible demands of perfect coherence³ as an attribute or essential of perfect truth; instead of adhering throughout to the position that the perfection of truth is not within its own character, but must lie in a reality different in kind. The importance of this point is that in this way an imaginary perfect type of truth and coherence is set up, by their “approximation” to which actual truth and coherence are to be judged. The term approximation, I take it, involves the correspondence theory, to which accordingly at this point the enquiry harks back. Thus we lose the immanent standard, and with it the whole merit of the coherence theory. But reality in all its forms and phases can defend and maintain itself according to the principle of non-contradiction. It

¹Joachim, pp. 119-20. The suggestion seems to me quite fatal to a working Logic.

²I shall return to this question, in speaking of the reservation above alluded to.

³See pp. 170-2. “A theory of truth as coherence, if it is to be adequate, must be an intelligible account of the ultimate coherence in which the one significant whole is self revealed”; and just before, “any partial experience, *e.g.* human knowledge, is ‘true’ more or less, according as it exhibits a character more or less *approximating to* the complete coherence.” (My italics.) I suggest that the “ultimate or complete coherence” is not an intelligible expression. Coherence is the substitute, possible only in a system of predicates and relations, for the immediate unity, transcending mediateness, which we are compelled to ascribe to a perfect Reality. I repeat that the affinity of two exhibitions of a principle, or of two kindred principles, has nothing to do with correspondence in the technical sense, meaning correspondence of a copy with the original by which it is to be judged. The application of it in other senses as an explanation of truth involves the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. See above p. 7.

never depends for its relative logical stability upon approximation or correspondence to anything else.

(iii) And further I suggest that it is a confusion to use the conception that even truth is not quite true to suggest a recurrence to a correspondence theory.¹ The meaning of this conception is very simple when we once have grasped the point that no experience short of perfect reality is altogether itself. It is in that sense that even the truest truth, such as the coherence theory of truth, is not quite true; that is to say its fullest completeness lies in something, a more perfect form of experience, which is beyond itself; and we may call this, to emphasise the relation of transcendence, a truer truth.

But it is not truth in the form of truth, and there can be no question of truth in its own form possessing correspondence or approximation to its character. Truth stands on its own ground, as a fulfilment under its own conditions of the nature of reality; and it can be tested as truth under those conditions and under no others, and therefore, as we have seen, by itself only and by nothing else in the universe. There is no meaning in the suggestion that "the coherence-notion of truth *on its own admission* can never rise above the level of knowledge, which at the best attains to the truth of correspondence."

The coherence-doctrine is a theory, and so far is only truth. But coherence does not further and doubly fall short not merely by being only truth, but by resting its claim to be truth on imperfect correspondence. It rests its claim on the working of reality within it, and not on any correspondence that may result from this; and to get anything truer you would have to pass beyond truth into another form of reality. This may seem a needless subtlety; but it is important to avoid the implication that truth as such is something away and beyond, which the coherence-notion ought to correspond to, but does not quite succeed. If this is admitted we lose our immanent standard.

5. One reservation, it seems to me, must be made upon the doctrine

¹ *Ib.* p. 174. "Since all human discursive knowledge remains thought 'about' an Other, any and every theory of the nature of truth must itself be 'about' truth as its Other, *i.e.* the coherence-notion of truth *on its own admission* can never rise above the level of knowledge, which at the best attains to the 'truth' of correspondence. Assuming that the coherence-notion of truth is sound, no theory of truth as coherence can itself be completely true, etc." The "truth," which a theory is about, is not truth as such.

that thought is essentially discursive and relational. It points only to an anticipation of the fuller experience, and, as I am quite aware, not to an achievement of it. But it appears to me suggestive, and more than that, I cannot see my way out of it.

It is nothing more than the recognition that the worlds we severally live in, with the spatial world of each of us, have been fundamentally transformed and reconstructed by thought working in and on perception and general experience. They are now, as for example our spatial world with its full properties and qualities, worlds all different and peculiar, and yet solid and individual in an appreciable degree, possessing up to a point existence and quality in one. The interest is, that if this is so—and I cannot open my eyes without finding it so—we have created for ourselves by thought originally discursive, a new immediacy, a new “given,” a new basis of feeling and object-matter of simple apprehension. Nothing is more various, more relative, more progressive and personal, than the so-called simple apprehension of objects which we roughly postulate to be the same. For if we are to admit such a thing as “simple apprehension,” we must take it as purely relative. Its object is a phase of our experience and not a stratum of it.¹ Our worlds are all different, and yet all apparently solid, and clothed in inseparable contents, which nevertheless are of our own discrimination and attribution. And these are not, as a rule, taken as predicates. They are taken as belongings of the quasi-subjects, or rather quasi-substantive objects, although we can separate any of these contents and make them into predicates. The objects of our world which are thus admitted as concrete subjects are, of course, affirmed in the general judgment which sustains the everyday reality which we accept. But they are, as I said just now, not naturally subjects in the sense of dividing themselves according to an SP relation. The judgment which affirms them most naturally takes an impersonal or existential form.

When treated as subjects, they are not naturally taken as subjects of their nearest habitual predicates. These have qualified and clothed them, and are presupposed, not explicitly affirmed, in judgment. It is only in text books of Logic that we say “Man has two legs,” “The grass is green,” and the like. All this belongs in usage to the solid

¹ I hope to return to this point in a forthcoming second edition of my *Logic*.

starting-point, not to an SP judgment proper. But these starting-points, though relatively given, are really artificial, and in some degree different for every mind.

These relative data or quasi-individuals are indeed the so-called subjects which were to count¹ as a plurality of substances. But the interesting point about them is their relativity. Thought has made them, and as may be seen in any criticism of their solidity, can unmake them. And to speak more obviously, and without reference to abstruse speculation, we can see that it is always remaking them.

This is all I desired to point out ; that a quasi-real world, apparently solid and individual, is always being deposited as part of the work of thought. I draw no general conclusion but this, that thought which can thus deposit an apparent solid individual, is not so far removed from the nature of the fuller experience as an exclusive study of the discursive SP judgment tends to make us suppose. This was the side of thought which, *e.g.*, to Green seemed characteristic and important.² I do not in the least care to enter into a verbal controversy whether it is more properly called thinking or something else. But that our discursive judgment itself is always building up a world which its operation then presupposes—the world in which each of us lives, and takes it as actual—this, I do think, is an important part of its character and a striking analogy between it and ultimate reality.

6. One word more. This quasi-real world of our own making is always passing at its edges into the discursive SP process of science and synthetic judgment. And on this ground it may be objected to our view of coherence and correspondence, “But here you have a real and immediate world, actual in your experience, and your synthetic judgments are about it. Does not this mean that your truth is correspondence—the right representation of your relatively real and solid world?” And I answer, “Emphatically, no.” For our “given” solid immediate and real world, in which all these characters are merely apparent, is absolutely plastic,³ as is all immediate judgment and every object of simple apprehension. It is just as likely that it may have to yield to Science or Speculation as that they may have to yield to

¹ p. 22 above.

² Cf. Works, iii. 144-5.

³ *ib.* This is not plasticity of ultimate Reality, but may perhaps have been mistaken for it.

it. Nothing in the whole field is a fixture to which all other elements have to correspond. Nothing is certain except the necessity that the whole should be coherent.

The bearing of a view like this on the spirit both of Logic and of Science, and even, I would add, of Life,¹ is, as I think, obvious, but is not always noted. It suggests that the quest for reality and the standard of truth lie always in the line of further determination, and not in the line of subtraction or abstraction. I am convinced that the recurrence of realism, so far as it is more than a wholesome insistence on the place of externality in experience, is connected with a pessimistic and reactionary temper² which is widely influential to-day. The longing to retire, as it were, upon the security of a hard and given fact-nucleus, involves at bottom a shrinking from the strenuousness belonging to our share in the self-maintenance of a reality conceived as the whole. In continuing the present argument elsewhere I shall insist on this "arduousness of reality"; and shall endeavour further to point out that the reassertion of realism, while valuable as against mere psychicalism, is undoubtedly destined to reverse itself by fastening upon "things" and "matter" a continuity with mind as definite as anything held by Hegel, and much better supported.

¹ It would be easy to point the moral from political phenomena, but it would be out of place in a logical essay.

² Then can it belong to the "flowing tide" (p. 15)? Why, yes. The demand for immediacy is always on one side pessimistic and reactionary.

THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES AND PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

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Printed at the University Press by
ROBERT MACLEHOSE & CO. LTD.

1911

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IT is almost a truism to say that the present time is one of religious perplexity and unrest. The critical study of documents, and the enquiry into historical origins, which were so vigorously pursued during the greater part of last century, have undermined many traditional beliefs. Other beliefs they have placed for us in a fresh setting and under a new light, and so have materially altered their significance. Even the 'plain man' whom it is usual to invoke, the man without theological or philosophical culture, is more or less aware that the religious outlook is changing. He knows that often where aforetime men of knowledge walked with confidence they now move with hesitating and uncertain steps. Referring to this sense of perplexity in theological matters, Eucken has suggestively indicated its far-reaching character: "At the present day faith, which was to relieve man of all doubts, has itself become an object of doubt."¹ Another thinker, in a recent work, has put it on record that, in his view, "Nothing short of a complete revision of current theological ideas...can bring permanent satisfaction to our highly reflective age."² Meanwhile the embarrassing feature in the present situation is, that the constructive principles on which the work of revision is to be carried out are not clear and universally accepted. Consequently there is no general agreement on the nature and the amount of change which are necessary. Both in the social and theological world the present discontent is much more patent than the new and better order which is to replace the existing system.

¹ *The Life of the Spirit*, Eng. Trans., 1909, p. 302.

² Watson, *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, 1907 (Preface).

The sense of dissatisfaction with the theology of the Churches is experienced keenly by those who approach the study of Theology from the side of Philosophy. In Scotland this is the recognised method of procedure for those looking forward to the service of the Church. Since the Reformation our Scottish universities have included a regularly organised Faculty of Theology, while Philosophy has formed an important part of the Arts curriculum. And it may not be out of place to say here that the University of St. Andrews has had the privilege of possessing distinguished teachers in both departments. To mention only those who are no longer with us, one recalls the names of Ferrier, Tulloch, and Flint, men honourably distinguished in Scotland and beyond it for the work they have done. Yet I doubt not the eminent teachers of the past were conscious of the difficulty whose pressure is now felt more acutely. The difficulty, put briefly, is this: philosophical teaching in our Scottish universities is now free and unhampered by tests of any kind, while theological teaching is still fettered by a Confessional system which is no longer in harmony with the enlightened culture of this age. The intelligent student who has passed from the class of Metaphysics to Dogmatic Theology feels the change of attitude and method, and realises he is now pursuing a study under awkward limitations.

Of course there are historical grounds for the existence of this situation, and there are reasons of expediency why it should continue. And a sort of *modus vivendi* can be found in the treatment of Dogmatics from a purely historical standpoint. But obviously this is no final solution of the question. The problem must ultimately be decided in one of two ways. Theology may cease to be a Faculty within the universities—the course, I believe, which has been followed in Holland. For many reasons this seems to be undesirable. Or tests may be removed, and theological studies pursued under the same conditions that obtain in the other Faculties of our Scottish universities. On the whole this seems far the better way, the way most in harmony with the idea of a university as a centre of liberal culture and progressive thought. I venture to add that one advantage of a solution on these lines would be, that it would make possible a more sympathetic and fruitful relation of theological and philosophical teaching than obtains at present. The same temper and method

would prevail in both departments ; and Dogmatic Theology, instead of confining itself to a historical survey, would develop to meet the needs of the time by becoming a religious philosophy.

My object in this paper is to indicate the meaning and function of theological doctrines ; then to consider how they come into contact with philosophical thinking, and to what extent they may be legitimately influenced by it. I will begin by viewing the problem from the standpoint of historical development.

All religion, to put it broadly, is an effort on man's part to link himself to an invisible Power or Powers, and thus to find satisfaction for his needs. The psychological condition of religion is human weakness and incompleteness, which imply the constant recurrence of wants and desires for goods. As these needs evolve from the natural to the spiritual, so does the character of the religious relation undergo change. From the first religion is an expression of the whole man, and involves the presence of all the psychical elements: feeling, willing, and thinking. But at the early stages of religious development the cognitive elements remain very much in the background ; they function at first only in instinctive beliefs, and afterwards in imaginative representations. Growth in culture, however, means growth in self-consciousness, and by way of myth and cosmogony man has passed to the conscious articulation of his religious beliefs in theological doctrines. Theology is not an accidental product : it has a determinate place and office in the logic of religious development. Every living religion which reaches a certain stage of growth will expand into doctrines, just as a tree arrives at a point when it puts forth branches. Theology is the answer to the demand of the developing religious consciousness for an explanation of the acts which are done in the cultus. Around the cultus, which is a relatively stable centre, doctrines gather, and embody the meaning man reads into his religious service. At a more advanced stage of social evolution, when religion interacts with science and philosophy, the task of the theologian takes a wider scope and a deeper meaning. Theology broadens into a world-view resting on religious postulates, while its doctrines are systematised so as to express in a connected way the general meaning of religious experience.

In the present paper the writer has exclusively in view the theology of the Christian Church, for this is the only system of theology which has a vital interest for the western mind. Christian doctrines had their source in those spiritual experiences which gathered round the life and the teaching of Jesus. They were primarily designed to set forth the cognitive aspect of these experiences, in other words, to express the convictions which were involved in Christian piety. But Christianity was from the first an expansive and missionary religion, and for practical purposes its content required to be stated in a communicable and a generally intelligible form. So dogmas were framed to be the objective expression of the faith of the Christian Society and the embodiment of its value-judgments. The rise and spread of heresies impelled the Church of the first four centuries to articulate with growing fulness a system of dogma for which the claim of authority and catholicity was made. *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus credendum est* became the note of Catholic doctrine. The intellectual aspect of faith was more and more accentuated, and the inner side of faith-experience was relatively neglected in consequence. The logical outcome of this tendency was seen in the Mediaeval Church's conception of dogma as forming an absolutely authoritative system, which thought might interpret and explain, but must by no means alter or discard. The motto of Scholastic Theology was *fides quaerens intellectum*, but the intellect was denied the right of questioning or criticising the content of faith. This dualism between the form and matter of thought made fruitful interaction impossible, and the later schoolmen were provoked to find a way out of this *impasse* by throwing out the theory of the 'double truth.' In fact, the whole Scholastic system had become so formal and artificial that it was doomed to fade before the light of fresh experience and knowledge. The Reformation signalised the deliverance of philosophy from bondage to the dogmas of the Church, and, at the same time, it recalled men's minds to the truth that religious doctrines must stand in some vital relation to Christian experience. Faith, for instance, with Luther is no longer an act of assent to the Church's creed: it is an inward and a soul renewing experience. And while it is true to say that the Reformers did not break with the principle of authority, but transferred the centre of authority from the Church to Scripture, it is also im-

portant to remember that they no longer claimed the old infallibility for religious doctrines. To them dogma was only a conditionally valid expression of the Church's knowledge of truth, and it was not exempted from correction and modification.¹ At the same time it is impossible to deny that the theology of the Reformed Churches was based on views of Scripture and its interpretation which, in the light of modern knowledge, it has become difficult to defend. And one has to admit that modern liberal theologians, under pressure from the scientific and philosophical culture of the age, would recast the Reformed Confessions in ways to which the Reformers themselves would never have consented. But if the situation is a perplexing one for the Reformed Churches, it is still more difficult for the Church of Rome. The claim of absolute truth made for the creed of that Church can only be upheld at the cost of ignoring the best fruits of modern scientific and philosophic thought. And though the Roman Catholic Church has a theory of development, the theory is not of a kind which admits of a vital relation between religious doctrines and the growing culture of the time. For development in this case is not organic: it does not allow of inward transformation. The Roman theory is technically known as 'preformation.' In the unalterable 'deposit of faith'—to use the phrase of Newman—which was entrusted to the Church at the beginning, all the features of the later growth were 'preformed'; and future progress could only be on the lines of further definition and explication of what was contained in the original matter. Under these stereotyped conditions a real reconstruction of ecclesiastical dogmas, such as would bring them into harmony with modern knowledge, is impossible. During recent years this truth has received striking recognition within the Roman Catholic Church, and it has produced the important movement termed Modernism. The demand of Modernism, as expressed by its prophets, is for a living instead of an artificial conception of development. To quote the late Father Tyrrell: "A bold contention that all ecclesiastical development is simply a mechanical unpacking of what was given in a tight parcel

¹ So in the Formula of Concord: *Symbola non obtinent auctoritatem judicis, haec enim dignitas solis sacris literis debetur.* And Luther, in connexion with the Articles of Visitation, says: *Wiewohl wir Solches nicht als strenge Gebote können lassen ausgehen, auf dass wir nicht neue päpstliche Dekretalen aufwerfen, sondern als eine Historie, dazu als ein Zeugniß und Bekentniß unseres Glaubens.*

6 THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES AND

2000 years ago"! In contrast to this he pleads for Modernism as "An expression of an opposite contention, of a belief in time, in growth, in vital and creative evolution." The proclamation of this principle coming from within a Church whose motto is *semper eadem*, is significant indeed.

The problem which presses in different degrees on Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians, is that of harmonising the world-view expressed in the ecclesiastical creeds with that which is the common property of modern cultivated minds. The trouble largely arises from the fact that religious doctrines have grown up in a pre-scientific age, and under the influence of philosophical conceptions which have lost their old authority. The doctrines themselves, nevertheless, have an authority derived from tradition and sentiment, and this makes it difficult to mould them freely to suit the needs of the time. So far as religion is matter of pious feeling, of practical life based on trust in a Higher Power, it may be fairly urged that it does not come into conflict with scientific thinking. But in so far as theology sets forth doctrines about the creation of the world, the origin of man, and miraculous interferences with the natural order, and in so far as it inculcates a particular theory concerning the composition of historical documents, it occupies ground where it is open to challenge from science. It is just on these points that there has been keen dispute—dispute growing out of the fact that either side has made demands which the other has refused to concede. If we look, however, beyond the immediate points at issue to the motives which are at work, we can see that the strife is the outcome of two sharply contrasted tendencies. Science is bent on establishing everywhere the presence of order and necessary connexion within the experienced world: religion is primarily concerned with a transcendent and spiritual world by reference to which it appreciates the facts of the natural world. Differing methods and diverging purposes have led to misunderstanding. So it has seemed that the antagonism between the scientific and the theological point of view might be obviated by a proper delimitation of spheres. On the one side let science keep to its own work, and forbear to question the reality of those spiritual experiences of which dogma is the intellectual expression: on the other side let theology pursue its spiritual task and cease to advance

doctrines which are inconsistent with the scientific knowledge of the time. Since the days of Kant this way of reconciling the claims of religious doctrine and scientific knowledge has commended itself to many, and in appearance it seems to do justice to the rights of both. But a closer inspection discloses difficulties. The rigid separation of the two spheres is not possible, for religion demands, and cannot help demanding, that even the facts of the natural world be construed from a spiritual and teleological standpoint. Natural science, again, when it strictly insists that the principles of mechanical connexion and causal explanation are sufficient, leaves no room for the teleological interpretation of nature which religion postulates. Concord is not to be expected under the circumstances. The mind desiring to find its own unity in the experienced world is urged beyond the departmental solution towards a coherent world-view in which both science and religion have a place. In fact, the attempt to delimit two spheres involves a movement of the mind beyond them to a comprehensive standpoint. The synoptic mind, the mind which thinks things together, must in some sense pass beyond the spheres which it endeavours to distinguish and relate. Such a point of view is that of the ultimate science, or philosophy, which seeks to organise all the elements of human experience into a coherent and consistent whole. And since religion claims to give a view of the world as a totality, it is inevitable that its doctrines should come into intimate relation with philosophy, which exercises the same comprehensive outlook. Except in some special cases where theology has transgressed into the domain of science, the differences between them cannot be settled from a purely scientific standpoint. The final adjustment must be between theology and philosophy, where the relationship is more intimate and far-reaching.

What, then, is the kind of relation which should subsist between theology and philosophy? During last century two interesting and influential efforts were made to settle this question. These efforts were associated with the work of Hegel and of Ritschl, and in spirit and issues they were strongly contrasted. It will prepare the way for a fresh discussion of the problem if I examine briefly the Hegelian and Ritschlian solutions.

The assumption which underlay the Hegelian system was, that

speculative thought was able to grasp the organic unity of things, and to exhibit all stages of experience as moments in the development of the Idea. There went with this assumption the claim that philosophic thinking, in the light of its supreme principle, could critically appreciate and determine the degree of truth in the different phases of experience. Religious doctrines, regarded as the expression of spiritual experience, when tested by this speculative theory, were found to contain the truth only in the form of figurative thinking or imaginative representation (*Vorstellung*). Hence they required to be critically purified ere they could be raised to the form of philosophic truth (*Begriff*). Much of the German speculative theology in the middle of last century was governed by this principle, and in the work of men like Vatke and his disciple Biedermann it bore interesting fruit. The defects of the method flowed from its initial assumption, that thought could rise to an absolute point of view and evaluate all experience by a single Supreme Principle. Hegelian theologians tended to ignore the question of what experience lay behind Christian doctrines: they often arbitrarily transformed doctrines in order to raise them to the level of philosophic thought, and they did not sufficiently consider whether spiritual values were not lost in the process of transformation. Still, the dangers inherent in this method should not blind us to the element of truth which it contained. It is quite correct that there is a blending of imagination and thought in the theology of the churches. Figures and analogies are used which a little reflexion shows cannot be strictly and literally true, although they are useful and even legitimate for practical purposes. For example, theological doctrine represents the Supreme Spirit as a Father, construes the Atonement in terms of forensic law, and depicts the final apportionment of rewards and punishments under the image of a Day of Judgment. It must, I think, be granted that such images cannot be literally and exactly true: and we may recognise this, while at the same time we confess that it is not possible for us to formulate the thought-content of such dogmas in a precise and logical form. Moreover, in a practical regard it is easy to see that a figure or an analogy may be the best centre and support of religious emotion and sentiment. Many to whom the image appeals would find no help in the pure thought. The element

of right in the theory before us may, I believe, be put thus. Philosophy, the attempt to think out coherently the meaning of the world, enables us to see the defects of partial and figurative statements in theology and elsewhere; and this may hold good even when we are not able to translate a dogma into a philosophic truth. Philosophy, where it cannot teach us how to reconstruct a dogma, may teach us to use it as a symbol; and in future the symbolic aspect of religious doctrines is likely to receive fuller recognition. A frank acceptance of the principle of symbolism, when exact dogmatic formulation is impossible, would at least diminish the discord between some of the dogmas of the churches and philosophical thought: it would make possible a better working relation between theology and philosophy. At all events this may be expected, provided that philosophy will recognise that symbols may be legitimate in their own sphere and have an objective reference. But if you treat the symbol as merely the figurative expression of a faith-state whose value is purely subjective, you do injustice to the truth-claim put forward by the religious consciousness. Lotze has some suggestive remarks on the symbolical use of dogma. "Religious truth is valid for all alike. On the contrary, the theoretical expressions which are found for it are all of them inadequate. And just for this reason it is legitimate to agree on a mode of formulation to which each one may give the theoretical interpretation by which he thinks he can best grasp the inmost meaning." A few lines further on he adds: "It is not the concern of religion to find a theoretical expression free from objection for what is transcendent. The point rather is that we have figurative expressions to which the mind can attach the same feelings as are due to the real content."¹

The influence of the great movement of speculative thought which culminated in Hegel gradually exhausted itself in Germany. The free handling of religious doctrines in order to elevate them to the philosophic form naturally provoked a reaction. The cry arose for a return from the shadowy realm of speculative concepts to the facts of experience and history. The most noteworthy and influential exponent of this reaction in the domain of theology was Albrecht Ritschl. The Ritschlian theology is historical and experimental, and is

¹ *Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 91.

definitely opposed to the intrusion of metaphysics into the sphere of religion. The historical Christian consciousness, it is urged, is an independent fact which rests on the revelation of God in Christ, and carries its own witness in itself. If we interrogate that consciousness, we find that the beliefs which it involves are essentially judgments of value. That Christ is the Son of God, for instance, is not to be taken in the sense of an eternal and metaphysical relationship, but as an expression of the worth of Christ for the souls of Christian people. Hence Ritschl would purge religious doctrines of those metaphysical ideas, which originally found their way into the creeds of the ancient Church through the influence of Greek philosophy. Christian theology must be cleansed from such alien elements, and become the embodiment of those living values which are at the root of Christian faith and life. This anti-metaphysical attitude is illustrated by the remark of a prominent disciple of the Ritschlian school (Herrmann): "The Metaphysics which seeks to cognise the common ground of the ethical and natural world is not only immoral but irreligious."¹ And this hostility to metaphysics is a note of the Ritschlian School as a whole.

The Ritschlian theology has substantial merits, although at many points it differs decidedly from the traditional theology. Into its merits or demerits, however, it is not my purpose to enter just now. I shall confine myself to asking how far the Ritschlian denial of the right of philosophical thought to influence religious doctrines is the solution of the problem of this paper.²

† It is evident, at the outset, that the Ritschlian theory involves a drastic separation of spheres within experience which raises serious difficulties. The scientific sphere, where strict causal explanations and mechanical connexions rule, is opposed to a sphere of freedom ruled by teleological ideas and spiritual values. I have already

¹ Ritschl's own attitude was hardly so extreme. He was in the end inclined to admit that theoretical thought might at least attempt the solution of the problem in question, provided it set out from the Christian idea of God as scientifically valid.

² The affinity of Pragmatism, with its theory that truths are values, to Ritschlianism has been frequently noted. But I have not deemed it necessary to say anything about Pragmatism at this point; for Pragmatism is not in itself anti-metaphysical, though it rejects an Absolutist metaphysics. Nor have I referred to Eucken's Activism; for, so far as I can see, Eucken would not quarrel with the theory that speculative thought must translate theological doctrines into a philosophical form.

referred to the objections which may be urged against this arbitrary division of the harmonious kingdom of human experience into rival states governed by diverse laws. The perplexing point is how things cleft asunder in theory can work together in practice. Judgments of value are set against judgments of fact, and how they come to be connected and unified is not apparent. For they blend in experience, and what is fact in one aspect, in another aspect is value. Are we to suppose, then, that the world of mechanically related things stands over against a world of spiritual ends and values, and that any speculative solution of the difference is impossible? If spiritual ends are realised in the natural world, and if the natural world subserves the achievement of spiritual ends, surely the attempt to think out the implications of the fact is not a forbidden quest but a reasonable obligation. In the long run the contrast can only be relative, for it is the same human spirit which is active in the fields of science and in the domains of moral action and religious service: and what falls within the unity of the mind cannot be parted in the nature of things. If the theologian persists in the rigid separation of the two provinces, he may be driven to admit that religion is justified in postulating what science is within its rights in rejecting. Miracle, it might be said, ought to be postulated from the point of view of religious value, but denied from the point of view of causal connexion. Such dilemmas can only be met by a philosophy which seeks a ground and principle of coherence between the natural and spiritual realms.

✕ There is undoubtedly a difference between the religious and the philosophical standpoints, but Ritschlianism has exaggerated this difference into an antagonism. In religion it is the personal interest which is dominant, while in philosophy it is the theoretical interest which prevails. The former develops its world-view mainly in response to emotional and practical needs. The latter is chiefly prompted by the desire to know and understand; though it is well also to keep in mind that the personal interest is present in speculative thinking, and the theoretical interest is not absent from the religious attitude. In both cases we have a world-view, though seen from different standpoints: in the one instance the standpoint of rationality, in the other that of value. For theological doctrines, it may be remembered, are the expressions of historic values. They set forth

the truths men of the past reckoned of most worth, the truths which it seemed to them give meaning to their lives ; and those who accept them now claim that they fulfil the same function in their experience. Now in trying to justify our conviction that speculative reflexion ought to influence religious doctrines, I think our object will be furthered by examining the conception of value, and that especially in its relation to fact and to truth. If it turns out that it is impossible to treat value in abstraction from these other notions, the result will greatly strengthen our theory that religious values must be brought into coherent relations with philosophical thought. The main principle of the Ritschlian theology will be shown to be defective.

The value-judgments of Ethics and of Religion, it need hardly be said, are not arbitrary products : they have grown gradually out of the historic life. The evolution of spiritual values has proceeded *pari passu* with that evolution of spiritual needs which marks the development of persons interacting within a social system. Every judgment of value, however, must have its ground ; and this ground is psychical, that is to say a state of the individual consciousness. Value-judgments, in other words, refer back to value-feelings as their psychological source and condition. We cannot merge value in the act of valuing, for there must first be something to value. At the same time a value-feeling can only develop into clear consciousness, and receive general statement, when it is explicated in the judgment : value-feelings must specify themselves in the judgment ere they can become working-values and function as ends for human wills. A value-feeling when thus defined becomes *eo ipso* an object of desire, for in its very nature it is a desirable state of consciousness. What on a lower level was mere conative tendency towards satisfying experiences, for the developed consciousness becomes an act of will which has for its object an idea of value represented as an end. In the psychological order of progress the end becomes an end for the will because it was first recognised as a value ; the psychological process is unintelligible on the opposite hypothesis.¹ As the social order evolves human ends become varied, and the necessity arises for introducing some sort of order and system into them, so that individual purposes may be made consistent and the social life harmonious. This can only be accomplished by some

¹ A point which has been emphasised by Höffding. *Vid.* his *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 11.

method of graduating values, and graduation in turn implies a general standard of value which can be applied to different ends. The standard must be an end or value conceived as ultimate, a standard by reference to which all lesser ends can be evaluated and systematisation can ensue. As a step to the Supreme End every other end becomes a means, while the lesser ends in turn have means which promote their attainment. The system thus takes form as a graduated whole of ends and means, of direct and indirect, or instrumental, values,—a system which gives meaning and interest to human life. It is within such a developing system that ethical laws, or norms of the will, are gradually defined and receive social recognition. They are not *a priori* principles, unconditionally valid, as Kant imagined, but generalised rules for the will, and their function is to guide men towards the end. They share the plastic character of the growing organism of society, and instead of determining the end they are determined by it. From value to end, and from end to norm, this seems to be the psychological order of progress.

At this point a question arises which demands careful consideration. Does the whole meaning of value-feelings and value-judgments lie in the fact that they are states or acts of consciousness? To put it in a slightly different form, do all the implications of value fall within valuing subjects? Certainly when we speak of the evolution of ethical or spiritual values, we can only find the active centre and source of that process in the developing consciousness of persons. Yet it seems impossible to hold that the whole content of our ideas of value can be derived from the side of the subject. We constantly speak of facts or things, conceived as independent of us, possessing value. Especially in the case of indirect or instrumental values, we refer to them as objects embodying values which we do not make, but discover and turn to profit. No doubt closer analysis shows this is not strictly correct, for the value of the means certainly depends on the purpose we have in view, and what has high worth for one person may be useless in the hands of another. Yet the subject cannot arbitrarily confer a value on any object whatsoever. Not every fact can be a means; the intrinsic character counts also. The value of a picture lies in the aesthetic feeling it can evoke in the spectator. But this feeling does not depend merely on the presence of the artistic temperament

in the observer : it depends also on something in the picture which the mind finds and which it does not create. German writers usually designate those objects which have power to elicit value-judgments, *goods*, and distinguish the doctrine of *goods* from the doctrine of *values*. The distinction corresponds to the two aspects of value, according as we see it from the subjective and from the objective side. The need of the distinction is brought home to us by the breakdown of every serious endeavour to make clear how the manifold content of our value-judgments can spring from conditions within the valuing subject. The reference to the subject is essential, we have already granted ; but the subject, as a centre of value, only develops through interaction with a world of objects. It has been truly remarked that value-feelings and judgments could not arise apart from the stimulus of objectively given facts.¹ The world of goods, therefore, contained in any developed social system is the outcome of interaction between man and his environment, and expresses that aspect of facts in virtue of which they function as values for human wills. The system of goods thus grows out of the commerce of subjects with objects, and points to some intrinsic relation between the realm of values and the realm of existences. This relation is not reducible to a strict identity ; for, if facts are values, the fact is not exhausted by its value-aspect. In the last resort the development of spiritual ends or values must be conditioned by the principles and potencies of that larger world of reality within which they develop and to which they refer.

The conclusion reached in this branch of our enquiry would seem to be, that we can, up to a point, work satisfactorily with the conception of value in Ethics or Theology. We do so by treating as irrelevant to our purpose the deeper issues raised by our use of the category. Ethics in its normative function may draw out the rules of conduct which conduce to the realisation of the Good : Theology likewise can elaborate doctrines whose aim is to define the way which the religious spirit must traverse to attain the higher values. But in either case it is necessary to make postulates which are demands on the real world, and the validity of these demands requires to be explained and defended. For if you claim that Reality is such that it coheres with

¹ Wundt, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, p. 35.

and responds to the claims of value, you are surely bound to try to justify the claim. And this is only possible by passing to the higher standpoint of philosophy and striving to think out the connexion of the worlds of fact and value. I shall not attempt now to discuss the lines on which such an enterprise should proceed. But it is not going too far to say that an important use must be made of the teleological idea. Valuing subjects and valued objects must be inwardly adapted the one to the other,—they must be brought into an organic relation by an end immanent in both. The organised value-judgments of human society are not possible save on the assumption of systematic coherence between the elements out of which they are developed. The universe must be an orderly and coherent whole in order that this development should take place within it. In an earlier part of this paper I pointed out that the category of end was psychologically posterior to that of value. But what is *ὑστέρον γενέσει* may be *πρότερον φύσει*, and this appears to be true in the case of the category of end. For the psychological working of the notion of value presupposes that the contents of inner and outer experience are co-ordinated and connected by some teleological principle. The psychological process from values to ends is the order of genesis : in the order of reality the idea of end is involved in the inner connexion of facts and values. The ultimate Ground or Source of things, one would say, must be teleological in its activity. Plainly, therefore, the speculative enquiry into the nature and working of this Ground has an intimate bearing on the spiritual values, and on the doctrines in which they have received historic expression.

It will make our position still clearer if we examine with some care the closely connected problem of the relation of truth to value. Both conceptions are of the first importance in the working of religion, and it is a normal feature of the religious mind that it postulates, not only value, but truth for its doctrines. Here again it is possible to say that, just as facts are values, truths are values ; and there is a sense in which both statements are correct. It is the case that fact and truth alike have a value aspect, but fact, we saw already, could not be merged in value ; and it is the same with truth. But, it may be replied, though faith lays claim to knowledge, though it expresses the conviction that religious doctrines are true, in so doing it does not mean to assert more

than that these doctrines have proved practically valuable to religious people. And observe, it will be urged, in putting forward this contention we are not affirming that truth is a purely subjective and individual satisfaction. To validate its claim to truth a proposition has to show itself a normal working-value, and to justify itself before the larger tribunal of historical and social experience. Now there are cases where this argument is not without force, as I will try to explain later. But, when all is said, there is something more in the faith-attitude than seems to be recognised here. Faith has its cognitive aspect, and like every cognitive act it contains a reference to a reality beyond what is given in the act of judging. In claiming truth for a religious belief, we affirm something more than that the consequences of believing it are and have been practically valuable. This something more appears to be the fact that our belief harmonises with an independent order or structure of reality,—a reality which enters into human consciousness and is in turn affected by it, but which has also a nature of its own. This reference to reality is clearly an implication of religious belief in God, for instance. We say that such a belief is true, not primarily because it works, though this may be valuable as a confirmation, but because our belief refers to a real Being related to us and yet possessing an existence beyond us. The validity of this transsubjective reference is essential to faith: once persuade men that the truth of their religious convictions is nothing more than the reactionary effects of these on their lives, and their faith would wither away.

Do you then, it may be asked, entirely reject the pragmatic conception of truth, and deny it any religious significance? By no means. Working-value is a test of truth, not however the sole test, not the exclusive test. The pragmatic theory that truths are values, validated by working, is often an important ground of religious assurance, and sometimes it may not be possible to assign any other ground. Take for instance the Christian belief, that the spirit of God works in man's working while he strives to do the divine will. It is hardly possible to hold that this claim to truth could be verified by us in any other way than that of spiritual experience and practical results. Any form of 'rational proof' would fall far short of yielding a conclusion of the kind; and the individual who has the verification

given in life experience neither asks nor desires any such 'proof.'¹ And it cannot be doubted that, in an age when the older apologetic methods are losing their force, the pragmatic theory of working-value is destined to prove a genuine support to religious beliefs which are really vital. The pragmatic test selects and sets in relief those theological doctrines which are central,—which have an intimate bearing on religious life. On the whole we may frankly admit that the writings of James and Schiller have done good service in calling attention to the humanistic aspect of truth, and in challenging the old notion of transcendent truths, existing somewhere in the beyond, and waiting to be recognised. Truth cannot be treated in abstraction from error, and it does not exist as such outside the form of judgment. Nevertheless it is not likely that either philosophy or religion will, in the long run, agree that in translating truths into values we thereby exhaust the implications of truth; and the principle of working-value is made effective by the fact that we qualify value by a reference to conditions beyond itself which are implied in the term 'working.' The process of selecting truths from truth-claims by applying the test of working-value cannot depend merely on the subject that verifies; it must also depend on the real context or system within which the value works. For that system goes to test the working. It is just in dealing with this objective reference that the exponents of Pragmatism are least satisfying. Dr. Schiller, for example, says: "The pragmatic theory of knowledge does not start with any antithesis of 'truth' and 'fact' but conceives of reality as something which, for our knowledge at least, grows up in the making of truth." He adds: "Initial reality would be *sheer potentiality*, the mere $\nu\lambda\eta$ of what was destined to develop into true reality."² The objection to this view is that, if the $\nu\lambda\eta$ is to have a meaning and function, it must possess a nature of its own and will only accept postulates of the subject which harmonise with that nature. If you deny it a nature it becomes a nonentity, and you are committed to the impossible task of showing how the mind builds up the fabric of knowledge out of nothing.

The point for which we are contending is recognised in the theory

¹ Compare with this the thought of Augustine: *Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas* (*De Vera Religione*).

² *Studies in Humanism*, pp. 425 and 433.

of truth as *correspondence*. But that theory suffers from a twofold defect. On the one hand it is not universally applicable, and, on the other hand, when it is applicable it is often stated in a way which can easily be refuted. In regard to the first point, there is a multitude of scientific and historical judgments where the notion of 'corresponding' to something is unworkable. If I say "The ultimate constituents of matter are electrons," or "Tell is a mythical personage," the only way to test either assertion is to show that it fits into a coherent body of judgments which we are in some sense able to verify. Neither proposition admits of being tested by a simple reference to a 'corresponding' fact. Even in the case of perceptive judgments the correspondence theory needs restatement if it is not to collapse under criticism. Thus, if you say that a judgment is true when an idea in the mind corresponds to an object which is independently given, the answer at once follows that, since the mind verifies the correspondence, both object and idea must be embraced and sustained by the activity of the mind. The distinction of corresponding elements falls within consciousness: it cannot be distinction between consciousness and an extra-mental reality. The object given in presentation is an ideal construction, and is not able to function as an independent norm. It is only possible to indicate very briefly here how this difficulty may be met. In judgments of this kind the test is not so much correspondence as adequacy of interpretation. In the object as mental content there is a reference to a reality which is transsubjective, the interaction of which with the subject is a condition of presented objects.¹ But presented objects may exist for consciousness with very different degrees of fulness, varying from mere awareness (*δυνάμει*) to developed interpretation (*ἐνεργείᾳ*); and in the transition from the one to the other lies the possibility of error. The tendency of mental belief, as Dr. Stout has pointed out, is to outrun the knowledge of the data, and so it may draw conclusions which will not harmonise with the facts when they are fully known.² I see a man coming towards me and I pronounce it to be Smith: on nearer approach I recognise it to be Brown. Had I simply said in the first instance, "That is a

¹ Meinong's Ueber Annahmen (ed. i.), p. 125 ff. contains suggestive remarks on the subject. A clear distinction is there drawn between *Gegenstand* and *Inhalt*.

² *Mind*, N.S. xvii. p. 23. In various ways I have profited from Dr. Stout's remarks.

man," my judgment would have been true. But my judgment outran the data cognised, and when these were explicitly presented I corrected my error. But in all cases of perceptive judgments the test of truth involves something more than the mental content and its arrangement. Whether a judgment is true or no depends on how far that content is an adequate and harmonious expression of the nature of a reality which is for itself as well as for the cognising subject. Such a test might be termed one of working-value, provided the implications of the term 'working' are duly acknowledged.

The idea of truth as internal coherence is valuable in complementing and supporting what, for convenience, may be termed the 'correspondence' notion. It will not work as an absolute and exclusive test just because reality is not exhausted by a coherent system of judgments. If *per impossibile* this were achieved, the conception of truth would have disappeared; for the very judgment that the absolute system was true would imply a reference of the system beyond itself. If, however, we do not urge the notion of coherence in this all-embracing sense, but treat it as signifying the development of a connected whole of judgments, starting from experienced data and if possible returning to them again, we fully admit the importance of such a method of proof. It affords a more comprehensive test of validity, and the support which each element has to give the others within the system makes the process of detecting error more sure and searching. The limitation of the method lies in the difficulty of being certain, that all the elements which are necessary to make the construction adequate to reality have been taken into account. Hence the importance of being able to show the system is verified by facts of experience which are immediately certain, or by preceptive judgments. The elaborate mathematical construction which deduced the existence of the planet Neptune from certain disturbances in the orbit of Uranus, and determined the position of the disturbing body, received an invaluable confirmation when Neptune was found by the telescope in the place indicated by Adams and Leverrier. The first astronomical calculations of the times of the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites were found to differ in varying degrees from the observed times. A fact had been ignored, because it was then unknown—the time light takes to travel. These illustrations prove how valuable it is for a connected

system of judgments to come back on some point of the experienced world for verification. Or take the case of a historical judgment such as 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon.' We test the truth of the proposition by showing that it fits into a coherent whole of historical judgments. But the system of judgments which relate to the Roman Empire and its destinies has a connexion with the existing world, which requires the Roman Empire to explain it. Even in this instance coherence has a point of support in the experienced world. But coherence by itself can never be an absolute test of truth, for internal completeness of system is not attainable. Any system of judgments we can think out will fall within the larger whole of reality; and to that larger whole it can never be fully adequate.

The result of the foregoing discussion may be thus summarised. The notions of truth and value alike contain a reference to a real order or system which the experient subject does not make. In the case of value this objective reference is implied in the idea of 'goods,' which represent facts as qualified by the valuations of the subject. But this qualification, of course, presupposes an intrinsic character in the thing qualified. Truth, again, exists in the form of judgment; if you go below or above that form the term 'true' ceases to have a meaning. The constant implication of truth is reference to a reality which the subject who judges accepts but does not create. The idea of truth signifies a harmonious and adequate relation of the content of ideas to transsubjective reality on the one side, and to the thinking and willing subject on the other. There cannot be a single and exclusive test of truth: different methods of verification must, so far as possible, be made to supplement and support one another.

If the foregoing line of thought is sound, certain conclusions follow which are of importance to our main subject. ✕ Theological doctrines, we have seen, claim to express values and to set forth truths. And in view of what has been said we think it impossible to treat these conceptions as terms which merely denote subjective satisfactions. In laying claim to truth we make a demand on reality, and in positing values to be realised we postulate that the nature of the real world is such that it admits of this realisation. For many religious people the assurance that these demands are met is, and will remain, a matter of faith; and if the rights of faith are questioned they fal

back on authority. The theologian too is often anxious to shun commerce with philosophy on the plea that his dogmas represent truths and values historically guaranteed. But the inherent difficulties and limitations of the purely historical method are very apparent to thoughtful minds: sooner or later they are urged to test by reflective thinking the postulates of religion. This means that we endeavour to bring the world-view which our religious doctrines express into harmonious relation with that deeper and more comprehensive thinking of experience we name philosophy. XPhilosophy stands for a more complete solution of the world-problem than the solution given by religion. For its aim is synoptic, and its task is to think out coherently the meaning of experience as a whole. The religious mind reaches its conception of the world by following out the implications of religious experience. For philosophy the development of the religious consciousness is a highly suggestive and important fact; nevertheless it is only one aspect of experience. There are other aspects that fall to be considered, and it is the business of philosophy from the first to think things together. Subject and object, thought and being, value and fact, these are the contrasted elements of reality whose inner connexion speculative thought seeks to explain by referring them to an ultimate Ground or unifying Principle. The aim of philosophy is system: it strives to show that experience is coherent throughout and satisfies the mind's desire for unity. While the world-view of religion is primarily the expression of faith, that of philosophy is developed by the exercise of reason or synthetic thinking. Hence the ideal of philosophy is systematic order,—the rational articulation of elements within a whole; and it cannot agree to treat anything as arbitrary or accidental. In a sense philosophy is only carrying out the principle of scientific explanation at a higher level and with a more comprehensive purpose. For the partial synthesis of science it tries to substitute a complete synthesis, in which each element has a determinate place and function in the organised totality. Were this purpose realised, a theological doctrine would have precisely that degree of validity which philosophy assigned to it: in a word; the truth of theology would be philosophy. It is abundantly clear, however, that no complete realisation of the ideal is possible. For one thing the process of experience itself whose

meaning we try to read is an unfinished process. And we survey the movement from a point within it: we cannot climb some mount of vision apart and see all reality *sub specie aeternitatis*. Moreover the philosophic thinker is constrained to accept immediate data of experience as his starting point, and he can never so carry out his work of construction as to come back on his data and give them their place and meaning in the fully articulated whole. The work of rationalisation is incomplete, and it can never be completed. The development of reason is an aspect of the development of the historic life; and, so long as the historic process continues, it will continue to set new problems to thought, and the task of reason will be unfinished. It is possible to go a step further, and to point out that the conception of rationality, taken by itself, is an abstraction which will not work. Reason always presupposes that there is something to rationalise, and its exercise is stimulated by the presence of materials calling for explanation. The reasoning process goes back to data which are the object of immediate conviction or faith, and however far we carry the work of rationalisation we always leave off with unrationalised elements on our hands. This non-rational residuum will not vanish, for experience is richer than thought, and thinking as judgment always refers beyond itself. Reason, in the personal life, is constantly qualified by the presence of conation and feeling, nor is it possible to reduce conation and feeling to reason, although there is no inherent contradiction between them. Rationality, we hold therefore, will ever signify an unfinished process for us,—a process which represents in its outcome our most connected, consistent and harmonious reading of our experience. Philosophy is thus partial in its achievement, and the ripest philosophy of an age is the measure of its insight into the meaning of the world. The toil of trying to think things together goes on because it is a permanent need of our nature: the mind is driven to seek the counterpart of its own unity in the world, and incoherency is a challenge to thought. Philosophy, though it never comes to its goal, is a salutary corrective to the departmental spirit, and it helps to free us from the tyranny of abstractions.

We have now come in view of a question of cardinal importance for our present enquiry. † Granted that the aim, scope and outcome of philosophy are such as here described, with what justice can

philosophical thought influence theological doctrines? Is its outlook wide enough, its insight deep enough, to constitute a claim to be heard which the theologian ought not to disregard? In order to answer this question let us ask how far the speculative thinker can cast light on those questions which, we have seen, are admittedly raised by the theologian without being solved. Broadly regarded the questions referred to are concerned with the relation of the ideal to the real aspect of experience. Spiritual values, as we have seen, are somehow connected with the world of facts through the idea of goods. And there is the claim of religious faith that the values of the personal life are true and harmonise with reality, and that spiritual ends are realised in the real world. The point at issue is not whether philosophical thinking can rationally solve the body of problems here involved: in our view no claim of the sort can be made good by philosophy. But the point is whether philosophy, in the form of metaphysics, is able to deal with these problems in a helpful way, and to carry them forward on the road towards a settlement. If it can do so, as we think it can, then, as the expression of man's rational activity, its results should be harmonised with the expression of man's religious faith: for faith and reason, however contrasted, are the reactions of the one human nature upon experience, and cannot be diametrically opposed.

When we survey the results of metaphysical thought, we find, of course, that it only gives a partial solution of these problems. The philosopher cannot rise to a First Principle of things, and then show deductively how this Principle comes to differentiate itself in the kingdoms of nature and of spirit. He must begin with experience, which is a continuous process of development, and try to make clear by reflexion what is implied in its gradual differentiation into subjective and objective aspects. The speculative thinker, in our view, finds that the experienced world, the world given in presentation, rests on the interaction of individual selves or centres of experience with a system of independent not-selves; and in this interaction the nature of both factors is manifested. In thinking out the meaning of this interaction, he has to consider whether the contrasts of ideal and real, of value and fact, are not distinctions which fall within the developing system of spiritual beings and represent modes

of their interaction. The question then follows, how we are to conceive the source or ground of this interacting system of spiritual factors which includes within it self-conscious and spiritual persons. The conclusions bear vitally on religion, for the Ultimate Reality of metaphysics must correspond to the God of the religious consciousness. Any real discord between the conceptions of philosophy and of religion imposes on us the task of striving towards coherency. In such matters as the nature of the Supreme Spirit, the relation of God to time and to finite spirits, the Divine immanence and transcendence, the theologian must strive, so far as he consistently can, to bring religious doctrines into concord with the issues of philosophical thinking. The religious mind is prone to be anthropomorphic, and to use analogies freely without examining their validity; while speculative thought represents a more comprehensive and critical method of trying to understand the universe. Hence it supplies a test—not absolute indeed, but certainly valuable—by which theology may be purged from uncritical assumptions, as well as delivered from one-sided conceptions that cannot be thought out consistently. In making this statement I have deliberately introduced qualifications. The theologian, if he is to conserve the values on which the religious life rests, cannot comply with all the demands philosophy has made in the past, or may make in the future. Philosophy, for instance, might insist that explanation means the reduction of all the differences of experience to an all-embracing identity; it might proclaim (it has done so) that the universe is a single real Being, a timeless Absolute of which all individuals are in the end only unreal appearances. A thorough-going monism of this sort, the theologian may fairly protest, does not explain religious values, but explains them away. In an earlier part of this paper I pointed out the importance of bringing the idea of truth as coherence to the test of direct experience. The support received from data of experience guarantees that a consistent thought-system is objectively valid, and is therefore more than formal. In the present instance it is impossible to doubt that religious doctrines are the expression of spiritual experiences which refuse to harmonise with such a theory of the universe. Spiritual selves claim to be real; and our consciousness of freedom and our sense of moral evil decline

to be relegated to the category of illusions. Here are experiences which do not fit into the universe conceived as a single real and timelessly perfect Being. The religious consciousness, by thus insisting on its claims to be heard, is able to exercise a wholesome influence on philosophical speculation. It reminds the thinker that religious experience is at least a fact, a fact which he is bound to take into account. A philosophy responsive to this appeal will not sacrifice the spiritual values to the interests of a speculative monism. It will rather explain the coherence of value and reality teleologically, tracing back the whole system of existences to a Supreme Will which is their Source and End. A speculative theory, which has profited thus by religious experience, is in a position to influence theology in its turn by making plain the directions in which religious doctrines require modification or development. For we have to remember that theological doctrines at best can only claim to represent one phase of experience, and they must be harmonised with experience as a whole. Philosophy is just the endeavour to exhibit the meaning of this wider experience.

Neither philosophy nor theology can lay claim to finality. No theological dogma nor any philosophical theory will be the last word on the subject. Out of the onward moving historic life come new feelings of value and fresh readings of what experience means. A dogma can only be a living form for the present in so far as the spiritual life of the present reads into it its own religious values. A speculative system marks the insight of an age into the meaning of life. But the body of knowledge grows swiftly, and the old synthesis soon fails to harmonise the increased materials. The very conditions under which man strives to rationalise the world preclude more than a partial success:—


“Veil after veil will lift—but there must be
Veil upon veil behind.”

In the circumstances, the philosopher and the theologian, having cast away all pretensions to infallibility, may consult together to advantage. Both offer us a *Weltanschauung*, but it has been reached from different starting-points and by diverse routes. Yet, since both claim to be true, they should agree with each other. If the two world-views will not blend and harmonise, there is need for mutual

criticism and counsel. The precise kind of help which the one can render the other will vary at various epochs. X The best service philosophical thought can do for theological doctrines at a particular time may be, by criticism to help to purify them from temporary and accidental elements which do not enter into the substance of the spiritual life. At another time the reality and persistency of Christian experience may be an influence which helps to emancipate philosophy from the *impasse* of pantheism, and to lead it in the direction of theism. But whether the issue of interaction between theology and philosophy be a critical or a constructive movement, it will be a movement which plays a part in man's spiritual development. Faith and reason, theology and philosophy, are forms in which man gives meaning to his experience, and by their interaction they deepen and enlarge his personal life. The rigid separation of the one from the other lessens the possibilities of spiritual progress, and seems to ignore the unity of the mind.

METHOD IN THE STUDY OF TOTEMISM

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GLASGOW

Printed at the University Press by
ROBERT MACLEHOSE & CO., LTD.

1911

Method in the Study of Totemism

Is there any human institution which can be safely called "Totemism"? Is there any possibility of defining, or even describing Totemism? Is it legitimate—is it even possible, with due regard for "methodology" and logic—to seek for the "normal" form of Totemism, and to trace it through many Protean changes, produced by various causes, social and speculative? I think it possible to discern the main type of Totemism, and to account for divergences.

Quite the opposite opinion appears to be held by Mr. ~~A.~~ A. Goldenweizer in his "Totemism, an Analytic Study."¹ This treatise is acutely critical and very welcome, as it enables British inquirers about totemism to see themselves as they appear "in larger other eyes than ours." Our common error, we learn, is this: "A feature salient in the totemic life of some community is seized upon only to be projected into the life of the remote past, and to be made the starting-point of the totemic process. The intermediary stages and secondary features are supplied from local evidence, by analogy with other communities, or 'in accordance with recognised principles of evolution' [what are they?] and of logic. The origin and development, thus arrived at, are then used as principles of interpretation of the present conditions. Not one step in the above method of attacking the problem of totemism is logically justifiable."²

As I am the unjustifiable sinner quoted in this extract,³ I may observe that my words are cited from a harmless statement to the effect that a self-consistent "hypothesis," or "set of guesses," which colligates all the known facts in a problem, is better than a self-contradictory hypothesis which does not colligate the facts.

¹ *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, April-June, 1910.

² *J. A. F.* p. 280.

³ *Secret of the Totem*, p. 28.

2 METHOD IN STUDY OF TOTEMISM

Now the "feature salient in the totemic life of some communities," which I "project into the life of the remote past," and "make the starting-point of the totemic process" is the totemic name, animal, vegetable, or what not, of the totem-kin.

In an attempt to construct a theory of the origin of totemism, the choice of the totemic name as a starting-point is logically justifiable, because the possession of a totemic name is, *universally*, the mark of a totem-kin; or, as most writers prefer to say, "clan." How can you know that a clan is totemic, if it is not called by a totemic name? The second salient feature in the totemic life of some communities which I select as even prior to the totemic name, is the exogamy of the "clans" now bearing totemic names.

To these remarks Mr. Goldenweizer would reply (I put his ideas briefly) there are (1) exogamous clans without totemic names; and there are (2) clans with totemic names, but without exogamy.

To this I answer (1) that if his exogamous clan has not a totemic name, I do not quite see why it should be discussed in connection with totemism; but that many exogamous sets, bearing *not* totemic names, but local names or nicknames, can be proved to have at one time borne totemic names. Such exogamous sets, therefore, no longer bearing totemic names, are often demonstrably variations from the totemic type; and are not proofs that there is no such thing as a totemic type.

(2) Secondly, I answer, in the almost unique case of "clans" bearing totemic names without being exogamous, that these "clans" have previously been exogamous, and have, under ascertained conditions, shuffled off exogamy. They are deviations from the prevalent type of clans with totemic names *plus* exogamy. They are exceptions to the rule, and, as such, they prove the rule. They are divergences from the type, and, as such, they prove the existence of the type from which they have diverged.

So far I can defend my own method: it starts from features that are universal, or demonstrably have been universal in totemism. There is "an organic unity of the features of totemism,"—of these two features, the essential features.

Lastly, Mr. Goldenweizer accuses us "Britishers," as he calls us, of neglecting in our speculations the effects of "borrowing and diffusion,

of assimilation and secondary associations of cultural elements, in primitive societies.”¹

This charge I do not understand. There has been much discussion of possibilities of the borrowing and diffusion and assimilation of phratries, exogamy, and of totemic institutions; and of “ethnic influences,” influences of races, in Australia. But the absence of historical information, the almost purely mythical character of tribal legends (in North-West America going back to the Flood, in Australia, to the “Dream Time”), with our ignorance of Australian philology, prevent us in this field from reaching conclusions.

(Possibly philologists may yet cast some light on “ethnic influences” in Australia. The learned editor of *Anthropos*, Père Schmidt, tells me that he has made a study of Australian languages and believes that he has arrived at interesting results.)

Mr. Goldenweizer represents, though unofficially, the studies of many earnest inquirers of North America, whether British subjects, like Mr. Hill Tout, or American citizens such as Dr. Boas. They vary, to be sure, among themselves, as to theories, but they vary also from British speculators. They have personally and laboriously explored and loyally reported on totemism among the tribes of the north-west Pacific coast and *Hinterland*; totemism among these tribes has especially occupied them; whereas British anthropologists have chiefly, though by no means solely, devoted themselves to the many varieties of totemism exhibited by the natives of Australia. These Australian tribes are certainly on perhaps the lowest known human level of physical culture, whereas the tribes of British Columbia possess wealth, “towns,” a currency (in blankets), rank (noble, free, unfree), realistic art, and heraldry as a mark of rank, and of degrees of wealth.

Mr. Goldenweizer’s method is to contrast the North-Western American form of totemism with that prevalent in Central Australia, and to ask,—how, among so many differences, can you discover a type, an original norm? I answer that both in North-Western America and in Central Australia, we find differences which can be proved to arise from changes in physical and “cultural” conditions and from speculative ideas. I have said that in British Columbia the tribes are in a much more advanced state of culture than any

¹*J. A. F.* p. 281.

Australian peoples, and their culture has affected their society and their totemism. Wealth, distinctions of rank, realistic art, with its result in heraldry as a mark of rank, and fixed residence in groups of houses are conditions unknown to the Australian tribes, and have necessarily provided divergences in totemic institutions. Mr. Goldenweizer replies "that the American conditions are due to the fact that the tribes of British Columbia are 'advanced' cannot be admitted."¹ But, admitted or not, it can be proved, as I hope to demonstrate.

II.

Mr. Goldenweizer gives what he supposes some of us to regard as "essential characteristics" or "symptoms" of totemism. He numbers five of these "symptoms."

1. An exogamous clan.
2. A clan name derived from the totem.
3. A religious attitude towards the totem, as a "friend," "brother," "protector," &c.
4. Taboos or restrictions against the killing, eating (sometimes touching, seeing) of the totem.
5. A belief in descent from the totem.

Mr. Goldenweizer next, by drawing a contrast between British Columbian and Central Australian totemism, tries to prove, if I understand him, that "the various features of totemism," are, or may be "essentially independent of one another," "historically, or psychologically, or both."²

Now, looking at the five symptoms of totemism, I may repeat (speaking only for myself) that, as to 1 and 2, I think *the exogamous clan*, with "*a clan name derived from the totem*" is an institution of such very wide diffusion that I may blamelessly study it and attempt to account to myself for its existence. But this does not mean that I regard all exogamous social sets as at present totemic; or as always having borne totem names. Again, sets of people (I cannot call them "clans," for the word "clan" indicates persons claiming common descent from a male ancestor,—say *Clan Gilzean*, *Clan Diarmaid*), may bear animal or vegetable or other such names, yet *not* be at present, as such, exogamous. Of these are the Arunta, and the Narran-ga.

¹*J. A. F.* p. 287.

²*J. A. F.* p. 183.

3. *A religious attitude towards the totem.* One cannot discuss this without a definition of religion. "Totemism is not a religion," says Mr. Frazer, with whom I am here in agreement.

4. *Totemic taboos.* These, though extremely general, are not quite universal even in Australia.

5. *A belief in descent from the totem.*

This belief is post-totemic, being merely one of many aetiological myths by which men explain to themselves *why* they are totemists; what is the nature of the *rapport* between them and their totems; why they bear as a kin (or association) animal or vegetable names. One or another such myth is not an essential part of totemism, for it is, necessarily, post-totemic.

I am thus left confronting the problems, (1) why are the immense majority of exogamous kins, in societies which we call "totemic," named by animal and other such names; and (2) why are they exogamous?

As for other exogamous social sets, which bear, not animal names, but territorial, or descriptive names, or nicknames, often derisive, it is my business to show, if I can, that these sets, or some of them, have passed, in historical times, out of the stage of totem-kins, owing to circumstances which I shall describe. Next (2) I have to show, if I can, why a few sets of people, bearing, as sets or associations, animal or other such names, are now no longer *exogamous*.

If I succeed, I think that I may regard "Totemism" as characterised by exogamous kins bearing totemic names, and as "an integral phenomenon" existing in many various forms.¹

If I understand Mr. Goldenweizer this attitude and effort of mine must seem to him "methodologically" erroneous, and "logically unjustifiable." "This attitude," he says (namely the attitude of those who hold totemism to be "an integral phenomenon"), "is reflected in the way several authors deal with the so-called 'survivals' of totemism, where from the presence in some region of one or two of the 'symptoms' of totemism, or of the fragments of such symptoms,

¹ But I exclude from my treatment of the subject, the "Matrimonial Classes," or "sub-classes" of many Australian tribes, for these are peculiar to Australia, appear to be results of deliberate conscious enactment, and, though they bear animal names (when their names can be translated), have no *traceable* connection with totemism.

6 METHOD IN STUDY OF TOTEMISM

they infer the existence in the past of totemism in its ‘typical form,’ that is, with all its essential characteristics.”¹

Thus, for example, from such phenomena as standards bearing animal forms ; or from animal worship,—each animal being adored in its own district,—or from myths of descent from gods in the form of animals ; or from the animal names of some Roman *gentes* ; or from animals closely associated with gods (like the Shrew Mouse with Sminthian Apollo) ; or from the presence of beings partly therio-morphic partly anthropomorphic, in art, many writers infer a past of totemism in Italy ; Israel ; Greece Hellenic and Greece Minoan ; in Egypt ; in Ireland ; and so forth. It is not my purpose to treat of such so-called survivals. I am to deal with peoples such as the tribes of Australia, New Guinea, and North-West America, who, if not the rose, have been near the rose : if not always totemic are at least neigh-bours of totemists.

III.

Mr. Goldenweizer tabulates the results of his comparison between the Totemism of British Columbia and that of Central Australia.²

¹*J. A. F.* p. 182.
²*J. A. F.* p. 229. I give the tabular form in this note :

TOTEMISM IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND CENTRAL AUSTRALIA

	BRITISH COLUMBIA	CENTRAL AUSTRALIA
<i>Exogamy</i> (1) . . . {	Totemic phratries (Tlingit) Totemic clans (Haida, Tsimshian, North- ern Kwakiutl)	Phratries Classes Totem clans (generally not independent exogamous units)
<i>Totemic names</i> (2) . {	Phratries (Tlingit) Clans (Haida) 2 of 4 clans (Tsimshian) Clans (Northern Kwakiutl)	All totem clans
<i>Taboo</i> (3) {	Non-totemic taboo, common ; totemic, absent	Numerous totemic and non-totemic taboos
<i>Descent from the totem</i> { (4)	Absent (Tlingit, Haida, Tsimshian) Occurs (Kwakiutl and farther South)	Universal
<i>Magical ceremonies</i> (5)	Not associated with totemism	Intimately associated with totemism
<i>Reincarnation</i> (6) . .	Not associated with totemism	Intimately associated with totemism
<i>Guardian spirits</i> (7) .	Intimately associated with totemism	Not associated with totemism
<i>Art</i> (8)	Actively associated with totemism	Passively associated with totemism
<i>Rank</i> (9)	Conspicuous (in individuals and groups)	Absent
<i>Number of totems</i> (10)	Small	Large

In the latter region the totemic institutions and myths are not those of South-Eastern Australia. To the totemism of many tribes in South-Eastern Australia that of a great tribe of British Columbia, the Tlingit, bears,—if we may trust some of the evidence,—the closest possible resemblance ; while, if we trust other and conflicting evidence, the resemblance is, on an important point, nearer to the institutions of certain Australian tribes of the furthest south, in Cape Yorke peninsula. The evidence for British Columbian totemism, I shall show, is so wavering as to make criticism difficult. The terminology, too, of some American students has been extremely perplexing. I am sorry to be obliged to dwell on this point, but a terminology which seems to apply five or six separate terms to the same social unit needs reform.

Dr. Boas is one of the most energetic field-anthropologists of the United States. To him we owe sixteen separate disquisitions and reports on the natives of the North-West Pacific coast and *Hinterland*, all of them cited by Mr. Goldenweizer in his excellent Bibliography. But Mr. Frazer observes that Dr. Boas variously denominates the kindred groups of the Kwakiutl tribe as “groups,” “clans,” “gentes,” and “families.” I must add that he also uses *gentes* as a synonym for phratries—“Phratries, viz. *gentes*.”¹ Now a “phratry” is not a *gens* ; a “group” may be anything you please ; a “family” is not a *gens* ;—a “*gens*” is an aggregate of families,—and a “clan” is not a “family.”

Mr. Goldenweizer’s tabulated form of his comparisons between British Columbia and Australia contains ten categories (see the last footnote of p. 6). Of these, two at least (8) (9) indicate elements which are purely proofs that the B.C. tribes are on a much higher, or later, level of social progress than the Australians. These two are *Rank* and *Art*. Had Mr. Goldenweizer added *Wealth* and *Towns* to his ten categories he would have given four factors in B.C. culture which affect B.C. totemism, and which do not exist in Central Australia, where realistic art is all but wholly unknown : art being occupied with archaic conventional patterns. Thus, in Australia, the bewildering B.C. heraldry—the “crests”—cannot, as in B.C., confuse the statements of observers, perplex their terminology (for they often use “crests” as synonyms of

¹ Franz Boas, *Fifth Report of the Committee on the North-Western Tribes of Canada*, p. 32, cited in *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iii. p. 319, note 2 ; cf. p. 321.

"totems"), and disorganise totemism itself. But we can find, not far from Australia, a parallel to this heraldry in New Guinea. For "crests" or badges in Central British New Guinea, see *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. ii. pp. 42-44. The people, like the B.C. tribes, are settled in villages. They have "a number of exogamous clans," most clans occupying several villages, and they have paternal descent. "Every clan" (as apparently in some cases in British Columbia) "has a number of badges called *Oaoa*, which, generally speaking, may only be worn or used by members of the clan." The "clan" names are geographical or are patronymics, they are not totemic; the badges either represent birds and mammals, or are "schematised" from some prominent feature of these. The people are not now totemists, even if they have passed through totemism.

Again (category 5), in British Columbia, "Magical Ceremonies are not associated with Totemism." In Central Australia they are "intimately associated with totemism." Yes, but in South-Eastern Australia they are not, as far as our evidence informs us. Magical ceremonies are not in Mr. Goldenweizer's list of five symptoms or characteristic peculiarities of totemism, so I leave them out of account.

Again, as to Taboo (category 3), in British Columbia, "non-totemic taboo is common; totemic, absent."

As to this "absence," Mr. Frazer has a great deal to say. For example, we have Commander Mayne's book, *Four Years in British Columbia*, a work of 1862, in which is given information from Mr. William Duncan, a missionary among the Tsimshian tribe. All such evidence given prior to controversies about totemism is valuable. According to this account, the Indians used, as "crests," representations of Whale, Porpoise, Eagle, Raven, Wolf, Frog, etc. Every person was obliged to marry out of the name of the animal represented by his crest, and each "clan" tabooed its animal, "will never kill the animal which he has adopted for his crest, or which belongs to him as his birthright," that is, apparently, his "familiar," and his inherited totem. This is original totemism in North-West America.

Mr. Frazer says, "So far as I remember, no other writer on these North-Western Indians has mentioned their reluctance to kill their totemic animals. In the course of this work I have repeatedly called attention to the paucity of information on this important side of

totemism in the writings of American ethnologists.”¹ Mr. Frazer also finds the usual totemic taboo among the Yuchi, a tribe of the Gulf nations.²

In Central Australia are “numerous totemic and non-totemic taboos.” But in other parts of Australia there are also tribes where people even kill and eat their totems. The totemic taboo is an extremely common institution, but not a note *stantis vel cadentis ecclesiae*.

Another category is (4), “Descent from the Totem.” As I have said, the belief in this descent is a mere explanatory myth to account for totemism; and, like all other such myths, could only arise after men were not only totemic, but wondered why they were totemic. Consequently such myths are not of the essence of totemism, and their varieties are of no importance.

The belief, or myth, of totemic descent is absent in British Columbia, says Mr. Goldenweizer, in the Tlingit, Haida, and Tsimshian tribes, and present “among the Kwakiutl and further south.” In Central Australia descent from the totem is “universal.”

But it is a queer kind of “descent,” is not, in the usual sense, descent at all, and, notoriously, *is not descent by physical generation*.

Then we have the category (7), “Guardian Spirits, intimately associated with Totemism” in British Columbia, “*not* associated with it in Central Australia.” Yet, in Central Australia, a man’s spirit is a totemic spirit. Again (10), “Number of Totems.” In British Columbia “small,” in Central Australia “large.” But it is “small” in such central regions of Australia as those of the Dieri and Urabunna, and in South-Eastern Australia; and why it is so large among the Arunta no man knows. It is an unexplained peculiarity, and not essential.

“Reincarnation” (6) is, in British Columbia, “not associated with Totemism,” in Central Australia “intimately associated with Totemism.” Here, Mr. Strehlow, for the Southern Arunta, reports otherwise; while for the Northern Arunta and other tribes, this “reincarnation” is part of a speculative explanatory myth. The myth, as I can show, explains, at one stroke, how men come to have souls, and why men are

¹ *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iii. pp. 309-311.

² F. G. Speck, *Ethnology of the Yuchi Indians*, Philadelphia, 1909, pp. 70 sq. *Totemism and Exogamy*, vol. iv. p. 312, cf. vol. iii. p. 181.

totemic. We know the kind of savage philosophy which accounts for this category.

I have now remarked on eight out of Mr. Goldenweizer's ten categories of differences between British Columbian and South Australian totemism; all of them, I think, are separable accidents of totemism; and most of them are easily to be accounted for by actual differences of culture, of social conditions, and by variety of savage taste and fancy in making guesses as to *why* totemists are totemistic.

IV.

We next arrive at the two first of Mr. Goldenweizer's categories. These are concerned with points of such very wide diffusion in the totemic world that I, under correction, take leave to regard them as "normal," while I hold that such variations from the norm as exist can be explained—as aberrations.

The first of these two categories is announced as: *Exogamy*

BRITISH COLUMBIA.

1. *Exogamy* { Totemic phratries (Tlingit).
Totemic clans (Haida, Tsimshian, Northern Kwakiutl).

CENTRAL AUSTRALIA.

2. *Exogamy* { Phratries.
Classes.
Totem clans (generally not independent exogamous units).

This needs explanation! By "totemic *phratries*" in the case of the Tlingits, Mr. Goldenweizer means the two main exogamous divisions of the tribe, Wolf and Raven. By "totemic *clans*," in the case of the Haida, he also means the two main exogamous divisions, Raven and Eagle, which, really, are phratries. But it is also clear that Mr. Goldenweizer is here using the word "clans" as it exists in the peculiar terminology of Dr. Swanton. Mr. Goldenweizer informs us that "Dr. Swanton now fully recognises the strict parallelism of the social units of the Tlingit and Haida, and sanctions the use of

'phratry' and clan in both cases." This terminological source of confusion happily disappears.

We are now, alas, entering a region where the variations of evidence, the confusions of terminology, and the influence of wealth and rank in the creation of heraldry, cause extreme perplexity. Meanwhile, as the Haida "clans" of the category are, in fact, phratries; on the other hand the "totemic clans" of the Tsimshians and Northern Kwakiutl (Raven, Eagle, Hawk, Wolf), and six "totemic clans" of the Northern Kwakiutl seem destitute of phratries, which, among the Arunta of Central Australia, have also died out. Mr. Goldenweizer, however, assigns phratries to Central Australia, the Arunta have none;¹ also "totem clans," where there are none, for the totemically named associations of the Arunta are not "clans," in the normal and usual sense of that word; they are not kins but associations.

Mr. Goldenweizer, in his first category, speaks of Central Australia as possessing totemic "*clans*" ("generally not independent exogamous units"). If by "Central Australia" he means the Arunta group of tribes, they have, I repeat, no "totemic clans"; they have only clubs with totemic names, and these associations are not "exogamous units." Where phratries with totem kins in them exist, no totem kin is or can be "an independent exogamous unit," except where one totem to one totem marriage prevails, as among certain Australian tribes. But if the phratry rule be dropped, as Morgan says it was among the Iroquois, then people may marry into any totem kin except their own, and each totem kin becomes an "independent exogamous unit."²

Thus the first category in Mr. Goldenweizer's list needs a good deal of explanation and criticism.

The second category is *Totemic Names*. Under these, in British Columbia, are:

"Phratries (Tlingit)."

"Clans (Haida)." (But these are phratries.)

"Two of four clans Tsimshian."

"Clans (Northern Kwakiutl)."

¹ That is, the matrimonial classes, eight in all, are divided into two sets of four each, but these sets are nameless.

² L. A. Morgan, *League of the Iroquois*, pp. 79-83.

In place of two animal-named clans out of four, Mr. Frazer assigns four animal-named clans to the Tsimshians;¹ Raven, Eagle, Wolf, and Bear. (*T. and E.*, vol. iii. pp. 307-308.) Mr. Goldenweizer himself² also assigns these *four animal-named clans to the Tsimshians*. But, in his table,³ he docks two Tsimshian clans of their totem names. He does so also in his p. 190. Thus (p. 187) all of the four Tsimshian "clans" have animal names. But (p. 190), and also in the tabular arrangement, only two of the Tsimshian clans have animal names. Mr. Frazer gives to all four Tsimshian clans the names of animals. Whom are we to believe?⁴ Method is here a little to seek.

A much more serious puzzle meets us when, in his second category (totemic names), Mr. Goldenweizer assigns no totemic names to the "clans" of the Tlingit, while Mr. F. Boas (whose list is quoted by Mr. Frazer) and Holmberg (1856) do assign totemic names to the Tlingit clans.

Let us examine this situation.

If we take a South-East Australian tribe of the Barkinji pattern, we find it divided into two animal-named intermarrying phratries (or

¹I may be permitted to note that these four Tsimshian clans look, to me, as if they had originally been two pairs of phratries. We find a parallel Australian case in the Narran-ga tribe of York's peninsula in South Victoria. Here Mr. Howitt gives us the "classes" (his term for phratries):

<i>Kayi</i>	-	-	-	-	Emu.
<i>Wau</i>	-	-	-	-	Red Kangaroo.
<i>Wiltu</i>	-	-	-	-	Eagle Hawk.
<i>Wilthathu</i>	-	-	-	-	Shark.

Each of these four main divisions had totem kins within it, and, as usual, the same totem (all are animals) never occurred in more than one main division. (Howitt, *N.T.S.E.A.* p. 130.) In precisely the same way "crests" of animal name occur in each of the four Tsimshian "clans":

<i>Raven</i>	-	-	-	-	Raven, Codfish, Starfish.
<i>Eagle</i>	-	-	-	-	Eagle, Halibut, Beaver, Whale.
<i>Wolf</i>	-	-	-	-	Wolf, Crane, Grizzly Bear.
<i>Bear</i>	-	-	-	-	Killer Whale, Sun, Moon, Stars, Rainbow, Grouse, and Sea Monster.

These "crests," thus arranged, no crest in more than one clan (or phratry?) look like old totems in the two pairs of clans, or, as I suspect, of phratries. The Australian parallel corroborates the view that the Tsimshian "clans" have been phratries.

²*J. A. F.* p. 187, quoting "Swanton 26th *B. E. R.*, 1904-1905, p. 423."

³*Ibid.* p. 229.

⁴The truth seems to be that Mr. Goldenweizer (p. 189) misquotes Mr. Swanton, who (26th *B. E. R.* p. 423) is speaking, not of the Tsimshian but of the Haida. In his p. 190 Mr. Goldenweizer is quoting Dr. Boas, *Annual Archaeological Report*, Toronto, 1905, pp. 235-249.

exogamous intermarrying "classes" or "moieties," I call them "phratries"). In each phratry are totem kins, that is, kins named after animals, vegetables, or other things in nature. The names of phratries and totem kins (I know no other word for them but totem kins or totem clans) descend in the female line. No such totem kin occurs in *both* exogamous phratries, therefore all these units are necessarily exogamous.

Two-thirds of the Australian phratry names are untranslated, like those of the Dieri; the other third, with a single exception (the Euahlayi), are names of animals.¹

Now turn to the disputable case of the Tlingits of British Columbia. I first examine Mr. Frazer's account of them in *Totemism and Exogamy* (vol. iii. pp. 264-278). The Tlingits are divided into two exogamous phratries, or "classes," of animal names, Raven and Wolf. (In the north the Wolf "class" is also known as the Eagle.) Phratry exogamy is the rule; descent is in the female line. Each phratry is subdivided into a number of "clans," which are named after various animals. As no "clan" is represented in both phratries, and as all folk are obliged to marry out of their own phratry, the "clans" are, inevitably, exogamous.

For purposes of comparison with other British Columbia tribes, I give the list of Tlingit totem kins furnished by Mr. Frazer, "on the authority of Mr. F. Boas"²:

RAVEN PHRATRY.

Raven.
Frog.
Goose.
Sea Lion.
Owl.
Salmon.
Beaver.
Codfish.
Skate.

WOLF (EAGLE) PHRATRY.

Wolf.
Bear.
Eagle.
Killer Whale.
Shark.
Auk.
Gull.
Sparrow Hawk.
Thunder Bird.³

As I found out, and proved, in many Australian tribes the name of each phratry also occurs as the name of a totem kin *in* the phratry; so also it is among the Tlingit—*teste* Mr F. Boas.⁴

¹ Thomas, *Kinship and Marriage in Australia*.

³ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 266, note 1.

² *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 266, note 1.

⁴ *Secret of the Totem*, pp. 164-170

Thus on every point—female descent, animal-named phratries, animal-named totem kins, and each phratry containing a totem kin of its own name, the Tlingit totemism is absolutely identical with that of many South-Eastern Australian tribes of the most archaic type.

But the Tlingit, unlike the Australians, live in villages, and “the *families* or households may occupy one or more houses. The *families* actually take their names from places.” (I italicise the word “families.”) Mr. Frazer’s authorities here are Holmberg (1856), Pauly (1862), Petroff (“the principal clans are those of the Raven, the Bear, the Wolf, and the Whale”), Krause (both here undated), Dr. Boas (1889), and Mr. Swanton (1908).

Mr Goldenweizer¹ does not mention that the “clans” of the Tlingit have animal names. Quite the reverse; he says that “the ‘clans’ of the Tlingit . . . bear, with a few exceptions, names derived from localities.”² This is repeated on p. 225.

At this point, really, the evidence becomes unspeakably perplexing. Mr. Frazer, we see, follows Mr. F. Boas and Holmberg (1856) in declaring that the “clans” of the Tlingit bear animal names. Mr. Goldenweizer says that, “with few exceptions,” the “clans” of the Tlingit bear “names derived from localities.”³ Mr. Goldenweizer’s authority is “Swanton, *Bur. Eth. Rep.*, 1904-1905 (1908), p. 398.” Mr. Frazer⁴ also quotes that page of Mr. Swanton, but does not say that Mr. Swanton here gives *local*, not animal, names to the clans of the Tlingit. Mr. Frazer also cites Mr. Swanton’s p. 423 *sq.* Here we find Mr. Swanton averring that Killer Whale, Grizzly Bear, Wolf, and Halibut are in the Wolf phratry, “on the Wolf side,” among the Tlingit; while Raven, Frog, Hawk, and Black Whale are on the Raven side. Here are animal names (not precisely as in Mr. Boas’ list) within the phratries. But Mr. Swanton does not reckon these animal names as names of “clans”; to “clans” he gives local names in almost every case. To his mind these animal names in Tlingit society denote “*crests*,” not “*clans*,” and with crests we enter a region of confusion.

I cannot but think that the confusion is caused (apart from loose terminology) by the *crests* of these peoples. The crests are an ex-crescence, a heraldic result of wealth and rank; and as such can have

¹ *J. A. F.* p. 186.

² *J. A. F.* p. 190.

³ *J. A. F.* pp. 190-225.

⁴ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 266, note 1.

nothing to do with early totemism. Scholars sometimes say "totems" when they mean "crests" (and perhaps *vice versa*), and confusion must ensue.

I quote, on this point, a letter which Mr. Goldenweizer kindly wrote to me (Jan. 21, 1911).

"Since the appearance of Mr. Swanton's studies of the Tlingit and the Haida there remains no doubt whatever that the clans of these two tribes bear (with some few exceptions) names derived from localities. On pp. 398-9-400 of his Tlingit study (26th Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, 1904-5) he gives a list of the geographical groups, and of the clans with their local names, classified according to the two phratries: Raven and Wolf. It must be remembered that to many of these clans he gives the totems [crests] of the Tlingit phratries: then the gentes [clans] of the Stikin tribe are enumerated. Some of the native names are translated as house or local names; it is pointed out that the raven occurs four times as the crest of four gentes [clans] with different names which, therefore, cannot mean 'raven.'

"The Haida case is quite parallel. Here 'each clan [phratry] was subdivided into a considerable number of families [clans] which generally took their names from some town or camping-place.' And again: 'It would seem that originally each family occupied a certain place or lived in a certain part of a town' (Swanton, *The Haida*, pp. 66, *sq.*). Now, of course, many clans are represented in several districts. Opposite p. 76 we find a genealogical table of the Raven families [clans] descended from Foam Woman, with their local names. A similar table of the Eagle families [clans] descended from Greatest Mountain, is given on p. 93. Again Professor Boas' account, although fragmentary, is correct. 'The phratries of the Haida are divided into gentes [clans] in the same way as those of the Tlingit, they also take their names, in the majority of cases, from the houses' (R.B.A.A.S., p. 822). The names of the Skidigate-village-people clans are given as an example.

"As to personal names among the Haida, a curious fact must be noted. Notwithstanding the greater prominence of crests and art among the Haida, their personal names are but seldom derived from animals, as is the rule among the Tlingit, the clans

are not now restricted to one village district, but are found in several of the geographical groups. Thus the *GānAxÁdî* (of the Raven phratry) are found in the Tongas, Taku, Chilkat and Yakutat groups, while the *Tégoedî* (of the Wolf phratry) occur in the Tongas, Sanya, Hutsnuwù and Yakutat groups. The only non-local clan-names in the list are the *Kluxînédî* (marten people) of Henya; the *SAguténédî* (grass people) and *NēsÁdî* (salt-water people) of Kake; the *Llūk!nAxÁdî* (king-salmon people) of Sitka; and the *LugáxAdî* (quick people) of Chilkat. Each of these five clans occurs only once in the list, from which we may perhaps infer that they are of relatively late origin (this merely as a suggestion). On the other hand, 'the great majority of Tlingit personal names,' Mr. Swanton tells us, 'referred to some animal, especially that animal whose emblem was particularly valued by the clan to which the bearer belonged' (Bureau, 1904-5, pp. 421-2). In the passage you note, viz. 'the transposition of phratries is indicated also by crests and names, for the killer-whale, grizzly bear, wolf, and halibut, are on the Wolf side among the Tlingit and on the Raven side among the Haida, etc.,' the animals cited are the 'crests' while the 'names' referred to are, of course, the personal names which are derived from animals and as a rule change with the crests; therefore, they are not illustrated in the passage.

"Professor Boas' list is incomplete but similar in substance (Reports of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1889, p. 821). First majority of Haida personal names refer to the potlatch, property, etc. (Swanton, *The Haida*, pp. 119-120.) This is, no doubt, due to the influence of the potlatch which is among these people the central social and ceremonial feature.

"Holmberg's work I did not see. Probably his list of animals also stands for the crests and not the clan names. . . .

"Of the Tsimshian clans only two bear animal names. K'anhada and GyīspotuwE'da do not, as Professor Boas formerly supposed, mean 'raven' and 'bear' (cf. R.B.A.A.S., 1889, p. 823 and Annual Archaeological Report, Toronto, 1906, p. 239)."

If I may ask a question about this very perplexing state of affairs, I would say, Is the animal crest of each "clan" supposed to be *later* than the local designation of the clan? To me it seems that the crest

is in origin a heraldic representation of the clan totem, and that, as in Australia, totemic names of clans are older than names derived from localities or "houses." The house, the fixed building, is part of a society later than the first bearing of totemic names by clans. The crest, as a badge of rank and wealth, is later than the totem; social advance, houses, towns, heraldry, as a mark of rank, appear to me to cause the perplexities, and to place these American tribes outside of the totemism of people without rank, wealth, and houses and heraldry.

As I understand the case, the Tlingit clans did not originally, as Dr. Swanton seems to suppose, "occupy a certain place or live in a certain quarter of a town," whence they derived the place-names or town-names which they at present bear, according to Dr. Swanton. The Tlingit, now living in towns, and with clans of town-names, may naturally fancy that from the first their clans bore local or town-names. But society that begins in people who, like the Tlingit, have female descent, cannot form a local clan of descent, unless the men go to the homes of the women, which is not here the case. Originally I think their crests, as in Holmberg's report, were effigies of their clan totems, and the clans bore their totem names. But with advance to wealth, houses, and settled conditions, the local or town-names (as in other cases is certain) superseded the totem names of the clans, while the totem badge became, as the crest, a factor in a system of heraldry, to us perplexing. Certainly the facts as given by Dr. Swanton, may be envisaged in this way; the processes of change are simple, natural and have parallels elsewhere.

If a totemic clan chooses to wear the image of its totem as a badge, and has no other badge, all is plain sailing. But in British Columbia, as in Central British New Guinea, men, in proportion to their wealth and descent, wear an indefinite number of badges or "crests." "Although referred to by most writers as totems," says Mr. Swanton, speaking of the Haida tribe, "these crests have no proper totemic significance, their use being similar to that of the quarterings in heraldry, to mark the social position of the wearers."¹ Of course Australian totemists have no social position to be indicated by crests

¹ Quoted, *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 281.

or badges. Now Dr. Boas speaks of "crests" as "totems," among the Haida,¹ and we are perplexed among these mixtures of heraldic with totemic terms.

Next, and this is curious, while Mr. Swanton gives local names to the "clans" of the Tlingit; to many but not all of his "House Groups" he gives *animal* names, "Raven, Moose, Grizzly Bear, Killer Whale, Eagle, Frog *houses*," and so on. All these animals are names of Holmberg's and Mr. F. Boas' totems of clans; but, according to Mr. Swanton, they are names borne, not by "clans" but by "house groups."² Other house groups have local names, or descriptive names, or nicknames, as "gambling house." Thus Mr. Frazer gives animal names to the "clans" of the Tlingit to which Mr. Swanton gives local names, and while many of the houses, or "house groups" of Mr. Swanton's Tlingit bear totemic names, Mr. Frazer says "the families generally take their names from places."³ There appears to be confusion due to imperfect terminology.

Mr. Goldenweizer avers that "the intensive and prolonged researches conducted by a number of well trained observers among these tribes of the North Pacific border have shown with great clearness,"—something not at present to the point.⁴ But we regret the absence of clearness. Can we rely on Holmberg who described the state of affairs as it was fifty years ago, and who knew nothing, I presume, of Australian phratries and totem kins? In his time the Tlingit, like a dozen South-Eastern tribes of Australia, had animal-named kins in animal-named exogamous intermarrying phratries, with female descent. Or was Holmberg (and was Mr. F. Boas in his list of animal-named Tlingit clans) led astray by the "crests"? Did each of these inquirers mistake "crests" for totems of clans?

One thing is clear, the Tlingit and the other tribes being possessed of wealth, and of gentry, and of heraldry, cause almost inextricable confusion by their use of heraldic badges, named "crests" by some; and "totems" (or *both* crests and totems at once) by other well trained observers. I am inclined to believe that most of these crests were, originally, representations of the totems of distinct totem kins. My reason is this: Mr. Swanton tells us that "the crests and names which

¹ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 283.

² *Bur. Eth. Report*, 1904-1905, pp. 400-407.

³ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 266.

⁴ *J. A. F.*, p. 287.

among the Tlingit are on the Wolf side" are "on the Raven side" among the Haida. Among these people, animal names and crests are divided between the two phratries, the same name or crest not occurring in both phratries. This is merely the universal arrangement of totems in phratries.

Even now, among the Tlingit, says Mr. Swanton, "theoretically *the emblems*" (crests) "*used on the Raven side were different from those on the Wolf or Eagle side,*" (precisely as, in Australia, the totems in Eagle Hawk phratry are different from those in Crow phratry), "and although a man of high caste might borrow an emblem from his brother-in-law temporarily, he was not permitted to retain it." (His brother-in-law, of course, was of the phratry not his own.) All this means no more than that occasionally a man of high caste may *now* impale the arms of his wife.¹ With castes and heraldry, born of wealth and rank, we have stepped out of totemism at this point. It has been modified by social conditions. "Some families were too poor to have an emblem," did they also cease to have a totem? Some of the rich "could," it was said, "use anything." Is this because they pile up sixteen quarterings? "The same crest may be, and is, used by different clans, and any one clan may have several crests. . . ."² Many "clans" now use the same crest, and there are quarrels about rights to this or that "crest." Some members of the Wolf phratry assert a right to the Eagle crest. Mr. Frazer thinks that "such claims are perhaps to be explained by marriages of the members of the clan with members of other clans who had these animals for their crests."³

That is precisely my own opinion. If "crests" were originally mere representations of each person's totem animal they have now become involved, through rank and social degrees, with heraldry, and with badges *not* totemic, such as a certain mountain. Meanwhile all the Tlingit "clans," if we follow Mr. Swanton's evidence, or almost all the "clans" are now mere local settlements, at least they bear local and other descriptive names. I nearly despair of arriving at Mr. Swanton's theory of what a Tlingit "clan" really is! But he gives a list of "the geographical groups," the "clans," and the phratry to which each of the clans belonged. . . .

¹ *R. B. E.*, *ut supra*, p. 415.

² *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 268.

³ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 269.

Thus we have (1)

PHRATRY RAVEN.

Then (2)

TONGAS (I take Tongas to be "a geographical group").

Then under TONGAS GāNAXA'di, People of Gā' NAX.

PHRATRY WOLF.

TONGAS (Geographical group, apparently).

Te' goedî, People of the island Teq°.

GāNAXA'di and Te'-goedî seem to be "clans," but then clan Te'goedî, "People of the isle Teq°," looks like "a geographical group"!

There are fourteen "geographical divisions" of this kind, and sixty-eight "clans" of this kind, with descriptive or local names. The clans "were in a way local groups," says Mr. Swanton. They were also "clans or consanguineal bands," each "usually named from some town or camp it had once occupied." They "differed from the geographical groups...being social divisions instead of comprising the accidental occupants of one locality."¹

Be it observed that Mr. Swanton speaks of "these geographical divisions or tribes"; which increases the trouble, for, if the Tlingit be a "tribe," and the geographical divisions of the Tlingit be also "tribes," things are perplexing.

Once more, the Tlingit reckon descent in the female line. Now how can "a consanguineal band," which reckons descent in the female line, look like "a geographical group"? A totem kin, with male descent, in Australia and elsewhere, like a Highland clan, say the MacIans, necessarily becomes "a geographical group," say in Glencoe. But how, with female descent (unless the women go to the men's homes), a Tlingit "consanguineal band" can also have a local habitation is to me a difficult question. The names of the phratries descend in the female line. Do the local and descriptive names of "the clans or consanguineal bands," also descend in the female line? I cannot presume to say. Mr. Frazer throws no light on this point believing, as he does, that the "clans" within the Tlingit phratries, are the familiar totem kins, of animal names. If so, the children must inherit the maternal totem "clan" name.

Only one thing is clear to me, a Tlingit of the Wolf phatry can only

¹ *R. B. E. ut supra*, p. 398.

marry a bride of the Raven phratry; a Tlingit of the Raven phratry can only woo a maiden of the Wolf phratry. If totem kins there be in the phratries, these totem kins are exogamous. If there be no totem kins in the phratry, are Mr. Swanton's clans of local names *locally* exogamous? May persons marry within the region where they are settled? I know not, but I rather incline to suppose that members of *both* phratries may be found in Mr. Swanton's clans of local name; indeed it *must* be so, and therefore a pair of lovers *may* perhaps wed *within* their "clan or consanguineal band," and within their local group, which, thus, is not exogamous. If so, the Tlingit clan is *not* exogamous. But all this is purely conjectural.

While, in Mr. Swanton's version, the Tsimshians, with female descent, have two exogamous "clans" with animal names, and two with other names; while in Mr. Frazer's book they have four animal-named exogamous clans, there is a third story resting on the authority of Mr. William Duncan, a missionary among the Tsimshian from 1857 onwards.¹ Mr. Duncan's information Commander Mayne incorporated in his book.²

According to Commander Mayne, using Mr. Duncan's evidence, in 1862, the Tsimshians (as we have seen), carved faces of "Whale, Porpoise, Raven, Eagle, Wolf, Frog, etc.," on roof beams. He calls such effigies "crests." No person may marry another of the same "crest": the children take their mother's *crest*, and bear the name of the animal which it represents. None may kill the animal of his crest. All this is exogamy with totem kins, under the phratries, as the exogamous units,³ and with the totemic taboo. If Mayne and Duncan are right, either more recent writers are wrong, or Tsimshian totemism has been much modified since 1862.

V.

Further south than the Tsimshian dwell the Kwakiutl, of whom the most southerly are called "the Kwakiutl proper." The northern Kwakiutl are divided, says Dr. Boas, into "septs" and "clans." What a "sept" may be I am not certain. The first tribe has "clans"

¹ Mayne, *Four Years in British Columbia*, p. 257 sq. 1862.

² See *T. and E.*, vol. iii. pp. 309-311.

³ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. pp. 309-311.

called Beaver, Eagle, Wolf, Salmon, Raven, Killer Whale: the usual totemic names in this region. These totemic clans are exogamous, like those of Mayne's Tsimshians. Descent is in the female line. In the next tribe we find three exogamous animal-named clans: Eagle, Raven, Killer Whale, Beaver, Wolf, and Salmon have vanished, or have never existed. In these two tribes a child is sometimes placed in the father's, not in the mother's clan, as a Dieri father sometimes "gives" his totem to his son, in addition to the inherited maternal totem.¹

When we reach the southern Kwakiutl ("the Kwakiutl proper") we are told by Dr. Boas that "patriarchate prevails." This appears to mean that descent is here reckoned not, as in the north, in the female, but in the male line. "We do not find a single clan that has, properly speaking, an animal for its totem; neither do the clans take their name from their crest, nor are there phratries."² As the *northern* Kwakiutl have animal-named exogamous "clans" with female descent, Dr. Boas now thinks that the *northern* Kwakiutl "have to a great extent adopted the maternal descent and the division into animal totems of the northern tribes."³ We do not know, elsewhere, that totemism has ever been borrowed by one tribe from another, especially by a tribe so advanced in culture as the Kwakiutl, and we have no example of a tribe in which the men have given up their social prerogatives, and transmitted them to their nephews in the female line.

Mr. Frazer writes, "The question naturally arises, Are the Kwakiutl passing from maternal institutions to paternal institutions, from mother-kin to father-kin, or in the reverse direction?... In one passage Dr. Boas seems to incline to the former member of this alternative, that is, to the view that the Kwakiutl are passing, or have passed, from mother-kin, or (as he calls it) matriarchate to father-kin or patriarchate, for he says that "the marriage ceremonies of the Kwakiutl seem to show that originally matriarchate prevailed also among them."⁴ Yet he afterwards adopted with great decision the "contrary view." On these very intricate problems I take leave to quote

¹ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. pp. 318, 319.

² *Fifth Report on N.W. Tribes of Canada*, 1890. *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 320, note 1.

³ *Twelfth Report on N.W. Tribes of Canada*, 1898, p. 676. *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 320, note 1.

⁴ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 332, citing Dr. Boas in *Fifth Report on N.W. Tribes of Canada*, p. 33, 1889.

the statement with which Mr. Goldenweizer has been good enough to favour me.

First, as to descent among the Kwakiutl proper.

"At first, as Mr. Frazer points out (iii. p. 329 *sq.*), Dr. Boas believed that the Kwakiutl were passing from maternal to paternal descent. Later investigations conducted by Dr. Farrand (cf. F. Boas, *The Mythology of the Bella Coola*, Jesup North Pacific Expedition, vol. i. p. 121), led to a reversal of that opinion. The main arguments for original paternal descent among the Kwakiutl are three in number. (1) The village communities, which were the original social unit of the Kwakiutl,¹ regarded themselves as direct descendants of a mythical ancestor, and not as descendants of the ancestor's sister, which is the case in the legends of the northern tribes, with maternal descent. (Cf. F. Boas, *The Kwakiutl*, etc., p. 335, where a genealogy is also given.) (2) A number of offices connected with the ceremonies of the secret societies, such as master of ceremonies, etc., are hereditary in the male line (F. Boas, *Kwakiutl*, etc., p. 431). The Secret Societies, with their dances, are a very ancient institution among the Kwakiutl, and the male inheritance of the above offices is a strong argument for the former prevalence of paternal descent among these people. (3) The form taken by the maternal inheritance of rank, privileges, etc., among the Kwakiutl points in the same direction. When a man marries he receives crests, privileges, etc., from his father-in-law through his wife, but he himself may not use them but must keep them for his son, who, when of proper age, may sing the songs, perform the dances, use the crest, etc., which he thus receives from his mother through the medium of his father. (Cf. F. Boas, *Kwakiutl*, etc., p. 334.) When the young man marries he must return his privileges to his father, who then gives them to his daughter when she marries. Thus, son-in-law No. 2 receives the privileges, but again may not use them, but keeps them for his son, etc. It appears, then, that the privileges exercised by the young man before marriage are always derived from his mother, but formally he receives them from his father, who acts as a sort of guardian of these privileges until the son is ready for them. Descent here is clearly maternal, but the form of paternal descent is preserved, a plausible condition for a

¹ It seems to me impossible to suppose that the village community was ever anywhere "the original social unit."—A. L.

people who, having become maternal, still stick at least in form to the traditional inheritance from the father. If this inference be rejected, the feature becomes quite unaccountable.

"In the sentence, 'The woman's father, on his part, has acquired his privileges in the same manner through his mother' (Frazer, vol. iii. p. 333, note 1), the privileges the woman's father exercised as a young man before marriage are meant. The privileges he later acquired through his wife he, of course, could not use, but had to keep them for his son. The phrase, 'each individual inherits the crest of his maternal grandfather' (Frazer, iii. p. 331, note 2), must be similarly interpreted. The crest the individual uses before marriage is meant.

"In connection with the foregoing it must be remembered that another mode of acquiring privileges, crests, songs, etc., was common among the Kwakiutl, viz. by killing the owner (cf. F. Boas, *Kwakiutl*, etc., p. 424, and elsewhere).

"I also cite the actual words of Dr. Boas. He believes that the intricate law by which 'a purely female line of descent is secured, although only through the medium of the husband,' can only be explained 'as an adaptation of maternal laws by a tribe which was on a paternal stage. I cannot imagine that it is a transition of a maternal society to a paternal society, because there are no relics of the former' (maternal) 'stage beyond those which we find everywhere, and which do not prove that the transition has been recent at all. There is no trace left of an inheritance from the wife's brothers; the young people do not live with the wife's parents. But the most important argument is that the customs cannot have been prevalent in the village communities from which the present tribal system originated, as in these' (village communities) 'the tribe is always designated as the direct descendants of the mythical ancestor. If the village communities had been on the maternal stage, the tribes would have been designated as the descendants of the ancestor's sisters, as is always the case in the legends of the northern tribes.'"¹

From all this it appears that Dr. Boas believes the Kwakiutl proper to have been once, "on the maternal stage," of which the usual "relics" survive, but why should *all* such traces survive? Some must disappear, otherwise there could be no transition!

¹ *Rep. U.S. Nat. Museum*, 1897, pp. 334-335.

Apparently, in the village communities, the existence of a mythical *ancestor*, not *ancestress*, is postulated; while in the northern tribes, with female descent, mythical *ancestresses* are postulated. But if, among the Kwakiutl proper, male ancestry is now the recognised rule (and it dimly seems to be so), then, as usual, Kwakiutl myth will throw back into the unknown past the institutions of their present state, will say "ancestor," not "ancestress." No argument can be based on traditions which are really explanatory conjectures. There is advanced no valid reason for supposing that the Kwakiutl proper began with descent in the female line, then advanced to the male line, and then doubled back on the female line, and so evolved transmission of crests in the female line, through husbands.

The waverings of the Kwakiutl between the two lines of descent are, in fact, such as we expect to occur when a people has retained, like the Tlingit, Haida, and Tsimshians, the system of female descent after reaching a fair pitch of physical culture, and arriving at wealth, rank, and the attribution of children to the paternal stock.

VI.

I now come to give my own opinion as to the ways in which Kwakiutl totemism may have attained its existing peculiarities. It is necessary first to defend my view that the essential thing in totemism—surveying the whole totemic field—is the existence of exogamous kins bearing animal and other such names. Here Mr. Goldenweizer opposes me, saying that "no particular set of features can be taken as characteristic of totemism, for the composition of the totemic complex is variable, nor can any particular feature be regarded as fundamental, for not one of the features does invariably occur in conjunction with others; nor is there any evidence to regard any other feature as primary in order of development, or as of necessity original psychologically."¹

I have already remarked that this is true; we find human *associations*, which are *not* kins or clans, bearing animal and other totemic names, while these associations are not exogamous (the Arunta nation); and we find exogamous sets, kins, or associations which do not bear animal names.

¹*J. A. F.* pp. 269, 270.

But the coexistence of the exogamous kin with the totemic name of that kin is found in such an immense and overwhelming majority over every other arrangement; the exogamous "totem clan" is so hugely out of proportion in numbers and width of diffusion over the Arunta animal-named non-exogamous associations and other rare exceptions, that we have a right to ask—Are not the exceptions aberrant variations? Have not the Arunta, with non-exogamous sets bearing totemic names, and other peoples with exogamous sets *not* of totemic names, passed through and out of the usual stage of animal-named exogamous kins? A mere guess that this is so, that the now non-exogamous human sets with totem names have once been exogamous, would be of no value. I must prove, and fortunately I can prove, that it *was* so.

It is certain, historically, that some exogamous units which now bear non-totemic names, in the past were ordinary totem kins with totemic names. As we can also demonstrate to a certainty that the Arunta have been in, and, for definite reasons, have passed out of, the ordinary stage of exogamous totem kins, we have a right, I think, to say that, normally, the feature of the totemic name is associated with the feature of exogamy, and that the exceptions really prove the rule, for we can show how the exceptions came to vary from the rule.

Mr. Goldenweizer, in a very brief criticism of my own theory of Totemism, given by me in *Social Origins* (1903), and in *The Secret of the Totem* (1905), writes "Why is the question, How did the early groups come to be named after the plants and animals?—the real problem? Would not Lang admit that other features may also have been the starting point?" (I not only admit but insist that "other features" were among the starting-points of exogamous totemism.) Among "the other features" Mr. Goldenweizer gives "animal taboos, or a belief in descent from an animal, or primitive hunting regulations, or what not? I am sure that Lang, who is such an adept in following the *logos*, could without much effort construct a theory of totemism with any one of these elements to start with—a theory as consistent with fact, logic, and the mind of primitive man, as is the theory of names accepted from without."

Now as to the last point, I have written "unessential to my system is the question *how* the groups got animal names, as long as they got

them and did not remember how they got them" (*et seq.*).¹ I *did* show how European and other village groups obtained animal names, namely as *sobriquets* given from without; and I proved the same origin of the modern names of Siouan "gentes," of two Highland clans; of political parties, religious sects; and so forth.

This mode of obtaining names is a *vera causa*: that is all: and nobody had remarked on it, in connection with totemism.

Next I cannot "without much effort" (or with any effort) construct a theory of totemism out of (1) "animal taboos." They are imposed for many known and some unknown reasons, and not all totem kins taboo the totem object. Next (2) as I must repeat that "belief in descent from an animal," is only one out of many post-totemic myths explanatory of totemism; I cannot possibly use it as the starting-point of totemism. If Mr. Goldenweizer has read the book which he is criticising, he forgets that I wrote² "it is an error to look for origins in myths about origins," and that I refused to accept as corroboration of my theory an African myth which agrees with my own view.

As to (3) "primitive hunting regulations," Mr. Goldenweizer does not tell us what they were. It is a very common "regulation" that no totem kin may hunt its own totem animal, but to suggest that the totem kin was created by the regulation is to mistake effect for cause.

Finally (4), who can take "or what not" for the starting-point of an investigation? But every totem kin has a totemic name: if there is no totemic name how can we know that we have before us a totem kin? If the Tlingit "clans" be exogamous but not named by totemic names (as Mr. Swanton tells us), then the Tlingit clans are not totemic, now, whatever they may have been in the past: and we are not concerned with them.

Of every totem "clan" the totem name is a *universal* feature; and therefore I must begin my study from what is universal—the names. Here (though we must not appeal to authority), I have the private satisfaction of being in agreement with Mr. Howitt. The assumption by men of the names of objects "in fact must have been the commencement of totemism," says Mr. Howitt.³

¹ *Secret of the Totem*, p. 125.

² *Secret of the Totem*, p. 23.

³ *Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, p. 153.

I start then, from the totemic names because,—no totemic name, no totemic “clan”! With the totemic name of a social unit in the tribe, I couple exogamy, (though exogamy may exist apart from totemism), because exogamy is always associated with a “clan” of totemic name, except in a very few cases of which the Arunta “nation” is much the most prominent. But it is not to the point, for *the Arunta have no totemic clans*. Mr. Frazer’s latest definition of totemism is “an intimate relation which is supposed to exist between a group of *kindred* people on the one side and a species of natural or artificial objects on the other....”¹ Now the Arunta associations of animal names are not (I must keep repeating) kindreds, are not “clans,” are not composed of persons who are, “humanly speaking,” akin. The totem is not inherited from either parent or through any kinsman or kinswoman. The Arunta bearers of the same totem name, in each case, do not constitute a “clan.” This puts the so-called Arunta “totem clans,” non-exogamous, out of action as proofs that “totem clans” may be non-exogamous.

Moreover, the non-exogamous Arunta associations bearing totemic names have once been exogamous totem clans. The usages of the Arunta, and their traditions, and the actual facts of their society, prove that their totems were originally hereditary and exogamous.²

I use the word “prove” deliberately; the demonstration is of historical and mathematical certainty. These facts compel me to believe that the Arunta have been in and passed out of normal hereditary totemism, in which the totems are arranged so that no totem occurs in both main exogamous divisions, and all totems are exogamous. In that normal totemic stage the Arunta have at one time been. But they have passed out of it into their present “conceptional” totemism, with the same totems appearing in both main exogamous divisions, the totems being non-hereditary, and non-exogamous.

Spencer and Gillen say, “in the Arunta, as a general rule, the great majority of the members of any one totemic group belong to one moiety of the tribe, but this is by no means universal, and in different totemic groups certain of the ancestors are supposed to have belonged

¹ *T. and E.*, vol. iv. pp. 3, 4.

² What follows I have already said in *Anthropos*, 1910.

to one moiety and others to the other, with the result that of course their living descendants also follow their example.”¹ (This statement I later compare with others by the same authors.) Now in normal totemism, not “the great majority,” but all the members of any one totemic group belong to one or other moiety of the tribe. The totems being hereditary, they cannot wander out of their own into the other phratry, and, as all persons must marry out of their own phratry, they cannot marry into their own totem, for no person of their own totem is in the phratry into which they must marry.

At present “the great majority” of members of each totem, among the Arunta, are in one phratry or the other. Thus their society is either, (1) in some unknown way, rapidly approximating itself to normal totemism, or (2) has comparatively recently emerged from normal totemism. The former alternative is impossible. Each Arunta obtains his or her totem by sheer chance, by the accident of the supposed locality of his or her conception, and of the totemic *erathipa* or *ratapa* which alone haunt that spot.² Manifestly this present Arunta mode of determining totems cannot introduce the great majority of each totem into one or the other phratry or main exogamous division (Panunga-Bulthara and Purula-Kumara), for these divisions have now no local habitation or limits. Consequently the arrangement by which the great majority of each totem is in one or the other moiety can be due to nothing but the fact that the Arunta have comparatively recently emerged from normal exogamous and hereditary, into conceptional, casual, non-hereditary and non-exogamous totemism. Had they emerged long ago, and adopted their present fortuitous method of acquiring the totem, *manifestly the totems, by the operation of chance, would now be present in almost equal numbers in both phratries*. This would also be the case had Arunta totemism always been conceptional and fortuitous.

According to Spencer and Gillen, “it is the idea of spirit individuals associated with *churinga* and resident in certain definite spots, that lies at the root of the present totemic system of the Arunta tribe.”³

This is certainly true; and the facts prove, we shall see, to demonstration, that this actual “conceptional” state of Arunta totemism is later

¹ *Northern Tribes*, p. 175.

² Vol. i. pp. 189-190. *Central Tribes*, p. 123.

³ *Central Tribes*, p. 123.

than, and has caused the disappearance of the normal hereditary exogamous totemism, among the Arunta.

It is plain and manifest that if the Arunta nation, from the first, were in their present stage of "conceptional totemism"—the totem of each individual being always determined by sheer chance—when the exogamous division of the tribe was instituted, individuals of each totem would be almost equally distributed between the two main divisions, Purula-Kumara and Bulthara-Panunga. Chance could not put the great majority of the members of every totem name either into one exogamous division or the other. If any one doubts this, let him take four packs of cards (208 cards), and deal them alternately five or six times to two friends, Jones representing the phratry Bulthara-Panunga, and Brown standing for the phratry Purula-Kumara. It will not be found that Brown always holds the great majority of Court cards—Ace, King, Queen and Knave—and the great majority of tens, nines and eights: while Jones holds the great majority of sevens, sixes, and fives, fours, threes, and twos.

Chance distribution does not keep on working in that way; and the chance conceptional distribution of totems could not put the great majority of, say, Kangaroos, Hachea Flowers, Wild Cats, and Little Hawks in the Bulthara-Panunga phratry, and the great majority of Emus, Lizards, Wichetty Grubs, and Dogs in the Purula-Kumara division. That is quite impossible. Yet all (or almost all) Arunta totems are thus distributed between the two main exogamous divisions.

When once the reader understands this fact—insisted on by Spencer and Gillen—he becomes convinced, becomes mathematically certain that the chance distribution of conceptional totemism did not and could not thus array the totems of the Arunta. This present arrangement, and this alone, makes the Arunta associations with totemic names non-exogamous. I proceed to give further evidence of Spencer and Gillen. "Whilst every now and then we come across traditions, according to which, as in the case of the Achilpa," (Cats) "the totem is common to all classes¹ we always find that in each totem one moiety

¹ The myth is self-contradictory in the case of the Achilpa. They were in both phratries; the other totems were confined to one or the other phratry. In the latter case the myth exaggerates the present state of things, and puts all, not the great majority, of each totem in one phratry or the other. In the former case the myth throws the actual state of things back into the past.

of the tribe predominates,¹ and that, according to tradition, many of the groups " (totem groups) " of ancestral individuals consisted originally of men or women or of both men and women, who all belonged to one moiety. Thus in the case of certain Okira or Kangaroo groups we find only Kumara and Purula; in certain Udnirringita or Wichetty Grub groups we find only Bulthara and Panunga, in certain Achilpa or ' Wild Cat ' (groups) ' a predominance of Kumara and Purula, with a smaller number of Bulthara and Panunga. ' ² At the present day no totem is confined to either moiety of the tribe, but in each local centre we always find a great predominance of one moiety, as for example at Alice Springs, the most important centre of the Wichetty Grubs, amongst forty individuals, thirty-five belong to the Bulthara and Panunga and only five to the other moiety of the tribe. " ³

Here the great majority—thirty-five to five—of the members of the totem belong to one of the two main exogamous divisions. Outside of the Arunta nation and Kaitish all the Grubs would belong to one main exogamous division. It is mathematically certain that chance could not bring thirty-five to five members of a given totem—or, " a great majority " in each case—into one or other phratry.

Consequently the chance distribution of totems on the present conceptional Arunta system has not caused this uniform phenomenon. It follows that the totems of the Arunta were at one time hereditary, and were arranged, some exclusively in one, some exclusively in the other moiety, so that no person could marry into his or her own totem. The fortuitous system of conceptional distribution then arose out of the Arunta philosophy of spirits and emanations, and out of the *churinga nanja* usage, and has now detached a small minority of members of each totem from their original phratry and lodged them in the other. Members of every totem can therefore find legal spouses of their own totem in the phratry not their own, and may marry them. And thus these Arunta associations with totemic names are now non-exogamous. But they have been exogamous totem kins.

¹ By " moiety " the authors mean one of the two main exogamous divisions or phratries.

² *Central Tribes*, p. 120. In fact out of three Achilpa or Wild Cat sets of wanderers, two, in the legend, are exclusively of one phratry—Purula-Kumara—and one is exclusively of the other, Bulthara-Panunga, *op. cit.* p. 120.

³ *Central Tribes*, p. 120.

Mr. Frazer finds what he calls totemism without exogamy in parts of Melanesia.¹ I need not here repeat my arguments, given in *Anthropos*, vol. v. (1910) pp. 1092-1108, to prove that the so-called "totems" in this case are only animal or vegetable "familiar" of individuals. Thus the great example of "totem clans" so-called, without exogamy, is put out of action. The Arunta "clans" are not clans, and the Arunta have had exogamous totem clans like other people.

VII.

We now turn to cases in which exogamous "clans" bear, not totemic names, but local or descriptive names, like the Tlingit according to Dr. Swanton. In several instances it is easy to prove that exogamous "clans," now bearing local or other descriptive names, have previously borne totemic names. This result has often been attained by the circumstance that *with male descent of the totem name*, a regular *local* clan is formed. Such a clan then comes to be known by a territorial description (just as lairds were in Scotland) and the totemic name may drop out of use. If so, the clan becomes exogamous under a territorial or other name, and is no longer a totem clan.

But this explanation cannot apply to the Tlingit, with female descent, for with female descent, unless the men go to the women's homes, no local clan of descent is possible. I have shown that I do not pretend to know precisely what are the facts of the Tlingit system, as accounts contradict each other. But in other American cases, as in those of the Apaches and Navahos, the tribes "are divided into a large number of exogamous clans with descent in the female line, but the names of the clans appear to be local, not totemic. . . ." ² Such names are Lone Tree, Red Flat, House of the Cliffs, Bend in a Canyon, and so forth. Are such names inherited? Is every child of a woman of Red Flat called "Red Flat"? Persons of the same clan or phratry (from eight to twelve phratries) may not intermarry. The phratries "have no formal names"; speaking of his phratry a man will often refer to it by the title of its oldest or most numerous clan—and that, it seems, is always a local name. "Dr. Washington Matthews," says Mr. Frazer, "who spoke with authority on the subject,

¹ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. pp. 9, 287.

² *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 243.

was of opinion that the Navahos clans were originally and indeed till quite recently local exogamous groups and not true clans." What else can they be? But Dr. Washington Matthews found a legend which suggests that the Navahos were once totemic. If this be an explanatory myth its point is to explain *why the clans have now local names*, and why do the clans think that the fact needs explanation? "It is said that when they set out on their journey each clan was provided with a different pet, such as a bear, a puma, a deer, a snake, and a porcupine, and that when the clans received their local names these pets were set free."¹ That is, place-names ousted totem names.

It appears to me that when a tribe acquires settled habits and lives in villages, territorial names may oust totem names, and exogamy may become, as among the Navaho, local, just as it becomes local in several Australian tribes with male descent. But nothing in my theory compels me to suppose that every people has passed through totemic exogamy. Exogamy, in my view, was prior to totemism; totem names were a later way of designating local groups which were already exogamous.² "The rule would be, No marriage within the local group." The totemic names were a later addition, and I can think of no reason why all peoples should necessarily accept totemic names; only, as it chanced, the enormous majority among the lower races have done so.

Perhaps the Navaho and Apaches never had totemic names for their exogamous local groups. They are not known to exhibit any sign or vestige of totemism beyond the legend or myth of the wild animal pets.

All such cases of exogamous units bearing non-totemic names, in tribes of female descent, where no vestige of totemism is found, are outside of the field of totemism. Why should we treat people as totemic who have no totems? If we held the opinion that totemism was the cause of exogamy, the position would be different. At one time I thought that the totem and the totem blood taboo, clinched, as it were, and sanctified a pre-existing exogamy. But as I never found that marriage within the totem was automatically punished by sickness

¹ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. p. 245, note 5, citing Washington Matthews. *J. A. F.*, iii., 1890, p. 105, and *Navaho Legends*, p. 31, 1897.

² *Secret of the Totem*, pp. 114, 115.

or death ; (as, in many tribes, the offence of eating the totem is supposed to be); I saw that marriage within the totem was a breach of *secular* law, punished capitally by "the State." There is no taboo in the case. But as we repudiate the opinion that totemism was the cause of exogamy, in studying totemism we have no concern with peoples who are exogamous but show no trace of having ever been totemic.

VIII.

The case of the Tlingit is quite different. Here the phratries have totemic names ; the "clans" in the phratries are said, by early authorities, to have totemic names ; the "crests" (mainly the same animals as those said to give names to the Tlingit "clans") are readily to be explained by totemism evolving into heraldry.

But, if the Tlingit clans have not totemic names, then it would appear that, among a people of dwellers in towns, local names of local groups have succeeded to totemic names of totemic kins. This can only occur where people have settled habitations, towns or villages, or where totem kins have been localised by male descent.

We know that, even among some of the Australian tribes with male descent, totem kins become local groups, and thus the predominant totem of each such group becomes attached to a locality, as among the Narran-ga of Yorke Peninsula. They had two pairs of phratries of animal names :

Emu.	Eagle Hawk.
Red Kangaroo.	Shark.

In each such phratry was a number of totem kins, the same totem never appearing in more than one phratry (or "class" in Mr. Howitt's term). Each class or phratry was limited to a certain territory : Emu to the north, Red Kangaroo to the east, Eagle Hawk to the west, and Shark to the extreme point of the peninsula (south). The totems, passing from father to son, were thus localised. They ceased to be exogamous—obviously because each man, to find a wife eligible on exogamous principles, had to travel to a place inconveniently remote. Thus the only restriction on marriage was "forbidden degrees" of consanguinity.¹

¹ Howitt, *N.T.S.E.A.*, pp. 124, 130, 258, 259.

All this is easily intelligible. Male descent fixed phratries and totems to localities. By the old rule, if Emu phratry had to marry into Shark phratry, the localities were at the extreme ends of the peninsula, north and south; the other two phratries were as far asunder as the east of the peninsula is from the west. Consequently, though the old machinery of exogamy existed, the practice of exogamy was dropped: persons might marry within their own totem kins. But we are not told whether all four "classes" intermarried, or each "class" only with one other, because the old rule had fallen into disuse before the coming of Europeans.

Mr. Howitt gives a case of "the transfer of the prohibition of marriage within the totem, to the totem clan—that is, to the locality." In this case, that of the Narrinyeri, with male descent, most "clans" have a local name, or a nickname, and have totems. But three such units or "clans" out of twenty retain their totem names—Whale, Coot, Mullet—thus indicating that totemic preceded local names. A *local* "clan" may have as many as three totems, but in thirteen cases out of twenty each local clan had but one totem. Among nicknames are "Gone over there," and "Where shall we go?" These clans (thirteen out of twenty) having local names, were strictly exogamous. So also, of course, were the totems of the local clans; though, save in three cases, the name of the place of residence, or a nickname, had superseded the totem name as the title of the clan. It is as if, in place of speaking of the MacIans, we said "the Glencoe men"; instead of speaking of the Stewarts, said "the Appin men"; in place of speaking of the Camerons, said "the men of Lochaber."

Thus it by no means follows that if the exogamous "clans" of any tribe of the North-West Pacific have local names, therefore they never had totemic names, as many of them have to this day. The rise of settled towns or village communities yields a new set of conditions, and a new set of non-totemic names for the clans, in some cases; precisely as the localisation of a totem clan through the operation of male descent causes a local name to take the place, usually but not universally, of a totem clan name in Southern Victoria.

Consequently Mr. Goldenweizer can make no argumentative use of the alleged local names of the Tlingit clans. If the totemic names of exogamous units—showing connections with totemism in crests and

totemic phratry names—be absent, that is because, under known conditions, they have been superseded by local names or nicknames. This process is a *vera causa* in totemic society.

IX.

I now give an American case, in which a tribe, the Mandans, exhibit female descent, exogamous clans, and a mixture of totemic clan names with local names or *sobriquets*. The people were settled, lived in villages or towns, "with houses very commodious, neat, and comfortable." The tribe was agricultural, growing maize, beans, pumpkins, and tobacco. Out of seven clan names four were totemic—Wolf, Bear, Prairie Chicken, Eagle; two—Flathead and Good Knife—look like nicknames; High Village is local.¹ Here we find other sorts of clan names encroaching on totem names.

Among the Crows, with exogamous clans and female descent, out of twelve clan names four are totemic—Prairie Dog, Skunk, Raven, Antelope; three are very unkind nicknames.²

The American tribes have been much disturbed by the whites, and many changes have occurred in their institutions. As Mr. Frazer points out, in a book of 1781 Captain Carver describes Siouan "bands" or "tribes" (really totem kins), each with a badge representing an animal, and named after the animals: Eagles, Panthers, Tigers, Buffaloes, Snakes, Tortoises, Squirrels, Wolves, etc. These people were Sioux or Dacotas; whether they were exogamous or not Carver does not say. But, in place of now bearing totemic names, the "gentes" of these people are at present distinguished by obvious and even odious nicknames, such as "Breakers of the Law," because members of this *gens* disregarded the marriage law by taking wives within the *gens*.

So says Mr. Dorsey. Mr. Frazer says the bands of this tribe are not exogamous. But they must have been exogamous when a *gens* received a nickname for breaking the law of exogamy. One "band" or *gens* "Eats no Geese"; it may have been a Goose clan. Other bands or *gentes* bear nicknames or local names.³

¹ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. pp. 135, 136. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, p. 158.

² *T. and E.*, vol. iii. pp. 153, 154.

³ *T. and E.*, vol. iii. pp. 86, 87. Dorsey, *R.B.E.*, xv. (1897) p. 215 *et seq.*

I need not give more examples. In America, as in Australia, various conditions, already mentioned, cause changes from totemic names of exogamous clans to local names and nicknames.

It has now been proved that though, in very rare cases, such as those of the Arunta and Narran-ga, sets of people may have totemic names, yet marry within the name; and that, though "clans" may be exogamous and yet bear names which are not totemic, nevertheless the co-existence of totemic names with exogamy prevails in the overwhelming majority of instances, while the exceptions, as they have been accounted for by their causes, prove the rule. Consequently I see no error of method in holding that the totemic name and exogamy are normal features of totemism, while totemism is "an integral phenomenon."

This is my answer to Mr. Goldenweizer's criticisms. Of course I do not say that totemism was the cause of exogamy; I hold that exogamy was prior to totemism, and think it perfectly possible that some exogamous peoples may never have been totemic.

In this discussion I have, not illogically I hope, taken into account relative conditions of advancement among the peoples studied. I have not here shown that reckoning descent in the male line is a social advance on reckoning in the female line, but I am able to prove that it is, at least in Australia. I have shown that wealth, rank, and settled habitations tend to modify totemism, for example, by introducing heraldry, and enabling non-totemic to supersede, now more now less, the totemic names of exogamous units.

Mr. Goldenweizer, as we saw, writes "that these conditions are due to the fact that the tribes of British Columbia are 'advanced' cannot be admitted."¹ I am sorry that he cannot admit what is true and obvious. The wealth, the art, the degrees of rank, the settled houses and towns of the British Columbian tribes have introduced the perplexities of their heraldry; as in other parts of America and in Australia other causes have brought in local names for exogamous kins.

¹*J. A. F.* p. 287.

GLASGOW : PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
BY ROBERT MACLEHOSE AND CO. LTD.

WHERE WAS EDEN?

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UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

GLASGOW

Printed at the University Press by
ROBERT MACLEHOSE & CO. LTD.

1911

Where was Eden?

THE site of Eden still awaits identification. The Garden has been fruitful of much speculation, and its four rivers have occasioned much searching geographical inquiry. Eden has been located by critics in Armenia: in Babylonia (both near the city of Babylon and near Abu Shahrein [ancient Eridu]): in Arabia (S., E., N.W., and N.): in the Palestinian Negeb: near Damascus: near Kashmir: near the Altai Mountains: on the mountains above Pamir: in Somaliland. Even Australia and the North Pole have their advocates.¹ By the 'astral school' of Babylonian scholars, it is contended that Eden must be sought in the starry heavens. The river that "went forth from Eden" is the Milky Way, and through their own telescopes they observe it branching into four. No site yet suggested, however, nor theory propounded has met with general acceptance and many critics in despair are looking to comparative mythology for fresh light on the problem. The present writer does not expect to be more successful than the more capable critics who have preceded him, but since the view he here presents appears to him to offer a possible solution of the difficulties he ventures to submit it to the judgment of scholars.

Assuming for the moment that the story of the Garden of Eden [Gn. ii 8–iii 24] is the work of one hand and has come down to us in an inviolate text, there are four references, or passages, in the

¹ Particulars and criticisms of these various theories may be found in the more recent commentaries on Genesis, especially those of Driver (1904), and Skinner (1910). Compare also Delitzsch, *Wo lag das Paradies?*, (1881), pp. 11 ff., Sayce in Hastings' *D.B. s.v.* Garden of Eden, and Cheyne in *En. B. s.v.* Paradise.

narrative indicative of site;¹ (1) eastward (מִקְרָם) [ii 8a],² (2) the name Eden, (3) the passage relating to the river of Eden, its four branches and the associated lands [ii 10-14], (4) the final extrusion and exclusion of the man from the Garden [iii 23-24]. Of these the first and third appear to locate the garden on the earth. The second points to no solution since no suitable corresponding place-name has yet been brought into connection with the name Eden.³

¹ Some critics would find other indirect references in the garments of fig leaves (37) and in the 'cool of the day' (lit. 'wind of the day' or evening breeze (רוּחַ הַיּוֹם) (38) to indicate that Eden was situated in a warm zone. But such reflections might be due to a writer ignorant of great climatic differences who imagined the whole world possessed of a climate the same as that in which he lived. Against the fig-leaf aprons may be set the 'coats of skins' (321).

² מִקְרָם—a somewhat elusive word as to meaning. In general it seems to denote "eastward," or "on the east side,"—cf. Gn. 11², 12⁸, 13¹¹, all passages assigned by scholars to the same hand (J) as Gn. 2^{4b}-3²⁴. The meaning of מִקְרָם in Gn. 3²⁴ is not very clear. In Gn. 2⁸ the LXX has κατ(ὰ) ἀνατολὰς [Josephus, *Ant.* I. i—πρὸς τὴν ἀνατολήν]. The Vulgate, on the other hand, has a *principio*, "from aforetime," the sense in which מִקְרָם is most frequently used in the Psalms and prophetic writings.

³ *Eden*—apparently not to be confused with the place-name עֵדֵן to which references are made in II Ki. 19¹² || I Is. 37¹², Ezek. 27²³, Am. 1⁵; [cf. W. M. Müller, *Asien u. Europa* p. 291]. In II Ki. 19¹² (|| I Is. 37¹²) the בני עֵדֵן are mentioned as in Telassar. According to Delitzsch, *Paradies*, pp. 3 ff., 262 ff., the עֵדֵן here, as well as in Ezek. 27²³ (עֵדֵן) and Am. 1⁵ (בית עֵדֵן), must be identified with the Babylonian *Bit-Adini*. The בית עֵדֵן of Am. 1⁵ has been looked for elsewhere. According to E. Robinson, *Bib. Res.* iii, p. 556, it is *Paradisus* (cf. Ptol. *Geog.* v. 14) mod. *Jusieh*—cf. also Steiner and Hoffmann, *Z.A.W.* iii, (1883), p. 97. A Babylonian identification of Eden has been persistently sought. It has been brought into connection with the Babylonian district *Karduniaš* [varr. *Kar-du-ni-ši*, *Gin-du-ni-šu*] so Rawlinson (*vide* Delitzsch, *Paradies*, pp. 65 ff., 133 ff.). Amongst a list of cities in the Sumerian language is mentioned *Sipar Édina* = Sippar of Eden (so Pinches, *O.T. and Bab.-Assy. Records*,² (1903), p. 70). Then there must be mentioned *Gu-edin-na* (thought by Hommel to be the old name for the Chaldaeans) [III R. 53, 4; II R. 59, Rev. 43; IV R. 21*, no 2, Rev. 19], *nar-edin-na*, *kiš-edin-na* (rivers) which Hommel has brought into comparison with the name [cf. Hommel, *Geog. u. Gesch.* pp. 241 ff.; *vide* Jeremias, *A.T.A.O.*², (1906), pp. 188 f.]. In one of the great syllabaries (S^b) *edinu* is synonym for *šēru*—"plain, desert." It is interesting to note that עֵדֵן has no determinative אֶרֶץ which J appears to use when the land-name is unfamiliar (as אֶרֶץ נֹד, Gn. 4¹⁶), poetical (as אֶרֶץ שְׁנַעַר, Gn. 11²) or comprehensive (as אֶרֶץ כְּנַעַן, Gn. 12⁶, etc.). Familiar lands such as מִצְרַיִם have no determinative אֶרֶץ. It has been contended that עֵדֵן was originally not a place-name at all, but meant "pleasure, delight," in which sense it is obviously used in II Sam. 1²⁴, Je. 51³⁴, Ps. 36⁹. In Gn. 18¹² J uses a fem. form עֵדֵנָה in this sense. This view is supported by the LXX renderings of עֵדֵן as ἡ τρυφή in Ezekiel and Joel [i.e. Ez. 28¹³, 31⁹, 16, 18, 18, 36³⁵;

The fourth, again, encourages strongly the view that the 'garden' is not on earth at all, since it is a place whence man was driven, presumably for all time.

The presence of such curiously contradictory conceptions of the same place within the limits of a comparatively short narrative suggests the desirability of a closer examination of the form of the story and of the condition of the text. Even if we agree with Driver that we have in the Paradise story, as, indeed, in general in the early chapters of Genesis, the expression in allegorical dress of profound truths respecting the nature of man, and "that what we have to consider is not the question of the site of Paradise as a real locality, but the question of its site as it was pictured by the Hebrew narrator,"¹ we have not rid our path of difficulties. Was the Paradise of the Hebrew narrator an *ideal* locality, whose only existence was in his own mind? That would accord well with Gn. iii 23 f., but is quite inconsistent with Gn. ii 10-14. The latter passage clearly indicates that to the narrator Eden was a *real* locality, the site of which he was at pains to define. It may be contended, of course, that although the narrator pictured to himself a real locality, an imperfect knowledge of geography may have occasioned a faulty presentment of its situation. But even allowing this contention full weight, it cannot reconcile the fundamental opposition of conceptions to which attention has been directed. The most feasible solution,—and as we shall see it is one justified by other evidence,—seems to lie in a surrender of the assumption that the whole section is the work of one hand and the reflection of one mind. We have to deal with a composite document, the constituent elements of which it is our task to determine.

Analysis of the Narrative. The story of the Garden of Eden is contained in Gn. ii 8—iii 24. This section in its turn forms part of a larger whole extending from ii 4b—iii 24, and distinguished

Jo. 2³]. The LXX reading for Is. 51³, however, is παράδεισος, and for Genesis [2⁸, 10, 15, 3²³, 24, 4¹⁶] it is Ἔδεμ. The Vulgate renders the גֶּן־עֵדֶן of Gn. 2⁸ by *paradisus voluptatis*. This seems by implication the interpretation put upon it by Josephus [φησὶ δὲ τὸν Θεὸν καὶ παράδεισον πρὸς τὴν ἀνατολὴν καταφυτεῦσαι παντοίῳ τεθηλότα φυτῶ.—*Ant.* I. i 3], who knows of no land Eden [*cf.* his 11¹ passage to Gn. 4¹⁶—Ναῖδα τόπον οὕτω καλούμενον—*Ant.* I. ii 2].

¹ *Genesis* (1904), pp. 57 f.

from the surrounding context by the use of the double name **יהוה אלהים**.¹ Thus in Gn. i 1–ii 4a (also a whole and attributed to P) the divine name employed is **אלהים**. In chapter iv again there is a sudden change to the use of **יהוה** alone. Modern criticism in general assigns the Eden story to J.

An examination of the whole section [ii 4a–iii 24] reveals a curious mingling of subjects. The section opens with what purports to be an account of creation [v. 4b]. A ‘mist’ goes up from the earth [v. 6], and the man is formed [v. 7]. After the statement in v. 5, we expect an account of the creation of vegetation to follow. But at this stage the creation narrative is interrupted by the opening account of the Garden of Eden [v. 8]. Vegetation of a *particular kind*² (**עץ**) is made to grow within the confines of the garden [v. 9]. A river issues from Eden [v. 10] which branches into four [vv. 11–14]. The man is put into the garden with certain injunctions vv. 15–17]. In v. 18 we have the recognition that an help-meet is essential for the man. In v. 19a we have an account of the creation of beasts and birds, but not of the help-meet which we were led to expect from the tenour of v. 18. Then follows the naming of the beasts and birds [v. 19b]. Vv. 21 f. contain the delayed account of the creation of the help-meet, and her name [**אִשָּׁה**]. V. 25 furnishes the connecting link with chap. iii. Chap. iii vv. 1–19

¹The distinctive use of the two-fold name, may be due to the final redactor [R_p], who adopted this device to bridge over the incongruity occasioned by the sudden and unexplained change in the divine name from *Elohim* in the first chapter to *Jahveh* in the second. This seems the most plausible explanation, although others are possible. Thus J may have availed himself of an older document in which *Elohim* was employed, and added of his own accord *Jahveh* thereto. Or the composite name may be due to some Q^{erê} [**יהוה** or **אלהים**] which has crept into the text. The LXX and Vulgate, it should be observed, read most often *ὁ θεός* [**אלהים**]. In the conversation between the woman and the serpent, the name used is merely **אלהים** [Gn. 3^{1, 3, 5}]. Whatever be the true explanation of the phenomenon, it can hardly represent a fusion of J and P sections dealing with the same theme.

²*Cf.* the **שִׁיָּה** and **עֵצָב** of v. 5 which we should have expected here. V. 8 limits the garden to an orchard. It might be argued that other forms of vegetation than the **עֵץ** may be comprised in the **יִצְטַע** of v. 8, but **נָטַע** in addition to its literal meaning of planting (trees, etc.) has the figurative sense of establishing [*cf.* Is. 51¹⁶ (the heavens); Je. 1¹⁰, 18⁹, 31²⁸ (people), etc.] which would be quite suitable here. It must, however, be acknowledged that where J employs the word elsewhere [*i.e.* Gn. 21³³ (a tamarisk tree), Gn. 9²⁰ (a vineyard); Nu. 24⁶ [JE] (vine)] it is taken in the literal sense.

form a continuous narrative which flows logically and without interruption. In *v.* 20 we have another name given to the woman [חַוְוָה]. Adam and Eve are clothed in skins [*v.* 21] (in iii *v.* 7 their garments were aprons of fig leaves). The expulsion from the garden follows [*vv.* 22-24].

Obviously we have here the commingling of, at least, two originally distinct narratives (1) a Creation story, (2) a Paradise story.

The Creation Story. A continuous narrative is furnished by ii *vv.* 4*b*, (5*a*), 7, 9*a*, 19*a*, 20, 18, 21, 22, 23*b* (or iii *v.* 20). Of the nature of redactional additions are *vv.* 5*b*, 9*b*, 19*b* (?), 24. *V.* 23*a* is apparently a quotation from an old form of words used at a marriage ceremony.

In the day that the **Lord God made** earth and heavens. (And no plant of the field was yet in the earth, and no herb of the field had yet sprung up.) . . . And the **Lord God formed** the man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living soul. . . . (And out of the ground the **Lord God made to grow** every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food.) . . . And the **Lord God formed** from the ground every living thing of the field, and every fowl of the heavens, and brought [them] unto the man to see what he would call them (lit. it.) . . . And the man gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the heavens, and to every beast of the field; and for the man he had not found an help-meet for him. . . . And the **Lord God said** "It is not good that man should be alone. I will make an help-meet for him." . . . And the **Lord God caused to fall** a deep sleep upon the man, and he slept, and he took one of his ribs and closed up the flesh after it. And the **Lord God built** the rib which he took from man into woman and he brought her unto the man. . . . (And the man said she shall be called woman because she was taken from man.)

The Paradise Story. A continuous narrative is also furnished by ii *vv.* 8, 9*a*, (9*b*), 15-17, iii 1-19, 22-24.

And the **Lord God planted** a garden eastward in Eden: and there he put the man whom he had formed. And out of the ground the **Lord God made to grow** every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food; (the tree of life also in the midst of the garden and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.) . . . And the **Lord God took** the man, and put him into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it. And the **Lord God commanded** the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die. . . . And the serpent was more subtil than any beast

of the field which the **Lord God had made**. And he said, *etc.* . . . to v. 19. (To this, perhaps the conclusion [vv. 22-24] falls to be added.)

It may be supposed that the foregoing roughly indicates the two main documents of which the section is composed. They contain the *matter* of the two originals,—which may have existed either in the form of oral tradition or written records—and probably even the actual wording in parts, but they have been worked over by J who appears to have fused them together, and cast their contents into the mould of his own style. That this is not a forced division is shown by the treatment meted out to it by Josephus, who claims [*Ant.* Pref. §4] to follow the sacred books.¹ Josephus separates the creation elements from the Paradise story.² He is clearly conscious of the diversity between the creation account of Gn. i 1–ii 4a and that in the section under review, explaining away the discrepancy by maintaining that after the seventh day Moses began *φυσιολογεῖν περὶ τῆς τ' ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς*.³ We must for the moment be content, however, merely to draw attention to the existence of these different documents without making any effort at closer delimitation.

A third document. It will be observed that no attempt has been made to include vv. 6, 10-14 in either of the foregoing. These verses are marked off for differential treatment by certain peculiar characteristics. Since vv. 11-14 hinge on v. 10, being of the nature of a gloss on that verse, our immediate concern is with vv. 6 and 10. For convenience we reproduce the Hebrew.

¹There can be no doubt that Josephus had other sources of information than the Massoretic Text at hand. By some he is thought to be merely a clever compiler.—Cf. Bloch, *Quellen des Josephus*, (1879), also Büchler, *Rev. d. Ét. Juives*, xxxii, (1896), p. 199, and xxxiv, (1898), p. 93.

²Josephus [*Ant.* I. i 2] treats in general terms of the formation of man [cf. Gn. 2⁷], the name Adam, and the presentation of the creatures [cf. v. 19], their naming [cf. vv. 19b, 20], the recognition of the need of an help-meet [cf. v. 18], the creation of woman [cf. vv. 21, 22], and he cleverly unites the passages Gn. 2²³, 3²⁰ on the naming of woman. In *Ant.* I. i 3-4 he takes up the Paradise narrative separately.

³Since in his Preface he asserts that the great lawgiver only shrewdly hinted at some things, whilst others again he concealed in a dignified allegory, explaining expressly such things as it was expedient to discuss directly [πάντα γὰρ τῇ τῶν ὄλων φύσει σύμφωνον ἔχει τὴν διάθεσιν, τὰ μὲν αἰνιττομένου τοῦ νομοθέτου δεξιῶς, τὰ δ' ἀλληγοροῦντος μετὰ σεμνότητος, ὅσα δ' ἐξ εὐθείας λέγεσθαι συνέφερε, ταῦτα ῥητῶς ἐμφανίζοντος], Josephus probably means by *φυσιολογεῖν* some allegorical or enigmatical treatment of the subject.

וַאֲד יַעֲלֶה מִן־הָאָרֶץ וְהִשְׁקָה אֶת־כָּל־פְּנֵי הָאֲדָמָה : 6

וְנָהָר יֵצֵא מֵעֵדֶן לְהִשְׁקוֹת אֶת־הַגֶּן וּמִשָּׁם יִפְרָד וְהָיָה לְאַרְבָּעָה 10

רָאשִׁים :

The peculiarities to note in connection with these two verses are:

(a) *the absence of the name יהוה אלהים* from both. In both cases we have every reason to expect the divine name. Observe in the context how each new phenomenon of creation is attributed to the active intervention of the Lord God,—the Lord God made, the Lord God formed, the Lord God planted, made to grow, took, etc. It is the same in the first chapter of Genesis. Each new act of creation is ascribed to the power of the word of God. Each is introduced by the familiar phrase “And God said.” In the present case both verses introduce phenomena, which consistently with the context ought to have been assigned to the activity of Jahveh Elohim. In *v.* 6 an אֲד goes up either from, or upon,¹ the earth. In *v.* 10 a river issues forth from Eden. We should thus have expected in *v.* 6 . . . וַיַּעַל יְהוה אֱלֹהִים אֲד. and in *v.* 10 . . . וַיֵּצֵא יְהוה אֱלֹהִים נָהָר.

(b) A second point to notice is that the *grammatical cast* of both verses is the same, and that in this respect also they differ from the context. Take *v.* 6, for instance. The ‘tense’ of the sentence is the Imperfect probably with Jussive force. “And an אֲד shall go up from (upon) the earth and shall water the whole surface of the ground.” Or it may be “and let an אֲד go up,” etc. “and let it water,” etc. It is not merely a “continuation of the descriptive sentence by the Imperfect and consecutive Perfect” [Dillmann]. In *v.* 10 we have an unusual construction,—the Participle followed by an Imperfect.² It almost seems as if by the use of the Participle an attempt had been made by the Massoretes to get back

¹ so in Merx, *Chrestomathia Targumica* (1888), also Haupt, *Proceedings of American Oriental Society* 1896, pp. 158 ff.

² “The Participle, followed by the Imperfect and the consecutive Perfect, expresses continuance; whether in the past or in the present of the author, may seem doubtful. The statement of purpose להשקות, leads rather to the former conclusion.”—Dillmann, *Genesis*, (Eng. Transl.), i (1897), p. 123.

to the Perfect in this manner since the form of the sentence denied them otherwise. The original reading in accord with *v.* 6 was, no doubt, **נַחַל** not **נַחַל**.

(c) *The tenour of the verses* marks them off from the surrounding text. It has long been recognised that *vv.* 10-14 had no part in the original narrative.¹ They obviously interrupt it. Holzinger, too, has recognised the individuality of *v.* 6, and thinks that it once stood after *v.* 8 in the description of the garden.² As we have shown above in our analysis, they can be removed without inconvenience from their place in the text for separate consideration. According to 10a a distinction must be made between Eden and the garden. It has never been evident why such distinction should be made. That Eden and the garden have separate identities might be maintained from the **גֵּן-בְּעֵדֶן** of 8a, but the **ב** has all the appearance of an interpolation introduced to justify and support the reading of 10a.³ Why, too, should the source of the river be outside the garden? Nothing in the narrative hangs on a distinction between Eden and the garden. The phrase "from there it shall be divided" only increases the confusion of ideas into which the verse throws us. Was the river divided before it reached the garden, or in the garden, or after it left the garden? Some critics argue for the separation taking place at the boundary of the garden or just within the garden at the point where the river is about to make its exit. But these are problems that only those who defend the unity of the section are called upon to solve. They serve to justify our separation of *vv.* 10-14 from the surrounding text.

The only connection these verses have with the story of Eden

¹ Such is the view *e.g.* of Ewald, Dillmann, Bunsen, Toy, Holzinger, Gunkel, Cheyne.

² Cf., however, Cheyne, *En. B. s.v.* Paradise, col. 3573.

³ Elsewhere the garden appears to be identified with Eden, if indeed **עֵדֶן** is to be taken as a place-name. Thus we have **גֵּן-עֵדֶן** merely, Gn. 2¹⁵, 3^{23, 24}; Ezek. 36³⁵ [where "the desolate land" shall become **בְּנֵי-עֵדֶן**]; so also Joel 2³. The identification of the garden with Eden is more obvious in Is. 51³, where **עֵדֶן** is found in poetic apposition with **גֵּן-הַיְדִירָה**, and in Ezek. 28¹³ with **גֵּן-אֱלֹהִים**. Identity is also suggested in Ezek. 31^{8, 9}. It is thus exceedingly probable that the **גֵּן-בְּעֵדֶן** of Gn. 8a was originally **גֵּן-עֵדֶן**. Indeed if the true reading were **בְּעֵדֶן** we should scarcely expect **גֵּן** and **בְּעֵדֶן** to be joined by the *maqṣeph*. The **ב** is antagonistic to the spirit of the *maqṣeph*. In the editions of Ginsburg and Baer, *e.g.*, the *maqṣeph* is omitted, but to all seeming it is the **ב** that should be removed instead. This is an emendation already suggested by Reuss.

is found in 10a. There we learn that a river went forth from *Eden* to water the *garden*. So runs the Massoretic Text. It may be asked, is this not proof that v. 10 at least belongs to the Paradise narrative? So strongly however does the evidence weigh against the inclusion of v. 10, that we are rather compelled to look for some explanation of the occurrence of the word עֵדֵן here at all. We very much doubt if the original text had it. It is much more probable that the reading was עֵיִן instead of עֵדֵן,¹ a change that is but slight and could easily have been made. Slight carelessness on the part of a scribe would suffice to create confusion between the י and the ך, more especially in the period prior to the introduction of the square character, when these letters were of the same size and a slight irregularity in the horizontal lines would serve to make them indistinguishable.² But this question of the substitution of עֵדֵן for עֵיִן takes us back to a further consideration of v. 6.

In v. 6 we are told that “an אֵדֵן shall go up from (upon) the earth and shall water the whole surface of the ground.” The meaning of אֵדֵן is not very clear. The word occurs in only one other passage of the Old Testament [Job xxxvi 27] where the interpretation is not obvious. Indeed the whole passage here is obscure and difficult.³ The LXX reads [Gn. ii 6] πηγὴ δὲ ἀνέβαινεν κ.τ.λ., and on the strength of this reading⁴ we may reconstruct the original Hebrew as . . . תַּעֲלֶה וְעֵיִן—a reconstruction that has been suggested before now. If עֵיִן, then, was the reading of the original text, why was אֵדֵן substituted? The reason is not far

¹ Perhaps instead of מַעְיָן or מַעֲיִן in v. 10 we should read מַעְיָן spring or fountain, in apposition to נָהָר.

² Cf., e.g., the י and the ך of the Siloam Inscription.

³ The passage runs יִגְרַע וְנִטְפֵּי-מַיִם יִזְקֶי מִטָּר לְאָדָם:—Literally—“For he shall draw up the drops of water, they (or perhaps *he*—reading יִזְק) shall refine [or perhaps *store up*, *bind up*—יִזְקֶי, cf. וְקָסִים=‘fettlers’ (or Aram. וְקָסִים=wine-skin)] the rain to its (*his*?)

? (mist? or cistern?).” Some critics wish to read לְנֶאֱדָר=“to his water-skin.” There appears to be an inclination to identify אֵדֵן with Assyr. *edû* ‘flood, floodwater,’ but this must be regarded with Zimmern [*K.A.T.*³, (1903), p. 529] as doubtful.

⁴ The LXX is supported in this reading by the Peshitta and the Vulgate. Aquila has ἐπιβλυσμός.

to seek. In אדם and אדמה we have a play upon words such as the Hebrew mind took delight in—אדם is formed from the אדמה. This play upon words has been extended by some later priestly investigator who conceived the brilliant idea of substituting אר for עין. An אר ascends from the earth and אדם is formed from the אדמה.¹

This עין, moreover, would give us a valuable additional connecting link between vv. 6 and 10. These sentences would then run

וַעֲיִן תַּעֲלֶה מִן־הָאָרֶץ . . . 6

וַנָּהָר יֵצֵא מִן־הָעֵץ . . . 10

In respect both of form and matter these verses purport to be a fragment of a creation story. As we know from Babylonian literature there could be several theories of creation existing side by side amongst the same people. Even in the Old Testament we have traces of more than one cosmogony and several cosmogonic echoes.² The verses before us, moreover, were to all seeming consecutive portions of the same document. Adhering to a strictly literal interpretation of the verses, we should say that this document formed a cosmogonic narrative, wherein, after the fashion of the cosmogony of P [Gn. i 1–ii 4a], the several acts of creation resulted from the divine command.

We have now distinguished in the section Gn. ii 4b–iii 24, three separate sources or documents—(1) a creation story, which for convenience we shall call *c*, (2) the garden story, which we shall call *g*, and (3) a cosmogonic fragment, which since it centres on the fountain (עין) we shall denote *f*.

It is of interest and of importance to compare the three creation

¹ There is another play upon words in the section of which we treat. Compare the עָרִים of Gn. 2²⁵ [= 'naked,' $\sqrt{\text{עָרַה}}$] with the עָרִים of Gn. 3¹ [= crafty, shrewd, $\sqrt{\text{עָרַם}}$]. As Gn. 2²⁵ is a later interpolation, we may be justified in assuming that the same hand which introduced this verse, is responsible for the substitution of אר for עין.

² Cf. (in addition to the cosmogonies in the first two chapters of Genesis) Job 38⁴⁻¹¹; Prov. 8²³⁻²⁹. We have cosmogonic echoes in Gn. 49²⁵; Judg. 5²⁰; Job 15^{7, 8}; and figurative reflections of the Babylonian myth in Is. 27¹, 51^{9b}; Ps. 74^{13, 14}, 89^{10, 11}; Job 3⁸, 9¹³, 26^{12, 13}. On the various Babylonian creation myths *vide* Weber, *Literatur der Babylonier und Assyrier*, (1906), pp. 40-60.

stories or fragments of such, which, if our analysis be correct, we find within such short compass. These are our *c* and *f* documents, and the cosmogony of P [Gn. i 1–ii 4a].

(a) *The c document.* According to *c*, when the earth and heavens are fashioned by God, the earth is *dry*—so dry that no vegetation can grow upon it. The implication [*cf.* *v.* 5*b*] is that the earth will be watered by rain. The author of *c* does not seem to be acquainted with any other means of irrigation. He makes no mention of any great body of water, such as seas, or rivers. Nor is this an accidental omission due to J. It is inherent in the document itself as is manifest from *vv.* 19, 20, where only ‘beasts of the field’ and ‘fowls of the air’ are included in the creation of the animals. No mention is made of the denizens of the deep, so conspicuous in P’s cosmogony—no ‘waters bringing forth abundantly the moving thing that hath life’ [*cf.* Gn. i 20–22].

c is the simplest of our three cosmogonic documents. Its conception of the Deity and of the universe is the most rudimentary. God labours in the process of creation. He shapes the earth and heavens, forms man of dust from the ground, and out of the ground fashions the beasts of the field and the fowl of the air. The notion of creation here presented could only have been the expression of the reflections of a people of primitive culture. The outlook is circumscribed. It is the cosmogony of a child of nature. The surrounding is that of the desert, where water is scarce, where the earth is dry and dusty, and where vegetation springs luxuriant after rain. There is here none of the sublimity of P’s narrative, where God but spake and it was done.

(b) *The f document.* Short though it is, this fragment takes us into an entirely different atmosphere. We are at once conscious of a wider and more comprehensive outlook, the fruits of riper speculation. If *c* is the outcome of desert musings, *f* is the product of culture in a land of cultivation. The author of *f* has in his mind’s eye a grand terrestrial scheme of irrigation. Four rivers branch off from a parent river, which in its turn is fed from a fountain,—no doubt one of the fountains of the great deep.¹ The parent river is

¹ *Cf.* Gn. 7^{11b} (P), 8² (P) [מַעְיָנוֹת הַחַיִּים (רְבָה)]; Pr. 8²⁸ [מַעְיָנוֹת הַחַיִּים]; Job 38¹⁶ [נַבְיִי־יָם].

probably the circumfluent Okeanos.¹ The four great world rivers—perhaps one for each of the great world divisions—leave it to rejoin it again. “Unto the place whence the rivers go, thither they return again.”²

Such conceptions as these could only originate amongst a people familiar with broad and extensive waterways. There can be no hesitation in fixing the birthplace of *f*. Babylonia is writ large upon it. The terminations of the names Pishon and Gihon, too, suggest Hebraised forms of Babylonian-Assyrian names terminating in *ānu*. Even the form of sentence with the subject preceding the verb is after true Babylonian fashion.³

(c) *The P cosmogony*. In Genesis i 1–ii 4a we recognise the work of a writer who has a grand conception of the universe and a noble and exalted conception of God. The outlook revealed is wide, and the scheme of creation logical. He covers the whole universe in his range. His cosmology, however, is still tinged with the crudities of early speculative philosophy. To the writer of P the heaven is still a solid roof overhead restraining the waters of the *primaeval* abyss with floodgates whence these waters escape as rain [*cf.* Gn. vii 11]. But his education has been extensive. He knows of the wonders of the heavens. He can appreciate the value of the planetary orbs for omens [אַתָּת], for the determination of the sacred seasons [מוֹעֲדִים], and for recording time in general [יָמִים וְשָׁנִים].

¹ An all-encircling Okeanos, known to the Greeks of Homeric times, was also believed in by the Babylonians. The well-known *Mapa Mundi* in the British Museum [No. 92687; *cf.* C.T. xxii 48] depicts the world encircled by a *nār marratum* (“bitter river,” viz. salt sea). The *nār marratum* is not merely the Persian Gulf, as some commentators assume. It is the ocean, the *river* which encircles the earth. In one of the Assyrian syllabaries *marratu* is given as synonymous with *unqu*, ring. The circular shape of the earth (probably a deduction from the form of the horizon) seems to be the assumption underlying such passages as Is. 40²²; Pr. 8²⁷; Job 26¹⁰. In Ps. 65¹⁰ (9) behind the figurative language we have possibly the thought of the ocean as the פְּלֵג אֱלֹהִים, or canal of God. According to Josephus the river of Eden is the river that surrounds the earth. [Ἄρδεται δ' οὗτος ὁ κήπος ὑπὸ ἐνὸς ποταμοῦ, πᾶσαν ἐν κύκλῳ τὴν γῆν περιρρέοντος, ὅς ἐστι τέσσαρα μέρη σχίζεται κ.τ.λ.—*Ant.* I. i 3]. We do not know what authority Josephus followed, but his account is certainly in conformity with the spirit of the *f* document and may represent an earlier and better form of text free from disfiguring emendations.

² Eccles. 1⁷.

³ Pride of place might have been given to the subject in vv. 6 and 10 as a direct translation from a Babylonian original.

He knows of the 'great sea-serpents' [תַּנִּינִים גְּדֹלִים], presupposing a general acquaintance with the great deep and the tales of adventurous sea-farers. His repeated use of מִן implies also a general knowledge of the various species of beasts, birds, fishes, and insects. P's conception of God although lofty is not altogether free from anthropomorphism. It is sufficient, however, that God should speak (almost the minimum of effort),¹ and it is done. Man made in God's image has forthwith dominion over the creatures. The horizon of the author of P is much more extended than that of *c* for instance. He is the product of a richer civilization.

A detailed consideration of *g* need not occupy our attention here. It is so obviously different from the other documents that it is quite unnecessary to emphasize the distinction.

The nature of the documents we have thus briefly reviewed, their manner of thought and style of diction, fully justify their separation. It only remains to give sufficient reason for the cause and manner of their compilation.

The combination of c and g. It will be readily acknowledged that *g* presupposes a creation narrative. It deals with the creation epoch, with the first man and woman, and the first creatures. A direct connection with a preceding cosmogony is even indicated by such references as "the man whom he had fashioned" [ii 8b], "the beasts of the field which the Lord God had made" [iii 1]. Was this preceding narrative of creation our *c*? It is natural to infer from their present connection that it was, and this view receives support from the diction of the two phrases quoted, re-echoing as it does the phraseology of ii 19, 20. The documents thus display a certain relationship which cannot, and need not, be set aside. Their harmony of diction lends confirmation to the opinion already expressed that from whatever sources the original compiler (probably J) drew his material he made free use of it, moulding it to his own style.

But common sense demands that the union of diverse documents such as *c* and *g* should be a union of entities, not a fusion, such as we find here, where passages from the one document are taken out

¹For the doctrine of creation by the mere exercise of thought, we must turn to India.

and spread broadcast through the pages of the other. How, then, is it possible to account for the remarkable interweaving of the documents? On the surface there seems no good reason for it. If, say, the working over of *c* and *g* had been by different hands, and *g* had thus possessed certain cosmogonic elements of its own, which could be supplanted by corresponding portions of *c*, such interlacing of sources would be natural, since documents become fused together in this manner, not because of dissimilarity, but because they have certain elements in common. Such case, however, is not applicable here.

The rearrangement of the text and consequent mingling of documents, may be traced to the editorial manipulation of a late period. The creation narrative, as we know, has been disseminated through the opening passages of the Paradise story in a remarkable manner, the result, it may be, of an attempt to exhibit a logical order in the development of events. For an explanation we need not look further than the statement of ii 8*b*—"and there (*i.e.*, in the garden) he put *the man* whom he had formed." We have here no mention of woman, nor of the beasts of the field. If this represents the original phrasing—as there is every reason to believe¹—any one reading the Paradise story critically might reasonably wonder at the inconsistency of a narrative which began by assigning occupation of the garden to the man alone, and then suddenly brought on the scene the woman and the serpent.² When the text had acquired a special sacredness, a remedy could not be sought in the ordinary way by means of the requisite additions and corresponding grammatical alterations. It was a clever solution of the difficulty that suggested itself. By rearranging the text suitably, it might be made to appear that woman was created *after man was put in the garden*. The same, too, with the beasts of the field. Thus it comes about

¹ This ignoring of the woman who plays so important a part in the narrative, is perhaps typically oriental. Cf. iii. *vv.* 22-24, where again there is no mention of woman.

² Josephus, who had no doubt access to works, bearing on the sacred records, which have been lost, or to traditions respecting treatment of text and interpolation of subject matter which are no longer preserved, takes the creation narrative in Gn. ii (our *c*) as a complete document preceding the Paradise story (*g*). He expressly states that God brought Adam *and his wife* into the garden, and explains that at that time the serpent lived with them [*cf. Ant. I. i. 3f.*].

that the creation of woman, and of the beasts of the field, is made to appear as a work performed by the Lord God *within the garden*, whilst the language used, as can be readily observed, conveys not the slightest hint that such was really the case. If these acts of creation had been performed within the garden, it is scarcely possible to believe from the style of the Paradise narrative that all reference to the surroundings could have been suppressed.

Then, again, there are flaws in the welding. In ii 8b we are told that the Lord God planted a garden and put (וַיִּשֶׁם) there the man whom he had fashioned. In v. 15 we are again told that the Lord God took the man and settled him (וַיַּנְחֵהוּ) in the garden "to dress it and to keep it" (לְעִבְדָּהּ וּלְשָׁמְרָהּ). There is no apparent need for a repetition of the statement that man was put into the garden. Still, this is not a point to which much value can be attached. Mere repetition of the same fact in an altered form of words is not evidence calculated to impugn the unity of a writing—if that were all. But note the anomaly in v. 15. The word גֵּן is masculine, and yet we read that the man was appointed לְעִבְדָּהּ וּלְשָׁמְרָהּ. The feminine suffixes here make it evident that the reference was originally not to the garden but to the אֲדָמָה of the creation narrative. Nor can the passage even be construed into an implicit reference to the אֲדָמָה of the garden. It was part of man's punishment that he was sent back "to till the ground whence he was taken" [iii 23]. The dressing and keeping of the אֲדָמָה was the duty assigned to man in the creation narrative. Thus in v. 15 we have part of *c* masquerading as part of *g*.

Then there is the problem of the *f* document. Why such obviously extraneous matter, as is here contained, should be mixed up with the other documents is not very obvious. Might it be that the notion of a pleasure-garden demanded that there be fountains and streams as well as all sorts of pleasant trees? The famous "Hanging Gardens" of Babylon were after this manner. Engines were installed in the foundations to pump up water for their running streams.

Wo lag das Paradies? We are now approaching the end of our inquiry. There remains but to fix the site of Eden, or rather the

Pleasure-garden, in accordance with our analysis. This compels us to a twofold consideration of site. In the first place there is the site of the Pleasure-garden according to the Paradise story proper (the *g* document), and in the second place there is the site of 'Eden' as it is presented after the compilation of the documents.

According to *g* the man after his creation is set in a garden filled with "every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food." The point meant to be emphasized clearly is that the man has been thus appointed to a life of luxury and ease. There is no need to labour. His food is ready to hand. He is warned, however, against aspiring to the peculiar privileges and attributes of Deity.¹ These, as we learn from the context, are (1) "the knowing of good and evil," viz., the power of discriminating between right and wrong, or perhaps, simply, of exercising the faculty of reason [*cf.* iii 5, 23], (2) the possession of immortality. Hence we learn indirectly what were regarded as the special attributes of Deity at the date of the narrative.² The man and woman at the instigation of the serpent,³ partake of the forbidden fruit, and thereby become possessed of one divine attribute—the sense of right and wrong. In consequence man forthwith became responsible for his conduct, where hitherto he had been irresponsible. He has become in part divine without being fitted otherwise for his high estate. "Behold the man is

¹ The man is not told that the tree, or rather trees,—for no doubt the tree of life was included in the prohibition also,—possessed such properties. It is the serpent, presumably by divination of some sort (see below), who acquires the secret and divulges it to the woman.

² This is also the Babylonian conception. When the God Ea created the man Adapa, we are told "wisdom he gave him, eternal life he gave him not."

³ נחש. There is a verb נחש meaning "to practise divination, use enchantment, etc.," which may or may not be connected with נחש. Used only in the *Pi'el*, it is generally regarded as a denominative from נחש. There is this objection, however, that the Aramaic has נחש but no נחש. If נחש, then, be not a derivative of נחש, we have new insight into the appearance on the scene of the נחש in the rôle of tempter. It gives the reason of his implied acquaintance with the divine secrets. [Note J's use of the word in Gn. 30²⁷, 44^{5, 15} (story of Joseph), and that of the noun נחש ("divination, enchantment") by JE, Nu. 23²³, 24¹ (story of Balaam).] A play upon words, such as this view would admit of, makes a strong appeal to the Hebrew imagination. The choice may even have fallen on the serpent from its having "poison under its tongue," a physical feature which could readily be travestied figuratively [*cf.*, *e.g.*, Job 20¹²; Ps. 10⁷, etc.].

become as one of us knowing good and evil" [iii 22]. To man, however, the other attribute of immortality is denied by a timely exclusion from the garden [iii 22b, 23 f.].

It is evident that the whole narrative is a figure of speech enshrining the doctrine of an irresponsible and sinless state in which man was created, whence he passed into one responsible and sinful. It draws attention to the semi-divine in man—the possession of wisdom which so separates him from the rest of the animal world. From what we can gather there appears to have been no definite location of the garden in the mind of the narrator. His Pleasure-garden is an ideal locality. With the expulsion of Adam and Eve it is closed for ever to mankind. If the מִקְדָּם of ii 8 belonged to the original narrative, and is to be interpreted "eastward," then, perhaps, the garden may have been vaguely conceived of as situated somewhere in the east, beyond the ocean perhaps,¹ and the "flame of a sword which turned either way," may be figurative of the rays of the rising sun.

The other site,—the site of the Pleasure-garden as indicated by the Massoretic Text,—is far to seek. We may with perfect safety aver that it cannot be found at all. "A river branching into four, of which two are the Tigris and Euphrates, corresponds to nothing which is to be found—or, we may safely add, was ever to be found—on the surface of the earth."² The incorporation of the *f* document gave to the Pleasure-garden a semblance of reality and an apparent definiteness of location, that were entirely absent from the Paradise story proper. The situation was not improved by the modifications made on the text from time to time, of which the main were the mistaken interpretation of עֶדֶן as a place-name, the sub-

¹ Cf. *Ethiopic Enoch* [LXXX. iii 2 ff.] "And thence I went over the summits of those mountains, far towards the East, and passed above the Erythrean Sea [here=Indian Ocean], and went far from it . . . and I came into the garden of righteousness, and saw . . . the tree of wisdom . . . and the holy angel Rufael, who was with me, answered me and said, 'This is the tree of wisdom of which thy old father and thy aged mother, who were before thee, have eaten, and they recognised that they were naked and they were driven out of the garden.'—R. H. Charles, *Book of Enoch*, (1893), pp. 102 f. So also Ephrem Syrus and Cosmas Indicopleustes transported Eden to the other side of the ocean. Up[Ar]šukunnakku the council chamber of the Babylonian gods, was conceived of as situated on the earth in the east in the mountains of sunrise not far from the edge of the world.

² Driver, *Genesis*, (1904), p. 58.

stitution of עֵדֶן for עֵיִן in *v.* 10 (if indeed this did not take place in the *f* document before incorporation and thereby furnish the reason for the incorporation), and the interpolation of ב before עֵדֶן in *v.* 8. Hence an entirely artificial 'Eden' came into being which has proved the despair of critics. Nor is it only modern critics who have been puzzled. In *vv.* 11-14 we have quite a little commentary on the rivers of 'Eden.' The form of *v.* 14*b* suggests that originally the names merely of the rivers were furnished. The rest of the geographical information in *vv.* 11-14 has been added from time to time,—it may be, in the form of interlinear¹ scholia which ultimately crept into the text.² But why pursue the subject further! It is, as we have said, an entirely artificial 'Eden' that the Massoretic Text presents for our consideration. To attempt to locate it is folly.

Here, then, we may let the matter rest. The real 'Eden' has no existence in reality, whilst the site of the artificial 'Eden' is, and will for ever remain indeterminable.

¹The earliest Massoretic notes, the so-called *Massorah parva*, were written on the outer and inner margins; but there is at least one case in which such notes are found between the lines of the Hebrew text [a MS. in the possession of Dr. Gaster, *vide Illustrated Bibles*, p. 12]. We are therefore justified in assuming the possibility of interlinear additions in times pre-Massoretic when the text was not yet rigid.

²Thus one early scholiast, to obviate the obscurity of the names of the rivers, identified the Pishon with the river "which compasseth the whole land of Havilah," and the Gihon with that "which compasseth the whole land of Cush." The Hiddeqel is defined as "that which goeth in front of Assyria." The impression we gather from such explanatory comments is that the commentator had before him some early, and therefore crude, map of the world. But even the explanations he furnishes are not altogether satisfactory. Cush and Assyria were familiar land-names to the Hebrews, but Havilah was apparently unknown. A second commentator consequently adds after Havilah "where there is gold," whilst yet a third, either to make the identification clearer or to display his own knowledge, contributes the additional information "and the gold of that land is good, and there is bdellium and the onyx stone." These comments, so suggestive of Babylonian-Assyrian lists, encouraged Delitzsch to sift the appropriate cuneiform material without, however, obtaining much reward for his efforts.

The very fact that three out of the four rivers whose names are given require explanatory comment, constitutes in itself strong proof of the foreign origin of that particular part of the narrative. The only river that explains itself is the Euphrates (Perath), which from its comparative nearness was familiar to the Hebrews.

IS INCREASING UTILITY POSSIBLE ?

BY

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GLASGOW

Printed at the University Press by

ROBERT MACLEHOSE & CO. LTD.

1911

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TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE
COMMISSION

Is Increasing Utility Possible?

IN 1896 a distinguished writer on the theory of Value in general spoke of a sub-division of it—namely that of Utility in Economics—as a field in which scientific research was then closed.¹ No doubt the analysis of Utility is complete, if certain assumptions that it makes are to be accepted as axiomatic. That there should be such assumptions, in a study which has been aptly named “the Metaphysics of Political Economy,” is evitable,² because the enquiry begins where Philosophy ends, and therefore the student of economic value must either accept results arrived at by Psychologists and Ethical thinkers or else re-examine the conditions implied in certain states of consciousness for himself. It so happened that, when the examination of Utility was begun, the former method was adopted; and the economists who endeavoured to outline this new study accepted a certain type of ethical dogma as self-evident, from which they deduced the law of diminishing Utility. For instance, when in 1855 Richard Jennings formulated this principle, he derived it from a special type of Physiological Psychology,³ and Jevons, who followed him in 1862 at a meeting of the British Association, candidly starts from the ethical conceptions of Bentham.⁴ Strangely enough the contemporary investigators of this subject on the Continent⁵ also began with similar presuppositions, so that it may be said that the theory of Utility made its appearance with the birthmark of Hedonism, a beauty-spot

¹ Ehrenfels, “The Ethical Theory of Value” in *The International Journal of Ethics*, vi. p. 376.

² Edgeworth, “On the Ultimate Standard of Value” in *Economic Journal*, iv. p. 518.

³ *Natural Elements of Political Economy*, pp. 98-100.

⁴ *Theory of Political Economy*, 1871, pp. 29-31.

⁵ *Entwicklung der Gesetze des menschlichen Verkehrs*, by H. H. Gossen (printed 1854), ed. 1889, pp. 1-9.

or a blemish, according as one regards it, which, it may be, has in the process of its growth become less marked, but has not wholly disappeared.

Attempts have been made to disavow or to eliminate the connection with Hedonism—that naïve view of man's practical nature which regards him as subject to wants which occasion discomfort, the removal of the latter then giving rise to pleasure. It is an instance of the comprehensiveness of Prof. Marshall's enquiries that he was aware of the danger of misconception, and in 1893 he expressly stated that in the analysis of Utility "pleasure" was to be understood "so as to include every good for which a man strives," and attention was drawn to the description of total Utility as an aggregate of "satisfactions," not of pleasures.¹ Satisfaction in this sense is to be understood as the attainment of the object of a desire. Now the general tendency of Philosophy in recent years has been to distinguish such satisfaction from the pleasure that usually follows it.²

It may seem that the distinction just drawn is a purely verbal one—but on the contrary it is vital; and it is the more important, since many who write of Utility, drift unconsciously into the interpretation of satisfaction as pleasure in the sense in which the term is used in Philosophy; hence the danger of re-opening in the field of economics that long drawn-out controversy as to whether pleasures as such are capable of summation and therefore of quantitative estimation.³ Even if one endeavours to interpret the term "pleasure," as used by many writers on Value, in the sense of satisfaction in general; it must be admitted that there is a marked tendency for many of them to think—not merely to speak—hedonistically, and so we still sometimes hear of "atoms of pleasure," of "a hedonic calculus," of "a psychological hedonism from which every economic truth is deduced."⁴ Moreover, this latter type of thought altogether overlooks the admission by some

¹ *Economic Journal*, iii. p. 388.

² Cf. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 178; Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 87; Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, pp. 46-7.

³ This is the basis of one of the points made by Professor Nicholson in his criticism of Marshall's statement of diminishing Utility (*Principles of Political Economy*, i. pp. 55-65). This criticism was the subject of a discussion in the *Economic Journal*, iv. pp. 151-8, 342-8.

⁴ Pantaleoni, *Pure Economics*, pp. 9-23; cf. *Zur Lehre von den Bedürfnissen*, by F. Čuhel, Innsbruck, 1907, pp. 29-31.

ethical Hedonists of a difference in kind in pleasure, by an ignoring of what Mill called "the higher pleasures," many of which would fall within the scope of Economics.¹

The investigation of Utility in its relation to Value requires to be liberated from the entanglement with Hedonism, and this means more than the substitution of the word "satisfaction" for the term "pleasure" when we come to describe the realisation of the object of a desire. Only confusion is introduced, if it be assumed that a "pleasure" or Pleasure in general is the object of the desire. Economics has little, if any, concern in the criticism of the ultimate ends of conduct, and therefore it is safer to avoid preconceptions which presuppose a somewhat dubious interpretation of these.

The tendency towards the acceptance of pleasure as the end of desire has diverted attention from the consideration of the object that actually is desired. Prior to the exertion of will, there must be an idea in consciousness of a future state of the self which is preferable to ² the present one. This is the object, ideally conceived, which is to be made actual by voluntary action.³ This again represents, as has been said, "a harmonising of life."⁴ To the economist, in particular, clearness on this point is essential, since there is danger through confusion of language; for the object of a desire may relate to the systematising in one universe of desire of a considerable number of concrete objects, those in fact that we name commodities. The peculiar risk of misconception at this point may have far-reaching results. For instance, the following is the general line of reasoning by which Wieser brings the collector of books or pictures under the Law of Diminishing Utility. It is admitted that this phenomenon is an apparent exception to the law, since each additional book or picture stimulates, instead of weakening, the desire as it brings the collector nearer the possession of a perfect library or a perfect gallery. But it is urged that if duplicates of some book or picture were offered,

¹ J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, pp. 11-15. This difficulty has been dealt with as a limitation of Consumers' Rent by Prof. Pigou, *Economic Journal*, xiii. p. 68.

² When this paper was read before the Economic Section of the British Association at Winnipeg, the phrase "more choice-worthy" was used. In accordance with the criticism of Prof. Chapman, I now substitute the more colourless term in the text.

³ Cf. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 135.

⁴ Bosanquet, "Hedonism among Idealists," *MIND*, N.S. XII., p. 312.

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the desire would be much weakened, if not destroyed, and so it is concluded that this case, instead of being an exception, is a strong confirmation of the law.¹ But what is the object of the desire? Surely it is the perfect or complete collection—and as that object *ex hypothesi* excludes duplicates,² the reference to them is on a par with the confusion of tongues invented by the enterprising twins, Budge and Toddy, in *Helen's Babies*, while playing at the Tower of Babel, on which occasion one brought bricks when the other called for mortar.

The object of a desire is related on the one side to the emergence of the desire and on the other to its attainment. The whole process might be described as an epoch in the life of a self-conscious being who, in relation to all that he is, endeavours to make himself, from his own point of view, more complete. Regarded in this way, the desire might be described as a practical problem, and the attainment of it is the solution. This is what is named satisfaction, which is a highly complex state of consciousness, but which is clearly measurable from several different stand-points, and it is one of these that is named Utility.

The placing of the measurement of the attainment, or the partial attainment, of the object of a desire on a less ambiguous foundation suggests some reflections. On this interpretation of desire, if we conceive the satisfaction to proceed progressively, there is no special reason for the later stages in the movement yielding invariably less satisfaction than the earlier ones. Indeed, it has been held that certain desires do give an increasing satisfaction, but most economists would rule these out as being obviously outside the scope of their science. The problem then takes shape as to whether, within this field, increasing utility is possible. To raise this question, even in a hypothetical form, represents a breaking with what has hitherto been accepted as to the nature of Utility, but it may be that the strangeness of the suggestion arises from presuppositions connected with the influence of Hedonism to which attention has already been drawn.

¹ *Natural Value*, London, 1893, p. 10.

² Wieser's illustration evidently proceeds on the supposition, that in the "perfect collection" there would be no duplicates.

In making an attempt towards the solution of the problem suggested, the first step will be to produce some possible instance that points towards increasing, rather than diminishing Utility. Attention has already been directed to the apparent failure of Wieser to establish the application of the latter principle to the collector who was aiming at the formation of a perfect library or picture-gallery. There would be difficulties in presenting a concise analysis of the motives and satisfactions involved in this special case, and it will be more convenient to illustrate the point under discussion by another type of collecting which will be found to present the various conditions that require to be dealt with in a more manageable form. I select for this purpose a certain aspect of the pursuit or hobby of stamp-collecting. It may be premised that, in order to prevent ill-disposed persons joining together the uncanceled halves of two stamps to defraud the Post-Office, a plan was adopted in the issues of Great Britain and several of the colonies, in the early days of adhesive stamps, of distinguishing the position of each particular stamp on its plate. Further, the plates themselves were also distinguished, and those engraved for use in Great Britain between 1858 and 1870 of the denomination of 1d. had the number of the plate introduced into the design of the stamp. It follows that any stamp of the issues from 1840 to 1870 can be assigned to its own proper position on the plate and that most of the plates can be identified. Many stamp collectors have interested themselves in reconstructing the plates, that is in gathering together such of those specimens, belonging to the same plate, which are capable of occupying a separate position on the reconstructed plate. The undertaking is one of very great magnitude. There are over 300 plates of British stamps of this character and of these each plate of 1d. stamps contained 240 separable stamps. Suppose we concentrate attention on the process by which the desire for a single complete reconstructed plate, say of the first British stamp (the black 1d. issue of May, 1840) is satisfied gradually. The collector will begin with a few specimens; as he adds others to these he obtains not only the satisfaction of acquisition but the further satisfaction of getting nearer and nearer to the completeness at which he aims. It follows that each addition to the group of commodities he already had acquired towards the satisfaction of his desire yields him an increasing utility. If we

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translate this phenomenon into terms of price, it may be noted that there is a very well defined market in postage-stamps of this character. As a rule, all copies of equally good condition from the same plate are sold at the same price. Taking a particular plate of this character for illustration, known as Plate No. 1, unused copies are sold at about £2 each. Now in so far as the collector has begun to reconstruct this plate, it is clear he would be willing to give this amount for each of the early copies—a price he may be actually assumed to have given.¹ But a further copy will bring him nearer his goal of completeness, and therefore, if it were necessary, he would give more than the market price to secure it. This tendency will show itself with increasing intensity as he came nearer the end, and the price he would be willing to pay for the 239th would be many times that of the first specimens, that of the 240th yet higher.²

This illustration, which might be pursued much further, though in some respects perhaps a trivial one, has the rare advantage that the process of simplification that is so often necessary in economic analysis is not required. From these data it would be possible to work out mathematically the exact value of the conception of completeness as it manifested itself at every stage, but probably enough has been said to show that each additional purchase gains in utility from the existence of the previous ones. Thus Utility, under these circumstances, tends to increase rather than to decrease. It seems to me that this analysis does not violate any of the legitimate limiting conditions introduced into the statement of Diminishing Utility. According to the phraseology of Prof. Marshall there is no need to suppose that there is “any

¹ Neglecting the supposition that he may have found or been given some copies. Supposing he obtains eleven in either of these ways and gives the market or catalogued price for the twelfth, that price shows that he considers the utility he obtains worth it; and, if he continued, he would be prepared to give more for later specimens.

² In order to obtain as great a degree of reality as possible, I have obtained particulars from a collector of the stamps described in the text, with a view to securing a basis for a demand-schedule. In the case of a British plate of 240 stamps, where the first 20 were obtained at 1s. each, in the circumstances explained in the text, the following figures would be likely to result :

For the 21st stamp the collector would pay	.	.	13d.
„ 50th	„	„	15d.
„ 100th	„	„	18d.
„ 200th	„	„	24d.
„ 240th	„	„	30d.

alteration in the character or tastes of the man himself.”¹ We start with a certain desire and observe the successive additions of things which are objectively equal increments to the stock, but giving increasing satisfactions, respectively. It might be held that the case investigated had been dealt with by anticipation by Prof. Marshall, when he shows that “a small quantity of a commodity may be insufficient to meet a certain special want,” as for instance in a comparison of the “pleasure” derived from ten pieces of wall-paper in comparison with that of the last two needed for a room which requires twelve pieces.² It is admitted that in this special case the decrease in satisfaction is not proportionate, and it is concluded that the phenomena are analogous to what happens in diminishing return where the earlier doses of labour and capital give a more than proportionate increase until a certain point is reached. It seems to me that this case may differ from the philatelist who is reconstructing plates of stamps. Supposing a person is papering a room, it may be that under no circumstances, at a given time, would he buy more than twelve pieces of paper—if so his satisfaction, as the object of his desire is attained, does not diminish—it ceases altogether when it is at its maximum.³ The true analogy then appears to be with Quasi-Rent, not with diminishing return. The same conclusion would hold good with the stamp-collector whose desire was for one reconstructed plate of the 1d. black of 1840 unused; the satisfaction ends when at its maximum. If on the other hand he begins to construct another plate, the market-price of the stamps needed for which is the same (say S. G. No. 24), the influence of the ideal of completeness reappears on a higher plane, that is he would derive a somewhat larger degree of utility from the 240th addition to his

¹ Since desire is relative to character, if we suppose an endeavour to be made progressively towards the attainment of its object, *in a certain special sense*, each stage of realisation effects a theoretical change in character. But such changes, unless they attain a certain degree, need not occupy the attention of the economist.

² Marshall, *Principles* (1907), p. 94.

³ In this case it may be assumed that the purchaser of paper would give more for the pieces of paper necessary to complete the papering of the room, if this course were necessary. Suppose when he had obtained the quantity needed, the price were to fall, say by three-quarters, he might be induced to consider the re-papering of another room or rooms. This case might be taken as analogous to diminishing returns, or again it might perhaps be urged that the original desire had been succeeded by a new one.

second plate than from the 240th on the first, and so his utility curve, though not showing an evenly continuous increase, would on the whole tend to move upwards. Further, before leaving this example, it may be added that should the collector desire to have a complete set of all the reconstructed plates of British stamps, absolute completeness would be exceedingly difficult of attainment, since in the case of one plate, numbered 77, sufficient copies are not known to exist to enable such reconstruction to be carried out.

Though this phenomenon, in so far as it has yet been analysed, affects only a comparatively small number of persons, it can be shown to extend very much further by other instances which can be discovered when search is made for them. It has been noted that the high price obtained for the Amherst collection of Caxtons was due to the large number of examples. Here again there is the influence of completeness, acting on the one side upon a desire which requires as its object a considerable number of the commodities needed, which commodities exist only in comparatively small numbers and are obtainable with difficulty. The conditions are the exact contrary of those required for diminishing Utility where the total quantity of the commodity a person would desire is inconsiderable as compared with the amount of that commodity that may be offered for sale. In his illustration of diminishing Utility derived from purchases of tea, Prof. Marshall supposes that in a year the person under observation would not use more than 30 lbs. even if he could have more for nothing—the stock in the United Kingdom at the present time is about 105 million lbs. On the other hand, the collector of Caxtons would be willing to possess every possible example, while the whole number known is considerably under 1000 copies.¹

As a result of this analysis it would appear that the idea of completeness acts a counteracting tendency to Senior's Law of Variety. But while this idea (*i.e.* completeness) is important in the formulation of the principle of increasing Utility, it may be doubted whether it is not merely the manifestation of a further conception. Why, it may be asked, should completeness have such an important influence on Utility?

¹ According to the census of Caxtons in Blake's *W. Caxton*, pp. 372-3, the number of copies known in 1882 was 560. Many of these were owned by libraries and could not come to market. Hence the "world's visible supply" of Caxtons is very small.

It may be suggested that the motive behind it is that which takes various forms, as emulation, the wish for distinction, or for excellence.¹ To be eminent in some direction constitutes a stimulus which enables the man, who strives for distinction, to give a very high degree of utility to such objects as are desired as steps in his progress. It is clear, then, that from this point of view there is much scope for the existence of an increasing utility, manifesting itself in the completeness of the number of objects acquired which have been bound together ideally as means towards the object of one desire. Hence the explanation of the concentration of the desire for completeness upon commodities which either from their nature, or from accident, are comparatively few in respect to the aggregate wish for them. A similar situation may arise in special circumstances in the case of commodities, neither naturally nor accidentally scarce, but artificially so. Suppose that a manufacturer sees a great prospective advantage in the amalgamation of his firm with a competing one, and that the latter is a joint-stock company. He would elect to acquire control of the latter by the purchase of a sufficient number of shares to give him a majority of votes at the next annual meeting, and it may be assumed that he enters on his campaign at a time when the shares that will vote at this meeting cannot be increased. Now, the person aiming at a controlling interest, would not give a price for the first shares purchased much in advance of that current in the market, because it would be uncertain whether his plan would be successful. But suppose that he is gradually able to acquire nine-tenths of the stock he needs. As the element of doubt lessens, he would, if he could not have bought each successive block of shares at any less price, have been justified in increasing his price progressively. Now, should it happen that the last tenth that is essential to him is most likely to be obtained from two persons, each owning the same quantity, but not in communication with each other; the manufacturer may find one of these less obdurate than the other, and in dealing with him he must keep before his mind the possibility that the last holder, from whom he has a chance of obtaining the shares, may not sell at any price. Therefore, the manufacturer, for this reason, cannot afford to pay the last seller

¹ Marshall, *Principles* (1907), p. 89; Pigou, "Some Remarks on Utility," *Economic Journal*, xiii. p. 61.

but one as much as he would give the stock-holder from whom he acquires the final block of stock. Thus all through, if he were pushed to it, he would give advancing prices for each successive purchase—a conclusion that has been abundantly confirmed by the course of prices of certain stocks in Wall Street in the not-distant past. Finally, this manufacturer is, in technical language, a consumer of the commodity known as stock in the particular company he is endeavouring to control; and it follows that, from his being willing to give advancing prices (if he cannot obtain what he needs at less), he receives an increasing utility.

If then my analysis, and the reasoning founded on it, is accurate, there is not only a possibility of increasing Utility, but cases can be adduced in which the tendency shows itself, while some hints can be discovered of the reasons that bring it into existence.

The discovery of this principle introduces a symmetry hitherto wanting in the theory of Economics. There is both diminishing and increasing return, and now, if my conclusions are well-founded, we have to balance this diminishing and increasing Utility. Further, it results from the previous analysis that increasing Utility sometimes involves an element of monopoly in consumption—thus I think the theory of monopoly can be extended in some directions from Production to Consumption. Finally, though these reflections and suggestions are highly theoretical, the establishment of Increasing Utility will have some not unimportant practical results in relation to taxation.

Some Fundamental Points in the Theory of Knowledge

INTRODUCTORY.

THE terms "Akt," "Inhalt" and "Gegenstand" are the keywords of a certain theory of knowledge which constitutes, in my opinion, the most important recent development of philosophical thought in Germany. ✓ Among its leading representatives I may refer to Meinong, Husserl and Lipps, Kölpe and Messer. In spite of manifold divergences in detail, these writers agree in adopting a certain fundamental scheme as expressing the fundamental nature of mental life and mental development. They agree in sharply distinguishing between what the mind means or intends in perceiving, thinking, or having ideas, and the actual experiences or "Erlebnisse" which belong to its own particular existence as a psychical individual. What the mind means or intends is called by them an object or "Gegenstand." The meaning or intending of something as distinguished from what is meant or intended is called by them an "Akt." An act is a mode of being conscious, and is therefore an actual experience or "Erlebniss" forming part of the existence of the individual mind. But it is an experience which has the distinctive character of intending or being or directed towards an object. Hence it is often described as "intentional" experience. Inasmuch as there are various modes of being conscious in relation to objects, it is necessary to distinguish different qualities of intentional experience. In this way mere supposing is distinguished from believing, and both from desiring or willing. But whether we merely suppose or believe or desire or will, the acts of supposing, believing, desiring, or willing are essentially relative to something other than themselves which is X

supposed, believed, desired, or willed, and this something is, in each case, the object of the act. The act is always an actual experience of the individual. The object, on the contrary, need not be actually experienced, and perhaps never can be completely identified with anything that is actually experienced at the moment in which the mind is cognisant of it. For instance, I may think of an event as happening before I was born; I may again affirm that this event actually happened; I may be agreeably or disagreeably interested in it; but it is plain that the event which I thus refer to is not part of my own immediate experience as my present belief and interest is, or a headache is, while I am actually feeling it. Similarly, when my doctor believes that I have a headache, I may be experiencing the headache myself, but he is not. In general, what is actually experienced, actually exists in being experienced; but the object of a mental act need not actually exist: "it may be self-contradictory; it may be something which happens not to be a fact, such as a golden mountain; it may be essentially incapable of existence, as, for instance, equality; it may be physical and not psychical, or it may be something which did exist or will exist, but does not exist at present."¹

If it is urged that the object must at least exist, inasmuch as it is something mentally referred to, the answer is that this implies only the actual existence of the mental act, not that of its object. The object *quâ* object may have being in some sense. But, in any case, its being does not consist in being an actual experience of the mind for which it is an object.

Acts, on the contrary, are always actually experienced, and, consequently, always exist as psychical facts. But they are by no means the only psychical facts. Sensuous impressions, for instance, and sensory images are sharply distinguished from such ways of being conscious as supposing, believing, desiring, hoping, fearing, and willing. On the other hand, it will not do merely to classify them as objects of a special kind distinctively characterised by their being actually experienced as well as mentally intended. For we are constantly experiencing sensations which escape our notice, and

¹ B. Russell, Meinong's "Theory of Complexes and Assumptions" (*Mind*, N.S. vol. xiii. p. 207).

so remain undistinguished in the background of subconsciousness; these subconscious sensations are not the object of any mental act, not even of an implicit judgment asserting their existence. A still more important point is that sensuous-experiences fulfil a peculiar function in our mental life which requires to be explicitly recognised in our terminology. They constitute a link between mental acts and objects which are not themselves present contents of immediate experience. Thus sense impressions and images are means by which we perceive or imagine material things and their qualities, states, and processes. We cannot imagine a horse without having an image of it; but the image in our heads is evidently not what we intend to refer to. It cannot be simply identified with the object of the mental act which we call thinking of a horse. Similarly, when we dispense with anything in the nature of a mental picture of a horse, and use only the word "horse," the word is still not the animal which we mean to refer to, but only a sensuous experience through which we refer to it. A special term is required to designate contents of immediate experience which thus fulfil, or are capable of fulfilling, the function of presenting or introducing objects that are not themselves contents of immediate experience. The term selected for this purpose by the group of writers I am dealing with is "Inhalt."

The general scheme which I have attempted to reproduce in broad outline has for me a special interest, because it is akin to views which I had independently developed in my book on *Analytic Psychology*, which was published in 1896.¹ I there connect my own position with that of Brentano, accepting his distinction between objects of consciousness and the modes in which consciousness refers to its object, but criticising his failure to distinguish between "Objekt" and "Inhalt."² The word which in my nomenclature corresponds to "Inhalt" is presentation, and I describe the presentative function of presentation as follows. "In having cognisance of an object there are two factors involved: (1) A thought-reference to something which, as the thinker means or intends it, is not a present modification of his individual experience. (2) A more or less

¹ I am not claiming priority, but only independence. Priority of publication belongs, I believe, to Zwardowsky.

² *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i. pp. 40-46.

specific modification of his individual experience, which determines the direction of thought to this or that special object; this special experience we may call a *presentation*. "We may say, if we choose, that the object itself is presented, but not that it is a presentation, and when we say that it is presented, it is better to say that it is presented to consciousness than that it is presented *in* consciousness. In the perception of a tree the reference to an object is specialised by a plexus of visual and other presentations. The object thought of is thus rendered determinate. It is determined as a material thing and not a mental occurrence, a tree and not a stone, an oak and not an elm."¹

Thus the term presentation has for me a twofold implication. In the first place, it is something existentially present in experience, an actual apparition in consciousness: in Berkeleyan phrase it "exists in the mind," and is not merely meant or intended by the mind. In the second place, it is, or may be, presentative of objects which are not thus immediately experienced.² So far as this is the case, it specifies the direction of thought to objects, so that the nature of the presented object varies in correspondence with the varying nature of the presentation. Presentations may, however, exist without directly fulfilling the presentative function. They are then what I have called anoetic experiences. Most of the sense impressions, which exist in the background of subconsciousness are anoetic. I had not originally any single word to designate what have since been called "acts." I was content to describe them as ways of being conscious of objects, or as attitudes of consciousness towards its object. I would now reserve for them exclusively the title of *subjective* states or processes: for presentations are not predicates of the subject in its individual unity and identity, as believing or being pleased are. The term "act" is certainly convenient, and in view of its having already become current, I am prepared to accept it. But in doing so I make two reservations. In the first place, I would make a distinction between acts such as supposing, believing, or desiring, and the relation to an object which is common to all. All acts as such involve this

¹ *Ibid.* i. p. 47. In quoting I have somewhat altered the wording of the passage.

² By "immediate experience" I mean what is actually an experience at any given moment, as distinguished from future, past, or possible experiences.

relation, but it is not itself an act. It is not itself a mental state or process, but a relational attribute of certain mental states or processes. In the second place, the word act must not be taken to signify activity; it is sometimes maintained that activity is not to be found in our mental life at all, and though I heartily disagree with this position, the question is one which I do not propose to discuss on this occasion. But in any case I submit that if the mind is, properly speaking, active, it is so only in virtue of one kind of "act," that in which it is interested in an object as something to be sought or shunned. Mental activity therefore, if there be such a thing, must be identified with conation, the striving aspect of our conscious life.

I have now indicated the general nature of the theory of knowledge in which I, more or less, agree with such writers as Lipps, Meinong, and Husserl. But the copious literature in which this general doctrine has been recently expounded contains many special developments which I fail to follow, and in which the writers themselves disagree with each other. I have accordingly selected two of these topics for discussion on this occasion. I have fixed on the following problems as being of most fundamental significance from the point of view of general Philosophy. (a) What is the nature of the unity and identity of the self or subject which experiences acts and presentations, and is aware of objects? (b) What are the conditions of the relation between presentation and presented objects?

THE SUBJECT OF MENTAL ACTS.

It is a fact, recognised explicitly or implicitly by everyone, that the manifold and constantly changing experiences which enter into the life history of an individual mind are in some sense owned by a self or ego which remains one and the same throughout their vicissitudes. But when we begin to enquire into the precise nature of the unity and identity ascribed to the self, and the precise sense in which its experiences belong to it, we are confronted with a fundamental divergence of views. On the one hand, it is maintained that just as the unity of a triangle or of a melody or of an organism consists merely in the special mode in which its parts are connected and correlated so as to form a specific kind of complex, so the unity of what we call an individual mind consists merely in the peculiar way in which what we call its experiences are united with each other. On this view, when we say that a desire is someone's desire, we merely mean that it enters as one constituent among others into a connected totality of experiences having a certain sort of unity and continuity which can belong to experiences only, and not to material things. In opposition to this doctrine, it is strenuously maintained by others that the identical subject is not merely the unified complex of experiences, but a distinct principle from which they derive their unity, a something which persists through them and links them together. According to these writers it is an inversion of the truth to say that the manifold experiences through their union with each other form a single self. On the contrary, it is only through their relation to the single self as a common centre that they are united with each other.

Of these two conflicting theories, I feel bound to accept the first and reject the second. The unity of the self seems to me indistinguishable from the unity of the total complex of its experiences. On the other hand, the adherents of the alternative theory seem to me essentially justified in denying that the sort of unity required to constitute a self can belong merely to immediate experience, abstractly considered, and in holding that it can be explained only by taking into account the common relation of the manifold of immediate experiences to some thing other than themselves. They are right in

demanding a condition of unity which does not itself form part of the psychical complex. Where they go astray is in identifying this precondition of the unity of experience with the unity which it conditions,—the unity of the conscious subject. The rôle which they ascribe to the subject of consciousness ought rather to be ascribed to its object. The general principle is that the changing complex, of individual experience has the unity and identity uniquely distinctive of what we call a single self or ego only in so far as objects are apprehended as one and the same in different acts or in different stages and phases of the same act. In other words, the unity of the self is essentially a unity of intentional experience and essentially conditioned by unity of the object as meant or intended.

It will be seen that I have here in view what, in Kantian language, is known as unity of apperception. I shall have to point out presently that my own position differs in vital respects from Kant's. None the less, I can utilise for my own purpose most of his arguments and illustrations. In particular, I would lay emphasis on the central importance, in this connection, of the act of judging. What is implicitly or explicitly apprehended as the same proposition, or what Meinong would call the same *objective*, is repeatedly asserted or denied in separate mental acts or in the continuance of the same mental act. To this extent, the distinct mental acts or stages of the same mental act have the unity distinctively characteristic of the self. The same unity is of course involved in apprehending the distinguishable constituents of any proposition as members of the whole. What has been said of judgment holds also for mere supposals, for what Meinong calls "Annahmen." For both in judgment and in merely supposing, it is the unity and identity of the propositions supposed or asserted which condition the unity and identity of the subject of the acts. It is needless to add that we have here to include not mere isolated propositions, but also propositions combined in a context. Such combinations may be, from our present point of view, regarded as forming one complex proposition. And this holds good, however loose and distant the connexion may be. We assert a single proposition when we assert that "virtue is its own reward and whales are mammals." The conjunction "and" expresses at least the vague

thought of the indirect interrelation of these facts as belonging to one world.

We reach the same result when we consider other mental acts. Take, for instance, the identity of the self which asks a question, with the self which finds or receives an answer. The self is identical, inasmuch as the question asked is identified with the question answered. Similarly with the pursuit of ends, however simple or complex these may be. The self is the same self, inasmuch as throughout the process of pursuit it is aware of the desired object as the same, and inasmuch as it is aware of the object attained as identical with the object pursued. The best example, however, is supplied by continuity of attention. Attention is continuous when it is throughout directed to the same total object from varying points of view, so as to distinguish successively its different partial features, aspects, and relations. For instance, in observing a flower with a view to its classification as a botanical specimen, the stamens, root, and leaf arrangement may be successively distinguished. The total object is the flower as a specimen to be classified, together with the whole body of botanical science so far as this may be relevant to the classification. The partial features of this total object are successively discriminated, and in their turn cease to be discriminated. But there is continuity of attention, inasmuch as the partial features successively discriminated are throughout implicitly apprehended as being partial features of the same complex unity. Such continuity is by no means confined to relatively advanced stages of mental development. On the contrary, it seems to be coincident with the most rudimentary beginnings of intelligent life. The observed facts point to its presence even in the instinctive behaviour of animals. The cat hunting a mouse, or the kitten playing with a ball, seem throughout to be dealing with a single complex situation, which includes not only the mouse or the ball, but all circumstances or occurrences which may turn out to be relevant to their governing interest. To this extent, the successive and simultaneous experiences of the cat and the kitten have the unity distinctively characteristic of an identical self.

I may now proceed to bring out the nature and significance of the theory I am advocating by pointing out a very important

consequence to which it inevitably leads. If the unity of the subject is essentially conditioned by the unity of the objects of its acts, as such it follows that wherever a manifold of experiences are connected as experiences in a single self, they must be related either as acts or as presentations to the same total object. All special objects must be distinguished within this whole as partial constituents. No special object can be apprehended as absolutely self-existent and self-contained. Every special object must be at least capable of being apprehended as related to others, and finally to the unity of the whole. So far as this condition is not realised, the identity of the self is not realised, but remains, at the most, merely potential. The common object is what, at the level of analytic or reflective consciousness, we explicitly refer to as the *Universe*. But the conception of the universe is only the explicit formulation of what is already implied in the apprehension of particular objects as incomplete, and therefore as requiring completion in a whole which transcends and includes them.

How is this view related to the Kantian doctrine of apperception? Both agree in insisting on the strict correlation of the unity of the object and the unity of the subject. But further comparison reveals vital differences. For Kant there are two selves, the empirical self and the pure ego. The empirical self consists in the total complex of simultaneous and successive experiences which enter into the life history of an individual from birth to death. This complex is not the subject which is conscious of objects, and consequently does not possess that form of unity which is the correlative of unity in the object. On the contrary, its unity is, in principle, analogous to that of any other object which is not itself a conscious subject. But on the view which I am advocating, the empirical ego and the pure ego are one and the same. There is only one self, the complex of simultaneous and successive experiences, unified in a way which essentially involves the relation of acts and presentations to a common object. This divergence from Kant is closely connected with another. The Kantian exposition tends to represent the unity of the pure subject as a precondition which produces unity in its objects by a synthetic process exercised upon what is originally given as a relationless manifold. This is, of course, quite irreconcilable with my position. If the unity of the subject presupposes the unity of its subject as such, the unity

of the subject cannot be a prior condition from which the unity of the object is derived.

I find a similar difficulty in the language used by Meinong and his followers in treating of what they call "objects of higher order." This phrase covers (1) complex unities of interrelated terms, (2) the relations or forms of unity as distinguished from the terms related or unified. Now, I might express my view of the unity of the self by saying that it depends on apprehension of objects of higher order. But in his otherwise admirable treatment of this subject, Meinong uses language suggestive of a doctrine which appears to me both incompatible with my own and with the facts.¹ He lays stress on the necessity of the constituents of a complex being independently apprehended as the logical precondition of the apprehension of their relations, or the complex unity within which they fall. To use his own metaphor, the objects of higher order are built up on their "inferiora" as their indispensable foundations. Further, it is in each case through a synthetic operation of the mind that the awareness of complex unity is superinduced on the awareness of the relatively disconnected inferiora. It would seem to follow from this doctrine that ultimately the mind must start from a multiplicity of unrelated items, and erect on these a superstructure of relations and complexés. Now it does, of course, very frequently happen that we are initially aware of given items without being aware of them as constituents of a certain kind of complex, and that their unity as constituents of this complex may then be discovered through such mental operations as comparing or counting. But in such cases there is no evidence, so far as I can see, that the original items are ever originally given as an unrelated manifold. On the contrary, the basis from which the mind proceeds in apprehending the new relation seems always to be itself a complex of interrelated parts. Or, to speak more accurately, it is always within a pre-existing form of unity that relatively new forms of unity emerge for consciousness through an appropriate direction of attention. This will, I think, become clear when we consider that there are two ways in which we may be aware of relation. We may be aware of relations either implicitly or explicitly. In seeing a book lying on a table, the book's being on the table is certainly part of the

¹ I do not say that he actually holds this doctrine.

object of which I have cognisance. But I apprehend it only implicitly if I fail to distinguish the general relation of above and below from the terms which in this instance it relates:—if I am only aware of the complex without mentally contrasting its constituents and their relational form. Now the explicit apprehension of relations and forms of unity may perhaps always involve a mental operation starting from a given basis, but the given basis itself seems in all cases to include implicit relations;¹ it is always some kind of complex. By comparing red and blue, I become explicitly cognisant of a relation of difference as subsisting between them. And the possibility of this no doubt presupposes that I began by thinking both of the red and blue together. But it is a condition of my thinking of them together that I shall think of them in some kind of relation to each other, and therefore as members of some kind of complex. I cannot attend to both in such a way as to begin comparing them without at least apprehending them as in some way spatially or temporally connected. Further, the function of comparison in general is to substitute for implicit or relatively indefinite awareness of likeness an explicit or relatively precise awareness. Similarly, when we count we start not merely with the apprehension of units, but with the apprehension of a relatively vague numerical complex, which becomes more precisely defined in the process of counting. In general, the basis or “inferius” | ^x of an object of higher order is itself an object of higher order. We may go further than this. In some cases of fundamental importance, a complex is apprehended without all its members being independently presented, and sometimes without any of them being independently presented. | We may think, for instance, of equality between x and y , where x and y are determined only as being any terms such as may enter into this relation. Here, if we are to make such a distinction at all, it is the constituents which depend on the complex rather than inversely. In other instances the unity of a complex is apprehended | ^x though only some of its constituents are independently given. Thus, in thinking of a class, it is plain that we do not and, for the most part, cannot independently bring before our mind all the members. We do indeed, when we think of a class, in a sense think of all its members.

¹ Locke similarly distinguishes “secret relations” from relations of ideas apprehended through “comparison.”

But it is the thought of the unity of the class which preconditions the thought of its members as such, and not inversely. In like manner, all the attributes belonging to the same thing are mentally referred to as a complex unity, including both what is known and what remains to be known about the thing; plainly, the unknown attributes, at least, are thought of only in and through the act of thinking of the complex as such, and not independently given as a precondition of this. Other examples of far-reaching importance are supplied by the unity of the order of succession in time and of coexistence in space, and also by the unity of the universe as the necessary correlative of the unity of the self. And the unity of the self as the complex of present, past, future, and possible experiences is another relevant instance. X

It may be urged that I have taken the phrase, "objects of higher order," in a wider sense than that contemplated by Professor Meinong. In all probability this is so. But it does not follow that what I have said is irrelevant. For, in the first place, the connexion between relational consciousness in general, and the special form of it covered by the term "objects of higher order," requires to be explicitly considered. In the second place, it is difficult to see how the view that the apprehension of a complex presupposes the independent apprehension of all its terms can be justified unless by making it part of the definition of a complex, and so rendering the statement a tautology.

It will be seen that in treating of the unity of the self I have omitted all reference to self-consciousness. I have done so intentionally, on the ground that there can be no consciousness of self unless there is a self to be conscious of. But this, in the first instance, can only be constituted by acts which have for their objects something other than their own being. This follows from the general principle that a relation cannot itself be one of the terms which it relates. On the other hand, if we presuppose the complex unity of the self, as independently conditioned by reference to objects, this difficulty vanishes. Given a self to know, there is no reason why it should not be known. It would seem that there is no stage or phrase of mental life in which self-consciousness is entirely absent, however vague and rudimentary it may be. However preoccupied the mind may be with other objects, these objects are at least

apprehended as qualified by attributes essentially relative to subjective states and processes. An object of desire, as such, differs from an object of aversion, and both from objects which are, in this respect, indifferent. Similarly, an agreeable situation differs from a disagreeable situation, a successful line of behaviour from one that is unsuccessful, and an occurrence which disappoints expectation from one that fulfils it. These and the like variable attributes of objects belong to them only as related to the self and its varying acts. Hence it would seem that the awareness of these must involve at least an indefinite form of self-consciousness capable of becoming more determinate under special conditions.

PRESENTATIONS AND THEIR PRESENTATIVE
FUNCTION.

(1) ANALYSIS OF A TYPICAL CASE.

We may begin by examining a typical case of fundamental importance—the presentative function of sensory images in relation to impressions. We may then proceed to use this as a clue to the general theory of presentative function. When it is said that an image is a “revival” of an impression, or a revived impression, part of what is meant is that the image more or less resembles the impression. My present mental picture of the visible appearance of my friend, as I last saw him, is more or less similar to the complex of visual sensations which I experienced in actually seeing him. But this is not all that we mean by the word *revival*. We also intend to imply that the occurrence of the image is in a special way preconditioned by the previous occurrence of the impression. The present image is conceived as being a modified recurrence or reinstatement of the original sensation, and, therefore, as being existentially connected with it and dependent on it. Thus the image is (1) more or less like the original impression, (2) derived from it. These are the two points on which Hume insists as constituting the relation of impressions to what he calls “ideas” or “thoughts.” But there is a third point which Hume ignores, although it is directly involved in his use of the terms “idea” and “thought.” The fainter copy derived from a past impression is constantly treated by him as being a thought or idea *of* the impression; and, without this assumption, he would not be able to stir a step in the exposition of his philosophy. Yet he never seems to see that thinking of a previous impression is something radically different from having a subsequent experience more or less similar to it and dependent on it. There is here a gap which is certainly not bridged by his insistence on the faintness or feebleness of the derivative copy as compared with its original. If the facts were exhaustively described by describing the present experience as a derivative copy fainter than its original, we should be for ever precluded from knowing or thinking that the copy is a copy or that it implies the previous

occurrence of the impression. The impression is no longer experienced when the image is experienced; it does not wait to be copied like the sitter who is having his portrait taken. It is only in the act of remembering itself that we can, in the first instance, come to know, believe, or suppose that the present experience is like or unlike the past: it is only in the act of remembering itself that we can, in the first instance, come to know, believe, or suppose that a prior impression has occurred or that its occurrence is a precondition of the present image. But as the impression, unlike the image, is not at the moment actually experienced, its previous occurrence, its nature and its relations to the present image can be mentally referred to only as the object of a thought which transcends immediate experience. Similarly, the cognisance of the image itself as being like or unlike the impression, as subsequent to it and as presupposing it, is also possible only as involving thought which transcends immediate experience. On the other hand, the thought which thus transcends immediate experience does so only by means of it; what is thought is rooted and grounded in what is felt. It is the existential presence and the nature of the image which determines for thought the occurrence of a certain past impression as its special object. The image is the specifying content of the thought, determining it as the *idea* of a specific impression. Apart from the image or something discharging an equivalent function, this thought would be empty—indeterminate or directionless; apart from thought the image would be blind—without reference to anything beyond itself, and, therefore, without reference even to itself.

It is not true that *any* image is capable of determining the direction of thought to *any* impression. Each image does so only in the case of an impression specially connected with it. What is the special connexion which conditions this presentative function of the image? It must be sought in one or both of the two relations already assigned: (1) The resemblance of the image to the impression; (2) the existential dependence which is indicated by saying that the impression is retained and reproduced in the image. If (1) were the sole condition, remembrance would extend only so far as resemblance extends. The thought of the impression would

only include such characters as are repeated in the image. But this is very far from being the case. The impression, for instance, is remembered as being vivid, whereas the image is faint; the impression is remembered as being distinct, whereas the image is blurred; the impression is remembered as being steady, whereas the image wavers and fluctuates; the impression may be remembered as coloured, whereas the image is black and white. Given a suitable direction of attention, such contrasts are recognisable in the very act of remembering. Thus, though the degree of fidelity of the image, as copy, to the impression, as original, is, no doubt, a condition of the detailed accuracy of memory, resemblance is not the sole condition of the presentative function of images. (2) is a fundamental condition as well as (1). Some community of nature between impression and image seems to be required; but the presentative function of the image also depends on the peculiar way in which the image is preconditioned by the antecedent impression. As the merely external fact of dependence cannot be supposed to be operative, we must assume that the image itself as an immediate experience has a character due to its derivative existence, and varying according to the varying impressions from which it is derived. To verify the presence of this character introspectively, we have only to contrast images which directly subserve memory with those that subserve the play of fancy, *e.g.* the complex image of a golden mountain or of a three-headed dog.

In the case of such complex images of fancy the components are ultimately derived from past impressions, but the complex, as such, is not the reproduction of an impressional complex. Hence, though the whole image conditions a thought-reference to impressional experience, it does not yield the awareness of a correspondingly complex sensation as having actually occurred. The thought connected with it is rather that of a possible impression, or, under special conditions, that of a future impression. Even images, which are wholly derivable from previous impressions, may determine the thought of future or of possible sensations rather than the remembrance of those which are past. All depends on the variable context of experience of which they form a part. To discuss in detail the questions which here emerge would be impossible at

the present stage of our enquiry. But we may safely assert that the reference to the past is primary, and that all other forms of the presentative function of images, in relation to impressions, presuppose it, and arise as modifications of it.

(2) GENERAL NATURE AND CONDITIONS OF THE
PRESENTATIVE FUNCTION.

The foregoing analysis of what takes place in remembering the occurrence of a past impression by means of a present image is intended to explain and illustrate by a typical example the general view of the inseparable correlation of thought and experience in all knowledge, which is involved in the doctrine of presentations. There are here two points to be noted. (1) As we have cognisance of the image only in remembering the past impression, so mere experience as it is actually being experienced cannot by itself constitute the object of knowledge, apart from a thought which transcends it. (2) As the specifying function of the image presupposes a special relation between it and the impression, and as this relation is itself cognisable in the process of remembering, so all thought is similarly conditioned by appropriate relations between immediate experience and what is thought of, and these relations themselves form part of what is thought of. | x

Apart from the examination of special cases, have we any general grounds for assuming that these propositions express universal conditions of knowledge? Let us proceed to consider them separately. (1) Can a bare experience, or, to use T. H. Green's language, a mere feeling, be, by itself, an object of knowledge apart from a thought which transcends it? In denying this, I find myself on ground which has been thoroughly traversed and explored. Little can be added to what has been already urged by Green in the introduction to his edition of Hume, and what I have to say here is intended mainly to remind the reader of work which has already been done effectively by others. The most general reason why a bare feeling, as it is being felt, cannot by itself be a complete object of knowledge is that it is not a proposition, and that all knowledge is of propositions and of other things only as forming constituents of propositions. To know is ✓

Distinction
of Facts
and
Events
 always to know "that..."; it is to know, for instance, "that something is or exists or occurs," or "that something is of such and such a nature," or "that it is so and so related to something else." Now a proposition, understood in this sense, is never a particular existence or occurrence, and it cannot therefore be a feeling which is always a particular existence or occurrence. Particular existences, as such, are capable of beginning to exist and ceasing to exist, but propositions are not thus affected by the flux of time. The battle of Waterloo is a particular occurrence, which began and ended on June 18th, 1815. But the facts of this battle being fought on June 18th, 1815, and therefore ninety-six years before 1911, are not events which come into existence or pass out of existence. Both these facts are expressed when some one speaking in 1911 asserts that the battle took place ninety-six years ago on June 18th, 1815. The dates assigned determine the time of the event, not the time of the fact of its occurrence or of its occurrence at a certain date, or before some other date and after some other date. These facts, as such, are dateless. Similarly a feeling exists only in the moment in which it is felt; but the fact of its being felt at that moment is exempt from such temporal limitation. The fact of its being felt at that moment cannot change into the fact of its not being felt at that moment; and if we consider the fact of its being felt abstractly without reference to any special time, it is still plainer that this does not change or cease to be. It follows that a bare feeling cannot by itself be a complete object of knowledge. But it may be thought that the view we are criticising can, in substance, be rendered defensible by restating in an amended form. Granting that what is apprehended is not the bare feeling only, but the fact of its existence, is it not still possible to assume that the apprehension of this fact may be merely coincident with and limited to the existential presence of the feeling, so that the fact is isolated for knowledge exactly as feeling is isolated for experience? To see that this view is untenable we have only to consider what it implies. *Ex hypothesi*, all reference to anything other than what is contained in the experience of the present moment is excluded, so that there can be no thought of the past or future. Hence the existence of the present feeling cannot be apprehended as being present; for this involves the thought of its relation to a before

and after. There can therefore be no cognisance of its beginning or ceasing, or of its being an event or occurrence. For the same reason there can be no cognisance of it as like or unlike any experience which has preceded or may follow it. For the same reason, there can be no apprehension of it as enduring or changing, or as having changed or endured. Thus it cannot be recognised as remaining the same in quality or intensity or as varying in quality or intensity in successive phases of its existence; this cannot be because the self-complete and self-contained object of knowledge is supposed to be only the present phase of its existence in isolation from anything else whatever. Here we seem to have reached a *reductio ad absurdum*. Where there is no identification or recognition of a thing as the same with itself, there can be nothing which deserves to be called knowledge. The same point may be exhibited in a still more searching way, as follows: To know that something exists involves a distinction between what it is and its existence. But this distinction carries us at once beyond the particular existent itself. Its nature as distinguished from its existence is general or universal, inasmuch as it is capable of being exemplified in other particular existents besides. Its existence again, as distinguished from its nature, is general or universal, inasmuch as it is common to whatever exists. As, therefore, a particular existent is only known or knowing the proposition that it exists, it can only be known by a thought which transcends it.

There still remains one objection to this line of argument. It may be said that the grounds assigned for denying that a bare feeling can by itself be known, depends for whatever cogency they may possess on an arbitrary distinction between what is and what is not to be regarded as knowledge. I have, therefore, to point out that the distinction on which I have proceeded is not arbitrary; and this is possible only by showing that it rests on a presupposition common both to those who affirm and those who deny that knowledge may be simply coincident with and limited to immediate experiences as they come and go. Now, it is acknowledged on all hands that cognitions are linked with each other in a system. As to the nature and extent of this systematic unity there may be much divergence of opinion. All agree, however, that it must in some way include the possibility of inferring from facts given in or through experience other facts not so

given. But this would be at least logically indefensible, if not psychologically impossible, were feelings capable of being *felt* by themselves correspondingly capable of being *known* in isolation. Such feelings as they are experienced from moment to moment would be the only particular facts primarily given. If we adopt a strictly empirical position and assume that the mind starts *solely* with these primary data, even the thought of anything that is not being actually experienced at a given moment, becomes an impossibility. For each experience being for knowledge self-complete and self-contained cannot imply anything beyond itself. Even the reference in memory from image to impression would be inexplicable on this view. On the other hand, if we add to the primary data a faculty of thinking to link them with each other and with facts not directly given in experience, then, as Hume has so brilliantly demonstrated, the work of thought would be wholly baseless and arbitrary. It could only consist in affirming connexion where no connexion is discoverable. No equipment of Kantian categories can help its impotence in face of a logically impossible task.

Generalising from the special case of the image as presentative of an impression, we obtain (2) the universal principle that nothing which transcends immediate experience can be known except in so far as it is apprehended in an appropriate relation to something which is immediately experienced. Further, if we take into account proposition (1), the inverse will also hold good, that no immediate experience can be known except as related to something which transcends immediate experience. Thus, in so far as knowledge is conditioned by a presentation, this presupposes (a) that there is a special relation between the presentation and the presented object, and (b) that this relation is itself part of what is known. As for (a), it seems sufficient to say that there would be no reason why a presentation should determine the direction of thought to one object rather than another, unless it had some special relation to this object, and that the relation must vary according to the various features or aspects of the object which are revealed to thinking consciousness. As for (b), we have already seen that the relation between presentation and presented object is itself apprehended in the special case of the images as presentative of the occurrence of previous impression; if other cases differed in this

respect, there would be a fundamental disparity in the nature of the presentative function in different instances of it, which would involve a breach of continuity, not to be accepted without cogent grounds. But there are no such grounds. On the contrary, a detailed examination will show that other cases are in this respect strictly analogous to the case which we have taken as typical. It is also important to notice that we can give no rational explanation of the function of presentations without implying that the relation to presented objects is itself apprehended. The only intelligible account seems to be as follows. Thought, as such, has for its ultimate object the universe in its unity; but not of course the universe in all its detail. The special features emerge successively, leaving always a relatively indefinite background. The unity of the universe is apprehended in apprehending its parts as being partial,—as being incomplete and requiring completion through their relations within a whole which transcends them. Now, the process through which the parts of the universe are successively revealed must start from primary objects, which ultimately specify for thought, directly or indirectly, all other objects. These primary objects can be nothing else than those modes of immediate experience which we have called *presentations*. But this implies not only that presentations are essentially fragmentary and so related in various ways to being which transcends their own existence, but also that they must be *apprehended* as incomplete, and therefore as related to objects which are not themselves presentations falling within the experience of the individual at the moment.

Inasmuch, then, as knowledge is conditioned by presentation, the total object known is a complex unity, which may be symbolised as PrO , where P is the presentation, O an object distinct from it, and r the relation between P and O . Plainly, this view is not open to the objections which are commonly regarded as making the doctrine of representative knowledge untenable. The doctrine of representative knowledge is, in principle, indefensible, because according to it we begin by apprehending a P which represents O without apprehending O itself. But we cannot be aware of P as representative of O without being aware of O itself; and, if we are initially aware only of P , there seems to be no conceivable way in which we could pass from the knowledge of P to the knowledge of O . Hence the

doctrine of representative knowledge, in the sense in which it is ordinarily understood, is doomed to collapse when it is brought face to face with the question: How does the mind pass from the representation to that which is represented? The position here advocated is such as to make this question entirely irrelevant. I do not say that we are first aware of presentation by itself, and then somehow pass from this to the knowledge of an object distinct from it. What I do say is that whatever other objects we know, we know only in knowing their relation to presentations. But the objects so known, and their relatedness to presentation, are known *immediately*. They are immediate objects of thinking consciousness; and, for me, whatever is really thought, in so far as it is thought really is.¹ Whether the object of thought is an actual experience of mine at the moment, such as a present toothache, or something not actually experienced, such as my having had a toothache yesterday, or the infinity of time;—in all these cases, equally, the object of thought, as such, is directly present to my thinking consciousness; and what is thus directly present is reality, and not something, intervening between me and reality. To put the case in a different way: I no more hold that the knowledge of other objects is mediated by presentations than I hold that the knowledge of presentations is mediated by that of objects which are not presentations. If it is true that I cannot know anything else except as related to a presentation, it is equally true that I cannot know a presentation except as related to something else. In different ways the knowledge of presentations and of presented objects mediate each other, so as to form an inseparable unity. It follows that the question, How do you get from the presentation to the presented object? is not relevant to my position at all. I do not need to “get to” the presented object; for I am there already. If this were not so, I could not even “get to” the presentation itself in the sense of knowing it; for the presentation, in order to be known, must be *thought* as well as experienced; and it cannot be thought except as connected with what is not presentation.

¹I have expounded this view and have attempted to reconcile it with the existence of error in my paper on “The Object of Thought and Real Being,” published in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1911-12.

It may be said that, on this view, our knowledge of whatever is not our immediate experience at the moment is merely relative, inasmuch as what we know of it is not its own intrinsic nature, but only the way in which it is related to something else. Does not this leave undetermined the question, what it is in itself apart from its relations to immediate experience?¹ Are we not reduced to the Kantian position, that we can know things only in their appearance as sensible phenomena and not as they are in themselves? Such questions seem to be based on an untenable assumption, the assumption that, knowing the intrinsic nature of *A*, we can know *B* as related to *A* without any insight into the intrinsic nature of *B*, whatever the special character of the relation may be. This really presupposes the general theory that relations are purely "external" forknowledge, so that anything may be apprehended as related in any way to anything else. Now, even if this be conceded in the case of some relations, it certainly cannot be admitted for all. We cannot apprehend *B* as prior to *A* without apprehending *B* as something which temporally endures or occurs. We cannot apprehend *B* as greater than *A* without apprehending *B* as a quantum of the same sort as *A*. So far as regards our present question, the assumption, that all relations are in the required sense purely external, breaks down at once when we consider the case which we have taken as typical. Obviously, in apprehending the relation of past impression to present image, we apprehend, in some degree, the nature of the past impression. Similarly, in so far as one man has cognisance of the sensations and emotions of another in relation to his own, he has more or less insight into the intrinsic nature of the other man's sensations and feelings, though he does not himself experience these. In general we may venture to assume, until a clear exception is shown to exist, that all knowledge of presented objects includes, in some respect and degree, a knowledge of their intrinsic nature, and not *merely* of their relatedness to presentation. The *respect* and *degree* will vary with the presentation and the sort of relation apprehended between it and the presented object. Thus, the

¹ By "*immediate* experience" I mean the experience of the moment distinguished from past, future, and potential experiences of the individual.

distinction between knowledge of things as they are in themselves and knowledge of things as phenomena may still be maintained in a relative sense. It ceases to be absolute and becomes a distinction of more or less. We may illustrate by comparing the knowledge which a man blind from birth may obtain of the visual sensations of other men with that possessed by a man whose own vision is normal. Inasmuch as the blind man himself experiences sensations of various kinds, he knows what it is for another to have sensuous experiences, and, to this extent, he knows what it is to have visual experiences: inasmuch as he himself has tactual sensations which are extensive, he knows what it is to experience extensive sensations, and to that extent he knows what it is to experience visual sensation. But all his further special knowledge of them has reference merely to their distinctive place and function in the mental life of other men; this knowledge may be extensive and systematic; and it often enables the blind to speak of light and colour with a propriety and accuracy which make it difficult to realise that they themselves are unable to see. None the less it can never give cognisance of the distinctive qualities of light and colour sensations as they are in themselves. These are known in their *δύναμις* rather than their *εἶδος*; they are apprehended phenomenally and not *per se*.

The knowledge of beings other than existent particulars, *e.g.* generalities and possibilities, and universal forms of unity, such as space, time, and causality, is ultimately coincident with the knowledge of relevant particulars as actually existing. Hence the presentations which present existent particulars *eo ipso*, present these other modes of being. Thus, in apprehending a particular existent, such as a tree or a horse, we must, however vaguely, distinguish its "what" from its "that"; and so regard as an instance exemplifying a general nature capable of having other instances. In order that these other instances, actual or possible, may be separately brought before the mind in their distinct particularity, other specific presentations are required; these may partly be given in the course of sensuous experience, as, when after seeing a white horse, we see a black one; or, again, they may be formed through productive imagination, under the guidance of general concepts, as, when after seeing a white horse, we imagine a green one, which we have never

seen; or, when after seeing a horse and a man, we proceed to imagine a centaur. But it is not necessary for the apprehension of a distinct instance, as such, that it should be thus separately perceived or imagined. It may be thought as having some determinate relation to what is perceived or imagined. Thus, to adopt an illustration from Hume, supposing that a qualitatively graduated series of colours is given, another colour, which is not given, may be determined for thought, as being intermediate in quality between two adjacent members of the series which are given. Whether or not the mind endeavours to imagine this colour, and whether or not it succeeds in so doing, the particular colour is none the less apprehended through its relation to the given particulars. Nor is this all; other unimagined particulars may be determined for thought as related to this one, which is itself unimagined. If the given colours are p and q , and the unimagined colour x is thought of as being exactly intermediate between p and q , then another colour y may be determined for thought as exactly intermediate between p and x , and yet another z as exactly intermediate between y and x , and to this process there is no theoretical limit, apart from the special conditions of special cases. It is in some such way that we are enabled to think of the infinite series of numbers intervening between 0 and 1.

We may say generally that universals, whether these be merely class concepts or other forms of unity, and also possible particulars, as such, are ultimately apprehended in inseparable unity with actual particulars. Hence, in dealing with the question, how far universals and possibilities are known as they are in themselves, we must take into account two conditions. We have (1) to consider how far the relevant actualities are, in relevant respects, known as they are themselves. So far as the things we see and touch are phenomenally known, the general concept of material things, and the systematic concept of the material world, are also phenomenal. On the other hand, so far as particular feelings, and sensations, and thoughts are known, in their intrinsic nature, the corresponding class concepts are known in their intrinsic nature, and so is the individual mind, inasmuch as it is a unified complex of feelings, sensations, and thoughts. Condition (2) has especial reference to

possible particulars and classes of possible particulars. A possible particular may be set before the mind through a process of productive imagination, and, to this extent, it is apprehended as it is in itself in the same manner and degree as the actual particulars with which it is connected. On the other hand, without being itself imagined, or even capable of being imagined, it may be determined for thought as "that which" is related in a certain way to other actual or possible particulars. It may be determined for thought as x in our example is determined through its relation to p and q , or as y is determined through its relation to x and p , or as z is determined through its relation to x and y . So far as this is the case, the possible particular is known "relatively" rather than "in itself."¹

(3) FUNCTION OF SENSE PRESENTATIONS IN THE PERCEPTION OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS.

I have so far avoided any discussion of the part played by presentations in the perception of material things and their qualities. Nor do I now intend to deal with the problem as a whole, as this would be impossible within the space at my disposal. I feel bound, however, to say something in reply to the charge that I hold a doctrine of Representative Perception. I have already shown that my general theory of knowledge is not really open to this criticism. But in dealing with the perception of the sensible qualities of bodies, I have to meet a more special objection. It is urged against me that there is here no room for any distinction between presentation and presented object; the sense presentation, it is said, is itself all that is discernible as the quality of the thing.

I may state the case against me in the language of a very acute critic, who has favoured me with a private communication on the subject.² "I have before me a brass inkstand. It is round and yellow. What is the relation between, *e.g.* the yellow which I see (presentation-

¹ This discussion of our knowledge of universal possibilities is meant only to indicate the general mode in which I would deal with the questions raised. There are manifold complexities and subtleties which I leave untouched.

² Mr. Henry Barker, of Edinburgh University.

yellow = Yp) and the yellow of the inkstand (yellow object = Yo)? According to Representative Perception Yp , the colour sensation yellow is one thing and Yo the colour yellow is another quite distinct thing, and Yp represents Yo . I understand that you would say that Yp presents rather than represents Yo , but that Yp must be distinguished from Yo , inasmuch as Yp is a momentary psychical fact and Yo is a permanent quality of the inkstand.... I am content to ask, In any one moment in which I see the inkstand is there only one yellow which may be regarded either as colour sensation or as colour quality, or are there two yellows? For my part I answer, of course, one yellow, the identical yellow colour which I see the inkstand to be of."

The point could hardly be better put. My reply is as follows: I grant that the "yellow I see" is the yellow of the object. But I deny that the "yellow I see" can, according to the normal use of language, be identified with presentation-yellow (Yp). Ordinary language follows common sense; and common sense regards the question, What is seen? as ultimately dependent on the question. What material thing is actually before the eye to be seen? If I say that I see a man, I may be told that I do not see a man but a wax figure. Similarly, if I say that I see a yellow inkstand, common sense may correct me by asserting that I do not see a yellow inkstand, but only one which looks yellow to my jaundiced eye, or under a certain unusual illumination. That it *looks* yellow to me means that I apprehend a sensory content similar to that which I should apprehend, if I really saw a yellow inkstand with a normal eye and under normal illumination. But we do not naturally speak of seeing the sensory content itself. The case of dreams and hallucinations is instructive. I may say that I saw a yellow inkstand in a dream. But "I saw in a dream" is only a way of saying, "I dreamed that I saw," and is sharply distinguished from really seeing. Yet, in dreaming that I see a yellow inkstand, the visual sensations may be virtually the same as in really seeing one. The awareness of the sensations is not by itself enough to constitute seeing. I do not really see unless there is present either a yellow inkstand or something mistaken for it, to which the yellow may belong.

What then is the relation of Yp to Yo ? It is suggested that if I say

there are two "quite distinct" yellows, I involve myself in obvious absurdity. So far I agree. Such a position would be absurd. But there is also another absurdity which I am equally anxious to avoid, one which my critics do not seem able to escape. If it is absurd to assert two distinct yellows, it is *a fortiori* absurd to assert an indefinitely numerous multiplicity of yellows, all belonging to the same object. But, if presentation-yellow is taken to be, by itself, identical with the yellow of the object, then, since the presentation-yellow may vary indefinitely for different percipients, and for the same percipient under different conditions, there must be a corresponding multiplicity of different yellows really belonging to the object.

My way of avoiding both the double yellow and the indefinite plurality of yellows is as follows: What I perceive by sight at any moment is not *merely* Yp , but Yp as conditioned. My perception includes not only awareness of the sensory content, but also the thought of its condition. Thus, if the presentation-yellow is symbolised by Yp , I should symbolise the yellow of the object, so far as this is perceived at any given moment, by $Yp-r-c$, where c stands for a condition and r for a relation. The two distinct yellows are thus avoided. For $Yp-r-c$ includes Yp , and if Yp is omitted there is no yellow to be seen in the inkstand. On the other hand, I also avoid the absurdity of the indefinitely numerous yellows. For the various presentation-yellows, in virtue of their common relation to the constant condition c , form, together with c , a complex unity which may be symbolised as follows:

$$\left. \begin{array}{c} Yp_1 \\ Yp_2 \\ Yp_3 \\ \vdots \\ Yp_n \end{array} \right\} r-c.$$

* This complex unity is the yellow of the object, Y_o ; and Yp_1-r-c , $Yp_2-r-c \dots Yp_n-r-c$ are not separate yellows, but the partial phases of the single objective yellow which we call its varying sensible appearances. The single objective yellow *looks* different according to the varying circumstances under which it is perceived. If we could see

or feel the vibrations which constitute yellow for the physicist, we should only be perceiving one sensible appearance of $Y\phi$ among others.

It is only from this point of view that it seems possible to account satisfactorily for the identification of visible with tangible extension in the same thing, notwithstanding the dissimilarity which Berkeley pointed out between the extensive characters of visual and tactual sensations, as such. Part of what we mean by the unity of the sensible qualities of the same thing is that, so far as they are in place at all, they are in the self-same place. In particular, visible and tangible qualities are apprehended as spatially coincident—as, so to speak, interpenetrating each other. The smoothness of the inkstand is exactly where its yellowness is; there is not one extension of the smoothness and another of the yellowness. There is a single indistinguishable extension of both. But if we compare the corresponding visual and tactual presentations, as such, we find no such identity in the extension which belongs to them. As Berkeley has shown in his Theory of Vision, the relation between Ev , the extension of visual sensation, and Et , the extension of tactual sensation, apart from the general similarity which is implied in applying the word, *extension*, to both, consists merely in their regular empirical conjunction in certain successive and simultaneous combinations. The Ev and the Et which I experience in seeing and touching the brass inkstand are, in their own nature and existence, as distinct from each other as each of them is from the Ev or Et which I experience in seeing or touching a book on my shelves. If, then, there is no difference between sense-presentations and the sensible qualities of bodies, how can we account for the identical extension of the visible and tangible qualities of the same thing? On my view, there is no difficulty. The identical extension of the thing is the complex unity $\left. \begin{matrix} Ev \\ Et \end{matrix} \right\} r-c$. $Evrc$ is that partial phase of this complex unity which we call its visual appearance, and $Et rc$ the partial phase of it, which we call its appearance to touch.

Plainly there are many further questions which arise out of this account of the perception of sensible qualities. In the first place, the constant condition pervading and unifying the different appearances

of the same quality is only one of the conditions on which the sense-presentation depends. The variations in the sense-presentation must be referred to correspondingly variable conditions. We have thus to face the problem, how does the percipient subject come to discern with increasing definiteness and certainty the constant from the fluctuating factors? In following up this line of investigation it would be necessary to traverse again, from a different point of view, the ground covered by Kant in his proofs of the Analogies of Experience.

Again, there is the very important question: how far does knowledge, by way of sense experience or otherwise, include a knowledge of the conditions of sensation as they are in themselves? Kant's view was that they cannot be known as they are in themselves at all. But as I hold that the distinction between knowing anything through its relations and knowing its intrinsic nature is merely one of degree, it is clear that I am bound to disagree radically with this Kantian doctrine.

The limits of the present essay debar me from dealing with these and similar problems. But I hope that I have said enough to show the general point of view from which I would treat them.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE IN ITS
THEOLOGICAL - ASPECTS

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Printed at the University Press by
ROBERT MACLEHOSE & CO. LTD.

1911

The Philosophy of Lotze in its Theological Aspects

THIS essay only aims at giving a preliminary survey of Lotze's position in so far as it bears immediately upon the most fundamental problems of the Philosophy of Religion. I am very conscious of the fact that many topics have had to be left after only very brief treatment.

My best thanks are due to the Rev. George Galloway, D.D., for his advice as to reading bearing upon Lotze's theological position; to Professor A. E. Taylor for reading my manuscript and for an important criticism on a question of historical orthodoxy; and to Professor Stout for his kind permission to make use of certain ideas of his discussed at recent meetings of the Senior Philosophical Society at St. Andrews University, and for the help which I have gained from conversation with him. The references are to the latest editions of English translations of the *Metaphysic*, the *Microcosmus*, the *Outlines of Metaphysic*, and the *Outlines of Philosophy of Religion*, and to the single volume edition of the *Logic*.

C. W. VALENTINE.

ST. ANDREWS, *June*, 1911.

INTRODUCTION

THE PLACE OF FEELING AND REASON

IT is characteristic of Lotze that, in a preliminary discussion as to the value of Philosophy, he recognises and emphasises two aspects or means of the search for truth, one or the other of which is frequently ignored by opposing schools of thought. In the first place, the very origin of metaphysics is due, he says, to the conflict of what *seems* to us reality, with the demands of man's heart, and its value is determined by the extent to which it shows us "what we have to reverence, as the true significance of existence, what we have to do and what to hope" (Introd. to *Microcosmus*, p. ix.).

Mere knowledge of truth is of no value in itself. "If the object of all human investigation were but to produce in cognition a reflection of the world as it exists, of what value would be all its labour and pains, which could result only in vain repetition, in an imitation within the soul of that which exists without it? What significance could there be in this barren rehearsal—what should oblige thinking minds to be mere mirrors of that which does not think, unless the discovery of truth were in all cases likewise the production of some good, valuable enough to justify the pains expended in attaining it?"

Yet mere desire is no adequate guide. It cannot be expected that the "obscure and unquiet movements of men's spirits should furnish a juster delineation of the connection of things than the careful investigation of science."

Hence, whilst recognising that the value of a philosophy is only determined by the extent to which it satisfies the whole man, and whilst asserting that the demands of the heart cannot be stifled, he holds that it can "expect a response to them only as an incidental result of knowledge which starts from a less emotional and therefore a clearer point of view" (*Mic.* Intro. vii.).

This should dispose of the often vaguely expressed accusation that Lotze "bases his Philosophy on Feeling," whilst it divides him at once from Ritschl and his school, by the emphasis upon the essential work of Reason.

Desire and
Belief.

We may add a further thought to this. Man will, in so far as he observes and reflects, himself tend to distrust those beliefs which accord with his strongest desires, if he has not honestly made an attempt to consider their bases without prejudice. For he will see how readily most people are led to believe that which they strongly wish to believe, and how often the subjective element in the determination of belief leads one astray. Yet this is not to assert that the desires of a man's deepest nature should have *no* influence upon his belief. It may well be that all philosophy can do is to show that there are no insuperable objections to a satisfying system of belief; or that the "chances are even"; or that there is a probability in favour of such a truth. In such a position why should not a man "Cleave ever to the sunnier side of doubt"? "With perfect knowledge, it would be otherwise, but with limited knowledge there is always room for faith and always need for it" (Professor J. Ward, *Outline of Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews*, 1910).

The guiding
work of desire.

Furthermore, a step thus taken at the promptings of desire may lead us to a new position from which the universe becomes more intelligible. "Credo ut intelligam," as Anselm put it. As Professor Ward showed in recent Gifford Lectures, it is thus that knowledge has advanced. "We gain knowledge solely by doing; the race at least has gained it only in this way." This is, no doubt, an overstatement. The knowledge of the race has advanced simply with the knowledge of individuals, and with them reflection has contributed—which Dr. Ward would, of course, admit. Yet it remains true that conation has been "at once the source of faith and the cause of knowledge," and by following its promptings we too may be led to yet a further stage of knowledge. The faith of Theism, says Ward, is, "psychologically considered, only the final phase of an ascending series."

If, then, we can show that a theistic view of the universe is at least as rational as one which fails to satisfy so adequately the heart of man, we need not hesitate to adopt it merely because we have been

prompted and upheld in our search for truth by a craving for such satisfaction. A frank recognition of such a motive at the outset of our search is more likely to guard us against undue influence by it in the consideration of particular arguments than would a profession of complete disinterestedness. Indeed, such a position of impartiality is probably impossible. Even Dr. McTaggart, who has combated vigorously the "argument from desire," gives as a justification for the study of Philosophy the fact that by its means we may attain to a "more cheerful view of the Universe." The biologist who seeks the truth about the universe along the lines of his own science, is doing so because at some time certain facts interested him more than others. Had his mental disposition been otherwise, it might have been historical facts which would have interested him more. If he is going to be absolutely impartial he must give up his specialising because at one time his search for truth had its trend determined by personal interest.

One further point before we leave this topic. There is a danger of the cautious man discounting too much beliefs that are in accord with his desires. As Professor Stout points out, "*Tarde creduntur, quae credita laedunt*" holds good only of persons of certain types. "Where the general mental attitude is one of fear, timidity, or gloomy suspicion, it does not hold good" (*Manual of Psychology*, p. 552). The danger of over-caution.

And probably we may go further and say that not only the pessimistically inclined, but also a certain type of extremely conscientious individual is apt to shrink too much from accepting beliefs that fit in apparently only too well with their hearts' desires—which seem "too good to be true." Such persons are comparable with those—often of stern puritanical upbringing—who tend to think that, of several possible lines of conduct, the most disagreeable one is probably the only right one.

We hold, then, that Lotze is justified in refusing to ignore entirely the claims of faith at the outset of his philosophy, and in refusing equally, on the other hand, to put aside the knowledge accumulated by scientific zeal, but rather in "consciously endeavouring to maintain the right of each and to show how far from insoluble is the contradiction in which they appear to be inextricably involved."

The work
of Reason
essential.

Yet it must not be imagined that Lotze would give an independent authority to the demands of the heart. At least this is not his final view—taken in the *Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion*. Rather the contributions of the inner states are only further data, additional to knowledge from external experience—"all of which have to be gathered together if possible into one harmonious truth of religion by our reflection." Only thus do we get at "Religion within the limits of mere reason." Such inner states include the aesthetic demand that the ideally beautiful and good shall be "no accidental product of that which is without significance, but must be rather the very Principle of the world or closely related to its creative principle."

GENERAL METHOD

THE POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF THOUGHT

Lotze is emphatic in his criticism of those philosophers who attempt to base their metaphysics upon a theory of knowledge or upon Psychology. For in examining the process of thought and in discussing its validity we have to make use of thought itself, and to trust to its validity in so doing. Or as Lotze puts it, "As to the truth of our cognition and its capability of truth no verdict can be compassed which is independent of that cognition itself" (*Met.* Introd. §. ix.). And further we cannot know that our knowledge is true unless we know some fact about reality; we require some ontological truth before we can make an epistemological assertion.

Whilst this is true it does not prevent us from taking a critical attitude towards the reliability of Thought. We are somewhat in the same position as that of the man who mounts a rope ladder in order to see if its supports are trustworthy: he must make use of them in the very attempt to examine them. We may say here briefly that Lotze's position is that Thought, whilst capable of attaining to true knowledge of reality, is yet incapable of exhausting reality, seeing that there are aspects of reality, feeling and volition, to wit, which cannot be represented adequately in Thought; and also, that there are problems which our thought has to give up as insoluble—in our present stage, at least, as for instance the problem of "absolute becoming" and that of the reconciling of the existence of evil with the omnipotence and goodness of God.

Lotze is keenly aware of the unsatisfactory nature of any system that starts with only one principle, however certain, from which it attempts to evolve a whole theory of the universe, any mistake in the process of which is a source of error in the subsequent development of the theory. Lotze's starting-points.

Further, though we assume a certain unity of the world, yet "that unity need not combine the manifold in general, or even combine individual truths among themselves, in such a way as that we should be in a position to deduce one out of the other, or all out of one according to law. It might, to use an imperfect comparison, control the whole of its organisation in a manner of a melody whose unity and continuity are perceptible, although no reasoning can prove that this particular continuation belongs to that particular beginning" (Art. in *Contemporary Review*, vol. xxxvii. p. 149).

Lotze himself maintains that investigation must take its departure from the largest possible number of independent considerations, with the proviso that "the results which the prosecution of one consideration yields, shall be subsequently corrected so far as is necessary by the results of the rest" (*Outlines of Met.* p. 9). The result is that one feels, in studying Lotze, that while his system may lack the compactness and stringency of some others, yet he is keeping in close touch with the whole of experience as known to us, and is not arbitrarily excluding one aspect or another for the sake of a greater consistency.

"Our whole theory of the universe," says Lotze, "has *three starting points*. We find within ourselves a knowledge of universal laws, which, without themselves giving rise to any particular form of existence, force themselves on our attention as the necessary and immediately certain limits within which all reality must move. On the other hand, we find within ourselves an instinct bidding us discern in Ideas of the good, the beautiful, and the holy the one indefeasible end whence alone reality derives any value; but even this end does not bring to our cognition the special form of the means by which it is to be attained. Between these two extreme points extends for us a third region—that of experience—boundless in the wealth of its forms and events, unknown in its origin" (*Mic.* i. p. 417).

In the first place, then, we find "universal laws" which the rational

mind cannot but accept as necessary. "I maintain with a philosopher's obstinacy that, above all things, that must hold good which we find to be in its nature a necessary result of Thought, though all else bend or break." Yet Lotze honestly admits that *a priori* reasoning, based on such self-evident laws, may lead to a conflict with experience. "We know in fact that the nature of reality yields a result to us unthinkable. It teaches us a union which we cannot construct in thought." We cannot, for example, give up the reality of our immediate experience of "becoming," and yet it remains for ever inexplicable by thought, and in a sense contradictory (*Met.* i. pp. 178-9).

When led to this impasse Lotze still clings to his two lines of thought, and their respective starting points. A solution of the contradiction, he maintains, can only be hinted at by a suggestion of that which is "superior to logical laws."

Lotze, then, is content, as every philosopher has had to be, to leave certain apparent contradictions as unsolved, even as insoluble from our point of view. Indeed, thought, he shows, is inadequate to deal completely with reality as immediately experienced by us, and if this be the case, how much more likely that it is inadequate to deal fully with that infinite universe towards which, however, it points.

Thought
cannot exhaust
reality.

Thus he says (*Mic.* i. 555): "Mind and mental life are more than thinking. It is quite possible that what things are is not beyond the possible experience of the whole mind, and yet that it is wholly incomprehensible by this one form of inner energy—thinking." Feeling and volition, for example, "are intelligible only to him who knows them by experience." And thought can never make "intelligible by forms of thinking the distinction that separates them from all thinking."

"Much goes on within us which even our thinking intelligence follows and contemplates only from without and whose contents it cannot exhaustively represent either in form of an idea or through a union of ideas. He, therefore, who is animated by the conviction that real existence cannot be impenetrable to the mind, cannot with equal confidence assume that thought is the precise organ which will be able to comprehend the real in its innermost essence" (*Contemporary Review*, xxxvii. p. 135).

FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION—THE UNITY OF
THE UNIVERSE

Now, if we are to make any attempt at understanding the Universe, we must, Lotze claims, make at least the fundamental assumption that the world is a unity, and further, that the elements act upon each other in accordance with law. For even if we supposed two such elements, *a* and *b*, as indifferent to one another, “we should after all never be compelled to regard this indifference as a fact based upon no principle, but as the necessary consequence of the same law, in accordance with which *a* and *b* exercise the aforesaid other reciprocal actions.” If we give up all assumption of any such unity of the universe, “the very basis for every investigation would be abolished.” “This one supposition is the foundation of every attempt to arrive at knowledge by means of experience, and is not deriveable from experience itself. The sceptic who doubts it is reduced to the absurdity of being unable, even under definite circumstances, to consider the occurrence of one event as more probable than that of another” (*Met.* i. p. 4).

Lotze is careful to point out that this assumption is no work of pure thought. In making it “we follow no longer the mere inclination of an uninterested understanding, but the inspirations of a reason appreciative of worth, which rejects even the thinkable, as long as it is only thinkable, and does not besides by the inherent excellence of its contents win recognition of its worth in the world” (*Mic.* i. 244).

The attempt to explain the universe, then, implies an assumption the negation of which, whilst thinkable, our full being refuses to accept. This point is fundamental in Lotze’s philosophy. Elsewhere Lotze closely allies with it the “confidence of Reason in itself.” “As regards the ultimate principles however which we follow in this criticism of our thoughts, it is quite true that we are left with nothing but the confidence of Reason in itself or the certainty of believing in the general truth that there is a meaning in the world and that the nature of that reality which includes us in itself has given our spirit only such necessities of thought as harmonise with it” (*Met.* i. 220).

"Faith" compared with
"Self-evident truths."

In certain places Lotze carefully distinguishes the nature of "religious faith" and that of self-evident ultimate truths. The latter, he points out, "do not tell us that anything whatever is or takes place, but only declare what would exist or would have to take place in case definite conditions occur": whereas Faith asserts some actual existence. Yet in this ultimate belief in the rationality of the universe we seem to have a link between the basis of our philosophy and a basis of religion. For it is a kind of immediate certainty. And, similarly, an immediate certainty exists according to Lotze that "what is greatest, most beautiful, most worthy, is not a mere thought but must be a reality" (*Mic.* ii. 670). Many, of course, have not this immediate certainty, but the man who has possesses for his religion a basis somewhat analogous to that basis which we have seen is necessary for all philosophic thought.

It is true, of course, that to deny the truth of this immediate certainty (that the most worthy is real) does not lead to self-contradiction—that is, no immediate and obvious self-contradiction. But neither does the denial of the unity of the universe, according to Lotze, who asserts that the contrary alternative is thinkable. Though, of course, the basis for all investigation would be taken away, and there would be "practical self-contradiction" involved in a regular mode of acting.

It is true, again, that the trust in the unity of the universe is a universal one; at least it is implied in the actions and thoughts of all sane men. But mere unanimity or the lack of it is no final test of truth.

Dr. McTaggart is doubtless right in asserting that he who bases his religion or philosophical position on an experience of immediate certainty which is not shared by another cannot expect this other to accept this certainty as an argument in favour of his belief. But this immediate certainty that the highest and best is real, is not by any means the sole basis of Lotze's philosophical system. Belief in the Good as real he regards not merely as a matter of personal conviction but as a necessary belief if we are to obtain a rational interpretation of the universe.

"It is not altogether just," he says, "to maintain that we believe in a supreme Good—in a life beyond, merely because we desire them.

In reality such beliefs rest upon an extremely broad though an unanalysed foundation of perception. They start from the fact of this actual world as it is given to us in experience in which we find certain intolerable contradictions threatening us if we refuse to acknowledge that those ways in which the structure of the world extends beyond our perception are real complements of that which we perceive" (*Logic*, § 347, p. 500).

Conception of Supreme Good necessary for completely rational account of the universe.

We have, then, an immediate conviction of the unity of the universe, and we also find this a necessary postulate if we are to form a rational interpretation of our experience: similarly, for Lotze there is an immediate conviction of the reality of the Supreme Good, and at the same time he finds this also a necessary postulate for a completely rational interpretation of our experience. Lotze speaks of the Highest Good as "the one real principle on which the validity of the metaphysical axioms in the world depends." Yet he goes on to say that we cannot regard it as a principle of cognition that can be profitably converted into a major premise from which to deduce the sum of metaphysical truth. That, indeed, would have been inconsistent with his statement that we must start from as many given points as possible. The principle of the Highest Good is rather one to which Lotze is led as explaining the *meaning* of life. Lotze himself does not attempt a concise statement of the steps leading to this position. That it is the "highest reason for the formation of the world and of our own metaphysical thoughts about it," is "not further demonstrable as a matter of strict metaphysics." The words "not further" refer to his summing up of the argument briefly in the preceding paragraphs. His metaphysical argument has shown, he maintains, the spiritual nature of all reality, including the phenomenal world. He refers then to Fichte's doctrine that those metaphysical principles "in accordance with which we trace out an inner coherency within this phenomenal world," can be shown to be "natural to our spirit on account of this, and only on account of this, because the spirit is intended for action." Lotze regards this as "not quite satisfactory, because it makes all actuality exist merely in the service of human action," ignoring the very end and aim of such action which determines it. For such "action," then, Lotze substitutes "the morally good for which the action is simply the indispensable form of actualization."

"The Good"
as means of
Interpretation.

Suppose we admit, as Lotze maintains, that he has proved in the Ontology that all reality consists of spiritual beings and that these are bound together in the life of one Infinite Spiritual Being. (This position will be critically considered shortly.) Now, spiritual activity is essentially marked by its purposiveness. And to the Supreme Good, which is the end and aim of this Infinite Being, all else is "subordinate means to an end." Hence it seems legitimate that such means may best be interpreted by the end to which they serve, so that the Good is that principle which is necessary to explain the whole of reality (in so far as it is explicable to us), including the phenomenal world. Apparent reality is merely a "system of contrivances by means of which this world of phenomena, as well as these determinate metaphysical habitudes for considering the world of phenomena, are called forth in order that the Highest Good may become for the spirit an object of enjoyment in all the multiplicity of forms possible to it."

Mechanism is universal in its working, but it is only the method adopted by a supreme intelligence, teleologically determined. Indeed, the time may come, Lotze thinks, when "these simplified propositions of all mechanics will become more directly connected with the Supreme Principle and will admit of being interpreted as the last formal offshoots of that Good which is the beginning of the end of the whole universe" (*Mic.* ii. p. 726).

The optimist sees a beneficent harmony of the universe spread out before him. To the pessimist "all things here seem out of joint." "Both views," Lotze points out, "imply the natural assumption that reality has no meaning except as it is productive of happiness." So while "absolute becoming" and an apprehension of a real beginning of existence are beyond our powers, explanation by end may not be. And in so far as we are able to apprehend a meaning and purpose "our cognition possesses more of truth than if it copied exactly a world of objects that has no value in itself. Although it does not comprehend in what manner all that is phenomenon is presented to its view, still it understands what is the meaning of it all; and is like to a spectator who comprehends the aesthetic significance of that which takes place on the stage of a theatre, and would gain nothing essential if he were to see besides the machinery by

means of which the changes are effected on that stage" (*Out. of Met.* § 92).

Now, perhaps, we see better what Lotze means in a passage previously quoted. "We find within ourselves an instinct bidding us discern in Ideas of the good, the beautiful, and the holy, the one indefeasible end whence alone reality derives any value."

There still remains, then, the three starting-points. (i) The idea of the Good gives us the clue to the final meaning of reality; but (ii) from experience we must learn the mode of its realisation. And (iii) through all thinking we must hold loyally to the immediate certainty of "necessary laws." Where the "necessary laws" and experience conflict Lotze speaks of a reality which is "superior to logical laws." Where experience and our demand for the Good clash, as in the case of the problem of evil, Lotze again falls back upon the idea that "our finite wisdom has come to an end of its tether." While refusing to follow some in superficial attempts to explain away evil, he, at the same time, "believes that the solution exists."

We may sum up this section with a statement of what Lotze calls his "philosophic faith"—that these three modes or means of seeking truth meet eventually in the conception of God—"the one real power appearing to us under a threefold image of an end to be realised—namely, first, some definite and desired Good; then, on account of the definiteness of this, a formed and developing Reality; and finally in this activity an unvarying reign of Law" (*Mic.* ii. p. 716).

THE SUBJECTIVITY OF OUR KNOWLEDGE

Throughout its activities thought must be coloured by its own subjective nature. We cannot get outside ourselves and see things as they would appear if we were not looking at them. The mind in apprehending things is active, and this activity implies that the mind contributes its share to the resulting knowledge. But this does not invalidate all knowledge of things external to us as being merely subjective. For, as Lotze points out, "our representation must be subjective not merely if there were no external world but it must be subjective also if there is. Even of a real world we could have no other kind of representation than we have, a representation reproduced

through our own subjective activity." Thus the admitted subjectivity of all our knowledge "decides absolutely nothing as to the reality of its object and the accuracy of our representation of it" (*Cont. Rev.* vol. xxxvii. p. 145).

"An absolute truth," says Lotze, "such as archangels in heaven would have to accept," is not the object of philosophy. Yet even archangels would be liable, on Lotze's own showing, to this subjectivity of cognition. For "it is no specially prejudicial lot of the human spirit, but must recur in every being which stands in relation to anything beyond it" (*Met.* i. p. 220).

This limitation, if it be a limitation, does not apply in Lotze's view to the knowledge of God. For He is the all-inclusive Being, and there is nothing "beyond Him." His knowledge, then, is analogous to our knowledge of self, and of this, Lotze admits, we have an absolute knowledge. And it is from this fact of knowledge of self that we may entertain a legitimate hope of learning just what positively constitutes in other things as well their essential "Being."

THE UNION OF INDIVIDUAL THINGS IN AN INFINITE BEING

We now proceed to deal with the ontological position of Lotze in so far as it is important in leading up to his Philosophy of Religion.

Very various labels have been applied to Lotze as a philosopher. He has been called Absolutist and Individualist, Realist and Idealist, and he has even been accused of defending Materialism. This last charge was due to his writings on the *Physiology of Life and of the Soul*, in which he attempted an explanation of mental phenomena by means of the conception of mechanism. But no careful reader of the *Microcosmus*, or of his later *Metaphysics* could for a moment suspect him of materialism. It is true that in opposing the usual argument from design, Lotze maintains that such "design" as we can trace in the physical universe might, supposing a state of originally complete chaos with infinite possibilities, be the effect of blind mechanical laws, "testing" the various forms of existence in the "endless alternation of its phenomena." Thus from a state of chaos, by selection of certain forms of combination, might a system arise presenting many signs of apparent design and conscious adaptation: such a hypothesis being rendered more plausible by the fact that

there are many things in which we can trace no purpose (*Mic.* i. p. 427).

Yet such an admission by no means justifies the term "Materialist." Lotze had his own reasons for rejecting such a hypothesis, if they were not those usual to the theology of his day. The preceding chaos postulated by the atomists is to him unthinkable. We must start, if we start at all, with a definite universe in a definite condition. No mere chaos of infinite possibilities is thinkable, from which just the existent system of spatial order could have been selected.

Further, the "Mechanical" Theory, even if tenable, is not identical with Materialism. For the presence of intelligent life must be acknowledged, and so it must be concluded as having been present even in the "original supersensible elements."

Elsewhere Lotze demonstrates the fallacy of explaining mind by reference to material forces, which are themselves only intelligible in terms of mind. In short, his attitude on this whole question he sums up himself in the introduction to the *Microcosmus*, where he speaks of showing "how absolutely universal is the extent, and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world."

We shall now deal with the main lines of thought by which Lotze leads up to his conception of a purely spiritual universe, with all its individuals bound together in the unity of the Being of an infinite God.

The problem
of Interaction.

This consists in an argument for the unity of the universe based upon the fact of the interaction of individual beings. Lotze starts from the Realist position, assuming the existence of individual things. "Even the most common apprehension of the world is impossible without articulating the content of our perceptions in such a manner that we assume 'Things' as the supports and centres of its phenomena and events and all kinds of 'reciprocal actions' as being interchanged between them" (*Out. of Met.* § i.).

This assumption of actual things is based upon sense experience. It is an inference from our perceptions. Yet Lotze's metaphysic leads him to deny the reality of matter as apparently apprehended in sense perception. This, however, does not invalidate his argument from the interactions of individual selves. For *souls* remain as

individual selves (the denial of the existence of any other souls than our own Lotze regards as too absurd to need refutation), and between these spiritual selves there is interaction. Lotze makes the assumption, then, that all real elements of the world act upon each other. Our experience, he remarks, so far as it goes, supports this view.

In reply to the theoretic objection that some individual elements *may* be indifferent to others, Lotze points out that even such indifference "we should after all be compelled to regard as a necessary consequence of the same law of interaction." While to the remark that elements which have interacted, may at another time, under similar conditions, be completely independent of one another, Lotze replies that if one adopt such a view "the very basis for every investigation would be abolished."

Such a world of interacting beings could not be deduced from beings which were originally wholly without relation to each other. Nor can it be demanded that things must exist before they can stand in relation to one another. It is true that we cannot think a relation without thinking things related. But the priority of unrelated to related existence is merely this logical priority, not a metaphysical priority.

Even if one could assume an unrelated existence how could it then enter into relation with other things? If it does, it must be some definite relation to the exclusion of others. And where can lie the ground of this specific determination of the relation entered into if not in a previous relation?

If, then, all real things are thus bound together by their relations in one system, no one being independent of the others, each interacting with others, how are we to conceive of their interaction?

Lotze examines the common opinion that some "influence" or "force" passes over from one thing to the other. What is this which passes over when *a* acts upon *b*? Is it a real element which leaves *a* and joins *b*? If so, there is really no "efficient causation," no real action. If it be said that it is a state which is transferred, how *can* there be a state "passing over," for in passing it must be a state of nothing, and "Attributa non separantur a substantiis." And even if it could, now that the state is near to *b*, why must *b* change on that account? This remains as great a mystery as the primary question.

Nor does the theory of "Pre-established harmony" solve the problem. "For if a change of some constituent of the universe has to follow and correspond to any event that may or may not happen, whenever it does happen, then that constituent must be able to distinguish the occurrence from the non-occurrence of the event by some passion which the event produces in it, and the action and reaction which it was desired to banish would thus be necessary for the comprehension of that harmony which is intended to replace it" (*Mic.* ii. p. 597).

It is also useless to suppose the interaction to be the result of the constant mediating activity of God, so long as God is supposed to be separated from the things in the same way as things are supposed to be separated from one another. For we must suppose an action of the things upon God, and a reaction of God upon them, so that the problem of interaction remains.

The only explanation, says Lotze, seems to be that the various things are not entirely separate and independent in the way supposed. But rather that a "state which takes place in the element *A* must for the very reason that it is in *A*, likewise be an affection in *B*; but it does not necessarily have to become such an "affection" of *B* by means of an influence issuing from *A*" (*Out. of Met.* § 48).

Unity of Being
essential.

This change *b* is rather due to the fact that both *A* and *B* are elements in a greater whole which embraces all individuals and which Lotze in his *Metaphysic* designates the "Infinite" or the "Absolute." The Absolute causes a sort of "compensating" changes, and all activity is really His activity.

Through another line of thought, including ethical postulates, Lotze identifies this Absolute with God. Now, Lotze's moral and religious philosophy requires a certain being for self for the individuals:—they must be capable of action. Otherwise how can individual moral progress be a reality: how can individual effort be justified or demanded? And this is inconsistent with the view of the Absolute just described. As Dr. Galloway points out, Lotze's discussion is not really a "proof of how interaction is possible, but rather a reaction to an illusory appearance somehow generated by the compensatory movements within the one real Being" (*Principles of Religious Development*, p. 290).

Criticism of
Lotze's
solution.

I do not agree with Dr. Galloway's further criticism that Lotze assumes that "reality is a fixed magnitude and cannot be more or less than M ," if by "fixed" he means incapable of progress or change of the whole. For whilst Lotze maintains that a new state a in an individual A is "compensated" by a new state b in an individual B , there is no reason why the second change should be a sort of negative quantity, exactly equivalent to a but of opposite action. It may well be that a is a better state for A , and b for B , than the previous state of affairs, and thus that both for these and for the "Absolute," or God, there had been actual progress. All the changes, indeed, may be so organised as to lead towards the realisation of the one great purpose of God (see *Outlines of Phil. of Rel.* § 20).

Still, the previous objection holds, and we are confronted apparently with the alternative of either giving up the individuality of the "unit" and thus making freedom impossible, moral effort futile, and the feeling of self-hood illusory; or of being thrown back upon the old difficulty of interaction. Lotze himself is inconsistent, holding at one time that every state and action of the mind is also a state and action of the Absolute, and elsewhere asserting that there is a "being-for-self" which separates the unit from the whole. "In that a thing is something for itself, consciously refers to itself, apprehends itself as an ego—by just this, which is its very essence, it detaches itself from the Infinite" (*Mic.* ii. p. 645).

Can the whole
of our
experience be
included in
that of God?

This act of apprehending myself as a separate self, and that self my particular self, is then an experience which in its very nature cannot be experienced by God. So here we have a part of my being which is not included in the being of God, even on Lotze's own showing. And here Lotze contradicts the result of his *Metaphysics*, which required that all reality, and therefore all experience, should be included within the being of the Absolute. And this feeling of self-hood, one may say in passing, is so emphatically a part of immediate and certain experience that the belief in interaction of things could more easily be given up than this.

The feeling of
self-hood.

But apart from this feeling of self-hood there would seem to be some human experiences which from their very nature cannot be experienced by God. Professor Roger suggests the case of ignorance. I am, say, in complete ignorance as to the solution of a problem.

“Now, can this concrete state of mind exist unchanged in all its detail in an all-knowing mind? Can I feel baffled and feel everything sun-clear as a unitary fact of consciousness? Can I feel baffled and see the solution in the same experience?” Further, suppose that for a moment I experience complete despair. “Can God have an identical feeling without himself being in complete despair?” (*Religious Conception of the World*, p. 156).

The case of
Ignorance
and Despair.

Now, it is true that I can know that I had a feeling of despair, although now I am again hopeful. I can still revive certain elements of the previous state of despair, and in so far as this is possible a partial interpenetration of two kinds of experience is possible. It might, perhaps, be suggested, then, that thus our experience may enter partially into that of the Divine Being, that He knows my experience without actually passing through an identical experience. But without further elucidation this only ignores the difficulty of interaction. For in the case where I know my own past feeling of despair, and partially revive it, it is only possible because my present self was modified by the previous feeling—which was entirely its own: and this modification continues and shows its traces in the present self, which is really one with the previous self. The two states are bound together in the unity of one being. But this is not the case with my feeling of despair and the experience of God, for we must suppose that there are two beings, if we cannot accept Lotze's view.

Paulsen's analogy of the individual cells of the body contributing to our total experience is not satisfactory for our purpose. For, supposing the cells to have psychic experiences of their own, it is not these, as far as we know, which contribute to our total experience, but rather their physiological conditions. We have of them only a phenomenal knowledge, not a sharing of their own inmost being, their being-for-self. And they affect us only by first affecting the brain processes, through interaction, and here again we must suppose interaction between brain and soul, or a parallelism which requires explaining by some such higher synthesis as we are now seeking.

Lotze's
view.

Dr. Galloway also fails, it seems to me, to supply an adequate substitute for the theory of Lotze which he criticises. He makes use of the analogy of organic unity, which, as he says, is essentially

teleological. "The universe is coherent because all its constituent centres of experience are sustained by the same ever-present Ground, a living will which gives organic connexion to the multiplicity of spiritual reals and a place and function to each of them. This will is a guarantee that the whole system is teleological" (*Principles of Religious Development*, p. 299).

But this only seems to provide that the interactions of the individuals shall lead towards the well-being of the whole, it does not explain how it can possibly be effected. While the analogy is a suggestive one in its bearing upon the combination of welfare of the unit and the whole, it does not explain interactions; as in Paulsen's case, interaction of the individuals in the organic unity has to be assumed.

It might appear that our object would be attained if we could suppose that any experience of the unit has its parallel and counterpart in the experience of God. But to suppose one merely a sort of function of the other, so that, say, an increase of intensity of experience *a* in one is accompanied by increase of intensity of experience *A* which enters as an element into the experience of God, to do this still leaves the problem of interaction unless we suppose a pre-established harmony between my experiences and those of the divine Being. Now, we saw reason to reject any theory of pre-established harmony. We can only adopt something like it by supposing that never from the beginning of my being has my experience been entirely separate from that of God. Thus we may come to suppose that in creating me, in progressively developing a new centre of experience, God has all along retained an element of my total experience as an element of His also. This leads me to the conception of the partial interpretation of two experiences. Professor Stout has defended this view in some recent lectures on Leibnitz. He fully admits that it is absurd to suppose that the *individual unity* of one being should form part of the individual unity of another, that, for example, my volitions as such, that is, as mine, should be part of another's.

But he points out that it does not follow that the content of my experiences should not be shared by others. Not merely that the content may be similar, but that a part of it may form a common element between two centres of experience.

Professor Stout refers by way of suggestive example—not, of course, as proof—to cases of simultaneous double-personality, where we have each, apparently, with its own character and point of view, yet sharing one body and apparently one series of sensations.

Now let us suppose some such common element between my experience and that of God. If this element varies constantly with my total experiences it may provide a complete clue to the nature of that experience, and thus may a complete knowledge about me be possible to the divine Being, as well as a means of interaction being provided. Yet there may be left to me a power of initiation and the evil volitions of the individual need not be ascribed to the will of God, as on Lotze's view they must ultimately be.

Partial
Interpenetra-
tion of Being
might explain
Interaction.

Professor Stout believes that such a "common element" is provided by the "presentation continuum," shared both by God and by all finite beings. We interact on one another by means of this "presentation continuum": and, similarly, God may work upon us, but in His case our very feelings and volitions may appear as presentations, so that a more immediate influence may be possible.

Such a view avoids the difficulty which both Dr. McTaggart and Dr. Rashdall emphasise, of supposing that I am merely part of a state, or an "adjective" of another being, for it leaves a central portion of my experience mine, and mine only, though it may be known and communicated through the medium of that part which I have in common with God and with other beings.

The conception is no doubt a difficult one. It does not seem to be proved, further, that in cases like that of "Sally Beauchamp" two separate personalities had certain sensations in common and not merely similar sensations. But it would seem that unless we can assume some such partial interpenetration of being, the problem of interaction must be classified with those which Lotze himself regards as beyond the powers of human reason. Whereas if we do assume it, we have a means of connection between the soul and God, and either through this, or directly, a connection with all beings thus united with Him. And through this common experience God may have a knowledge of individual beings which includes all of them, and all of their experiences, though this "knowledge about" is not the same as immediate knowledge given by experiencing the same things Himself.

It may be argued that it must ultimately depend upon similar elements in His own past experience, as is apparently the case with our own understanding. (Compare the suggestion in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that through His human experience, Jesus was able to reach a more complete knowledge of human difficulties than He would have had if He had never taken upon Himself our human nature. Heb. ii. 17, 18).

Dr. Rashdall frankly gives up the problem as to how God can know what I feel without having felt the like. But without assuming any exactly similar experience, may we not suppose that elements of experience sufficiently similar to ours may enter even into the divine life for re-combinations to be formed and so very varying and much more limited ranges of experience be comprehended?

God's knowledge may thus be complete in the only important sense.

Such a knowledge *about* might surely at least be complete in every sense necessary for the religious consciousness. By it God may know completely how to act upon man, and what is best for the welfare of such a being. And it might be much more complete from this point of view than my own knowledge of self, in which much of the past is omitted and in which the knowledge of my circumstances is so inadequate that I cannot foresee the future.

Further, we must be cautious in applying the tenets of human psychology to the workings of the mind of God. And in any case the difficulty is not nearly so great as in supposing with Lotze, that my whole experience is simply a part of the wider experience of God, and that my feeling of present ignorance is felt by Him too as ignorance, and that my volitions towards evil are also His volitions.

God and the Material World.

We have seen that Lotze assumed the existence of individual things at the outset of his discussion upon the nature of interaction and its bearing upon the unity of the universe. We also pointed out that, even if the existence of individual things apprehended in the apparently material world be denied, Lotze could have found a basis for his position in the existence and interaction of human souls.

Now, it is true that Lotze does deny the existence of material things as such. As his arguments on this point have much in common with other Idealists, they need not detain us. But we must refer to his view as to what material appearances are due

to. He mentions with considerable respect what he designates as the view of Idealism (though it is not the view of all Idealists), that material things as apprehended are the results of the activity of the Infinite working upon our minds. But Lotze maintains that nothing is gained by making such an assumption, and prefers the view that things are both Real and Spiritual; "things which seemed to our merely external observation as working blindly, suffering unconsciously and being self-contradictory through their incomprehensible combination of selflessness and Realness, are in fact better internally than they seem on the exterior—that they too exist not merely for others, but also for themselves" (*Mic.* ii. p. 642).

Lotze accepted the atomic view of the physical world, and held that each atom is in reality not an extended thing but a spiritual self, giving rise in us to a perception of extension.

Yet the realness of such things does not involve a separation from God according to Lotze. Yet with these too, as with human selves, that "being-for-self" at least must, even on Lotze's own showing, be something which is not also a part of the experience of God. Here, too, then, if we suppose that matter is the presentation to us of real spiritual beings, one may also suppose that there is partial interpenetration of their experience with that of God, through which He works upon them.

Further, through the material world as given in presentation, God has a means of working upon us, as well as more immediately. And this may be so even though their entering into the experience of God may be the condition of their affecting us, though this is not essential to our view.

We have seen that Lotze's metaphysics required that all the individuals in the universe should be bound together by one supreme Being. Lotze himself spoke of this Being as the Absolute Being. But we saw reasons for holding that there are at least aspects of our experience, and those the most essential, which are *not* merely modes of the being of the Absolute. Indeed, we saw that even Lotze separates that feeling of being-for-self, possessed by each finite being, as an element of the experience of each of us, which is not also a part of the experience of the Absolute.

Hence we see the undesirability of naming Lotze's Supreme Being

"the Absolute," seeing that He does not include all reality within Himself; though, as we showed, we may believe Him to be in active touch with the whole of reality.

THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE UNITING BEING WITH A PERSONAL GOD

By another line of thought in the metaphysic Lotze leads to the view that all reality is spiritual. For a completion of his Philosophy of Religion, it remains for him to show that this supreme and unifying Being may be regarded as a Personal God.

The fairness and caution of Lotze are well shown in his manner of approaching this final goal of his thought. He recognises it as a demand of the religious consciousness. Yet he will not have such faith given as a proof of the reality of its object. If we cannot reach it by reason, it may still be an *object* of faith, says Lotze, but "that which is inaccessible to human reason cannot furnish any proof that such faith is true" (*Mic.* ii. p. 668). The traditional "proofs" of the existence of God he finds unsatisfactory.

The Cosmological Proof, which concludes from the conditioned and contingent character of everything in the world the fact of the existence of a necessary and unconditioned Being, could only, if valid, attain to the metaphysical conception of "an Unconditioned" and not to the religious conception of a God.

The Teleological Proof is unsatisfactory, for, though in a high degree improbable, it yet remains *possible* that such design as we find may have been evolved from chaos by blind mechanical laws. And Lotze further regards it as unsatisfactory in that it would only lead us to a notion of a Governor of the Universe and not to that of a Creator.

In the Ontological Proof, useless in its usual form, Lotze discovers a hint of a "fundamental thought which is seeking for expression, the immediate certainty that what is greatest, most beautiful, most worthy, is not a mere thought but must be a reality." But this, Lotze admits, is not capable of logical proof.

Lotze avowedly takes a leap in identifying such an ideal of the most worthy with a Personal God. But having done so, he does not leave the matter here, but proceeds to argue for its validity by a

process of elimination. He reviews the possible alternatives and finds each of them unsatisfactory even from a metaphysical point of view. Thus the conception of a Personal God has a theoretic superiority, and it is also a more complete solution in that it satisfies the aesthetic and moral demands of our nature no less than those of the understanding.

Having previously arrived at the conviction that all reality is spiritual, it is legitimate for Lotze to consider only those views which regard the "Absolute" as spiritual.

In his *Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion* he considers first of these the view of the Absolute as "unconscious Reason." This, as he points out, is going contrary to all our experience, if, indeed, it is not self-contradictory. "We have no right to strip off from Reason, which we invariably first learn by experience to know as conscious, this predicate of consciousness, and then to persuade ourselves that aught intelligible is left" (*Out. of Phil. of Rel.* § 24).

Alternative
views of the
Absolute con-
sidered.

Nor can we think that our self-conscious reason could possibly ever originate in a universe of "Unconscious reason." The existence of so-called "sub-conscious" or unconscious states or processes is no argument in favour of the view under discussion. For these are only known in connection with some conscious personality, and as in some way dependent upon it.

In the next place "Impersonal Spirit" goes contrary to our experience. We only know spirit as the spirit of some individual. There may be states of consciousness in which there is no reference to the self as such, where "we so lose ourselves in the content of a sensation, an idea, a feeling, or an effect, that we (so to speak) *are* for a time nothing but this." But we only know such states as states of a personal spirit. Lotze might also have urged that no multiplicity of such spiritual units, even if such were conceivable, not bound together in the unity of one self, would provide the unifying and binding functions which we found were necessary to explain the unity of the universe. Nor would Lotze's purpose have been served by Dr. McTaggart's view of the universe as a system of spiritual selves, forming a unity after the analogy of a "body corporate" but in which no person forms the bond of unity. For this again leaves unexplained the mode of interaction among the units.

Hence Lotze is led to adopt the theory that the Absolute is not only spiritual but personal. On purely speculative grounds this is preferable, and this alone can fit in satisfactorily with the religious demands of man's nature.

THE PERSONALITY OF GOD

We now come to deal with the problem of the Personality of God, perhaps the most important topic in any discussion of Lotze's theological views.

We saw reasons for dropping the term "Absolute," because we could not agree with the idea that all experiences of all individuals were included in that of the Supreme Being, in the sense that if that which God shares in my experience were removed from me, nothing would remain, peculiar to myself.

As we saw, this is really involved in parts of Lotze's own discussion of the matter though he makes statements inconsistent with it. This is recognised by Dr. McTaggart, who at the end of his criticism of Lotze's views of the Personality of God, admits that his objections "do not challenge Lotze's right to consider the Absolute as personal. For he regarded the Absolute as not exhausted by its manifestations and those manifestations as to a certain extent from an ethical point of view, outside the Absolute" (*Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 81).

Our modified position is, then, relieved from that attack of Mr. Bradley upon the idea of the personality of the Supreme Being, based upon the position that a self must have something outside itself, that every ego implies a non-ego. But our position only remains free from this criticism so long as we regard some finite selves as co-existent with God. If we retain a belief in a creation, in the sense usually understood, we must face the problem, as we shall see, of a personal God at one time existing alone.

Yet this only applies if we suppose that all beings other than God Himself were created. It is, however, possible to hold that while all human beings and those lower than these were at some time created, yet that there are beings of another order who are co-eternal with God though inferior to Him. This position would meet both difficulties. It would admit a reality other than the Divine Self, which some maintain is essential for personality. And yet it would allow for *our* creation.

It may be remarked that some interpretations of the Christian doctrine of God involve a view analogous to this. I refer to those interpretations according to which the "personae" of the Trinity are regarded as of the nature of selves.

Such a view helps somewhat towards the satisfying of both metaphysical and religious demands. For the being and experience of the second and third persons must be regarded as in some degree other than and distinct from that of the first. And in so far as this is the case, something other than self is provided as the object of knowledge, and so the condition of personality demanded is supplied.

From the point of view of the religious ideal we may quote Professor Rogers (*Religious Conception of the World*, p. 166): "Which represents the higher type of existence, judging by the best standard we are able to apply,—a being shut up within the limits of his own self-centred nature, or one who finds his life by losing it in the common life which he shares with others." Also, "Regarded as a mere solitary, self-identical, infinite, the nature of God would be a stranger to that which is the highest element of a spiritual nature, the element of love" (John Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, vol. i. p. 70).

Caird proceeds to argue that for the perfect self-realisation of God, the created world, nature and man, would not suffice: partly because of its imperfection: and partly because it would involve progression in the nature of God. Caird is inconsistent here, in denying the possibility of such progression. For he has just pointed out that the highest expression of love is attained only by sacrifice, and so this was necessary for the Ideal realisation of God's nature, the act of redemption, a "going forth of God's own being according to the needs of man"—a progressive act, as the development of the human race is progressive.

I do not wish to dwell upon this point, but only to lead up to the fact that Lotze's own system seems to provide for the non-ego necessary for divine personality, a fact which has apparently escaped the notice of some other critics of Lotze. This would not be the case if we hold to the Absolutism of Lotze, for even the created Beings would only be differentiations of the Absolute entirely included within His own being. But we pointed out that Lotze himself really gives this up in allowing a being-for-self for each soul, which particular

Lotze's view as
to Creation.

experience is not shared by the Infinite. This being admitted, we must consider what view Lotze holds as to the *creation* of such selves. We find he denies that there is any *process* of creation. Creation rather signifies the complete dependence of the universe upon the will of God. The world did not suddenly come into being by a divine act of creation, thus profoundly altering the experience of God at some definite time. Rather "the will to create is an absolutely eternal predicate of God and ought not to be used to designate a deed of his so much as the absolute dependence of the world upon his will in contradistinction to its involuntary 'emanation' from his nature" (see *Phil. of Rel.* § 44). This being so, it is unnecessary to suppose any period of time when God was alone in His universe and was in the most complete sense the "Absolute."

From eternity
there were
other selves
than God, but
these were
dependent
upon Him.

Rather does Lotze hold that from eternity there were differentiations of the Divine Being within Himself, and those, too, of the nature of selves, for only selves can be real. But being-for-self, as we saw, cannot be regarded as entirely included in the being of another. Hence from all eternity we may regard God as having material which supplied the non-ego, which we are supposing essential for personality. To say that such "creation from all time" is incomprehensible to us is futile. For as Lotze repeatedly points out, *any* theory of absolute becoming is beyond us. We can comprehend existence from all time no more than creation from all time, in Lotze's sense of the word.

Yet to meet the speculative difficulty as to the personality of God it is not necessary that *all* selves should have been existent from all time. And Lotze is rather concerned with showing that there was no period when the "creative will had no existence" than in proving that no finite beings (ourselves, *e.g.*) began to be. Indeed there are passages in which Lotze distinctly suggests this latter. Here, again, the mystery of absolute beginning need not compel us to declare its impossibility, even if we feel, as Dr. Rashdall does, that the absence of all trace of an earlier experience and the dependence on the bodily organism are conclusive arguments for believing in the creation of our human souls at some definite time. For the mode of origin of life and being is, in any case, beyond us, as Lotze points out, *ad nauseam*. Yet there is another

suggestion that may throw light on the matter. If we suppose matter to be merely the presentation of spiritual selves at a low stage of development, may we not suppose that by bringing such selves into certain definite relation with others such an increased development may be produced in some of them that what we may almost regard as the creation of a new being may take place? Such an undeveloped mind would also have its being not entirely separate from God. There would, on the view we have upheld, be an element of its being which would also enter into the Being of God. To Him, too, may be due that stimulus which results in the origin of the new development, so that He does in a sense create a New Being, that is, He develops a being of greater and more varied capacity.

This view resembles somewhat that put forward by Lotze in his chapter on the "Beginning and End of Soul-life" (*Mic.* i. 390-1), though here Lotze naturally treats of such development as being entirely within the being of the Absolute. But, with this proviso, we may quote the passage as a suggestive one in reference to a possible mode of the development of a new type of self. "No necessity of Reason constrains us to shun the thought of a beginning of a soul. As every physical process, even the most minute, apparently taking place between two elements, is likewise an event within the Eternal, on whose constant presence all possibility of action depends, even so the quietly advancing formation of the organic germ is no isolated, independent, event, but a development of the Infinite itself. Fostered by it, received by it into its own inner being, this natural event there excites the creative power to new development; and as our human soul receives stimuli from without and answers them by the production of a sensation, so the consistent unity of the Infinite Being lets itself be stimulated by this internal event of physical development to produce out of itself the soul appropriate to the growing organism."

Thus far we have assumed the truth of the view that personality is impossible without something other than self which the self may know and from which it may distinguish itself. And we have seen that even supposing its truth, we need not give up the belief in the personality of God as long as we do not insist upon identifying God with the Absolute in the sense of the whole of reality. It

Is a Non-Ego
essential for
personality?

now remains to examine Lotze's arguments against the view that personality necessarily involves a Not-self.

Lotze states the usual objection as follows: "An Ego (or Self, Ich) is not thinkable without the contrast of a Non-Ego or Not-Self; hence personal existence cannot be asserted of God without bringing even Him down to that state of limitation, of being conditioned by something not Himself, which is repugnant to Him."

This, as Lotze says, is ambiguous. It may mean:

(1) "What the term Ego denotes can be *comprehended* in reflective analysis only by reference to the Non-Ego."

It may also mean:

(2) "That it is not conceivable that this content of the Ego should be *experienced* without that contrasted Non-Ego being experienced at the same time."

Finally:

(3) "It may point to the existence and active influence of a Non-Ego as the *condition* without which the being upon which this influence works could not be an Ego."

In reference to (1) Lotze points out that Ego and Non-Ego "cannot be two notions of which each owes its whole content to its contrast with the other." Each must at least bear in its own nature the reason why it should be the one of the two (Ego or Non-Ego) and not the other: so any being which is an Ego, must have the ground of its self-hood in that nature which it had previous to the contrast, although before being thus contrasted it cannot be called Ego or Non-Ego.

Now it seems to me that Dr. McTaggart's criticism of this argument of Lotze fails. Dr. McTaggart first admits that it would be a "vicious circle" for us to attempt to explain the Ego exclusively from the outside. But he suggests an alternative not contemplated, he thinks, by Lotze, "that the isolated Ego cannot be explained at all, being an unreal abstraction, which shows its unreality by its inexplicability, and that Ego and Non-Ego can only be explained when they are taken together as mutually explaining each other" (*Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 67).

Then he instances the case of parent and child. If we tried to explain the idea of a parent merely in terms of the idea of a child we "should

have fallen into a vicious circle since we should find that the idea of a child could not be explained except in relation to the idea of a parent. But it would not be correct to argue from this that a parent could exist or be conceived without a child."

But Dr. McTaggart persists in using the term Ego where Lotze acknowledges that it must be given up—when that stage of Being is spoken of which is thought of as previous to the contrast "although it is not yet entitled to the predicate which in that contrast comes to belong to it." Dr. McTaggart's own example gives support to Lotze's own contention. The parent *can* be thought of as existing before the child, in fact his pre-existence is a necessary condition of parenthood; only he is not then called "parent," but only man or woman. This very pre-existence is a necessary condition of his entering the relationship of parenthood—though previous to this new bringing into contrast he was "not yet entitled to the predicate which in that contrast comes to belong" to him.

Lotze, then, is willing to give up the term Ego. "For it is our opponents' opinion and not ours that personality is to be found exclusively where in ideation (or presentation) self-consciousness sets itself as Ego in opposition to the Non-Ego" (*Mic.* ii. p. 679). It is *feeling* which is the primary basis of personality. In order that the distinction "myself"—"something other than self"—may be thought, there must be a certainty of self which is immediately experienced, "a self existence earlier than the discriminative relation" by which it becomes Ego as opposed to Non-Ego. Thus Lotze deals with the second possible meaning of the opposing criticism, maintaining that there may be conscious experience apart from the experience of the contrasted Non-Ego. "We admit that the Ego is *thinkable* only in relation to the Non-Ego, but we add that it *may be experienced* previous to and out of every such relation and that to this is due the possibility of its subsequently becoming thinkable in that relation" (*Mic.* ii. p. 680).

Dr. McTaggart objects that "each of us finds that for him, consciousness of the Non-Ego is an essential condition of his personality." "We can never say 'I' without raising the idea of the Non-Ego."

Now, in so far as introspection serves me, I should be prepared

to question this. For example, I believe that when in a state of fatigue I can think the thought "I am tired" without raising any idea of the Non-Ego. Further, I may think "I am not what I once was" without any thought of a Non-Ego except in the sense of a past self, which is no longer my present self. Further, I may regard an isolated impulse (though something entirely within my own being) which I resist, as "not myself," cf. "I was not myself when I did that."

It would seem then that given a developed personality there can be the *thought* of the self and not only the immediate experience, without any reference to anything other than either the present self or a past state of the self.

Dr. McTaggart refers to Lotze's complaint that "those who deny the personality of the Absolute separate spirit from personality in an unjustifiable manner, since they are never separated in our experience." Lotze's criticism, according to Dr. McTaggart, recoils on himself. "For personality without a Non-Ego is just as alien to our experience as spirit without personality." If my previous contention is sound this argument falls to the ground, if it is meant that we never have experiences which do not involve a reference to an other-than-self.

It remains true, however, that personality as we know it always includes—with the exception of rare possible moments—some reference to a not-self. The rare moments, however, may suffice for us to show the possibility of thought without a reference to a not-self. Dr. Rashdall, I find, takes this view in asserting that "the self must distinguish itself from something; but that something need only be the changing states of itself."

But there still remains the question of the necessity of a not-self for the *development* of a full personality. In dealing with this Lotze protests against the transference of the conditions of finite personality to the personality of the Infinite. He, as the source of all life, does not require that His "life should be called forth by external stimuli, but 'with perfect self-sufficingness' possesses in His own nature the causes of every step forward in the development of His life."

We even get a hint of how this may be from our own experience

"in the course of memory in the finite mind. The world of our ideas, though certainly called into existence first by external impressions, spreads out into a stream which, without any fresh stimulation from the external world, produces plenty that is new by the continuous action and reaction of its own movements" (*Mic.* ii. p. 684).

As Lotze admits, it remains to ask, "What it is that in God corresponds to the primary impulse which the train of ideas in a finite mind receives from the external world?" But this suggests the question, "Whence comes movement in the external world?" Both questions are unanswerable. For we must, in any theory of the cosmos, recognise some original movement as given reality; we can never "extract it from rest."

There remains, however, a difficulty which Lotze does not discuss. He states, rightly enough, "that no being in the nature of which self-existence was not given as primary and underived, could be endowed with self-hood by any mechanism of favouring circumstances however wonderful."

But may we not say that it is equally difficult to see how a consciousness of the *not-self* could in any way arise if it, too, were not "primary and underived." As Dr. Stout says, "We cannot proceed by inference to a not-self from an experience which has no element of not-self. An individual could never get beyond the circle of his immediate experience once confined within it" (*Proceedings of British Academy*, vol. v. pp. 178, 9).

It may be suggested that the knowledge merely of past states of the self satisfy these conditions. But this would seem to lead to a logical impasse—the existence of a previous state as the condition of any given state. There only remains then the knowledge of a present state as a state of the self but yet distinguished from it. But though logically distinguishable, yet that state too is a matter of immediate experience, not something known by means of immediate knowledge, and so would not satisfy the condition demanded according to Professor Stout.

There remains then this difficulty from the standpoint of Lotze if he be understood as maintaining the view of God as alone before the creation. But as we saw, his view of creation as an eternal act makes it unnecessary for him to maintain this difficult position.

Personality an
Ideal.

Before leaving the question of Personality we must mention Lotze's contention that Personality is an ideal—unattainable by finite beings. In six points do we fail to satisfy the conditions of perfect personality.

(1) In our subjection to a cosmic order which we did not ourselves ordain ; thus our freedom and independence are limited.

(2) Our inability fully to comprehend ourselves because our being is founded in the Infinite.

(3) Our dependence upon external reality for stimulation of our energies.

(4) The fact that our own souls cannot be completely known even by ourselves.

(5) The fact that we are moved to action sometimes by individual impulses rather than by the whole of the self.

(6) Our susceptibility to the influences of time ; much of the past disappears entirely from memory. And the future is largely unknown to us.

Personality can only be perfect in the Infinite Being, says Lotze, "which in surveying all its conditions or actions never finds any content of that which it suffers or any law of its working the meaning and origin of which are not transparently plain to it, and capable of being explained by reference to its own nature" (*Mic.* ii. p. 686). This was so for Lotze, because, according to him, the Infinite Being included within His own being all reality. In our view this is not so, but this does not lead us to any theory of the knowledge of God which is unsatisfactory from a religious point of view. The knowledge of other selves, even for God, may have to be mediate knowledge, but it is not therefore inadequate. (Even God's knowledge of the past, taking Lotze's view of His nature and experience, is no longer immediate). The bond of connection, the partial interpenetration of being, may be, as we saw, a completely adequate clue to a knowledge of other selves : and it may still remain true for us as for Lotze that to God everything is capable of being explained by reference to His own nature.

THE "ATTRIBUTES OF GOD"

This discussion of the omniscience of God leads us on naturally to speak of the other attributes of God, which are suggestively dealt with by Lotze.

God is said to be "*unchangeable*." This, according to Lotze, does not mean that God is without changeable inner states. Such an one would answer no religious need. We need a living God. Therefore, by His unchangeableness "nothing further is meant than the consistency with which all these inner states proceed from a nature that remains the same." This view is consistent with Lotze's own metaphysical doctrine of identity amid change. For such identity of being it is only necessary that the individual, while changing, should "remain always within a closed series of forms, every one of which can be transformed by means of definite conditions into every other, and no one of which can be transformed into any form foreign to this entire series" (*Out. of Met.* § 36).

Unchangeable-
ness.

Lotze himself does not attempt to prove that God possesses this attribute in a sense that it is not possessed by finite selves. But we can see how certain of his remarks upon the difference between the degree of our own personality and that of God may bear upon the question. The power of isolated impulses to move us, the fact that we forget the past and know little of the future, our ignorance of our own full being, and our partial dependence on the outside world for stimulus to activity, all make for changeableness, whereas the knowledge of past and future, and the presence of a consciousness of His full being in any and every activity, all make for unchangeableness in the Being of God. Now, the religious consciousness has generally held to the view that God's own experience is partially modified by the action of His creatures. But the influence of prayer, for example, has been held to be, not that of actually causing a change in the nature of God, but in so changing conditions that God's actions are now *consistently* different from what they would have been apart from such prayer.

In reference to the doctrine of God's *Omnipresence*, Lotze, of course, deprecates any such interpretation as would suppose God to be spatially extended. Rather is it interpreted in the sense that God is independent of space distances. "The activity of God is everywhere alike immediately and perfectly present without difference of degree."

Omnipresence.

Professor James remarks, in his *Principles of Psychology*, that the mind is cognitively present with the fixed stars, but dynamically present only with the brain. God, we may say, is both cognitively and efficiently present with the whole of reality.

Omnipotence.

A further attribute is that of *Omnipotence*. Lotze does not approve of the expression "God can do all possible" as an interpretation of the doctrine of omnipotence. The religious "feeling is not satisfied, as it is implied that God himself is subjected to a sphere of laws antecedent even to himself which would determine for him the scope of his power" (*Phil. of Rel.* § 30).

Nor will Lotze have the other interpretation, "God can make even the impossible to be possible and actual." For, apart from the self-contradiction inherent in it, as it stands, it is unthinkable. "For all order, all consistency and all coherency of the world appear to depend upon the limits between the possible and the impossible being absolutely immovable. If that which is of itself impossible can once be made possible by any power whatever, then every sure foundation for making any conclusion whatever in relation to the coherency of the world falls away" (*ibid.*).

God Himself
the ground of
distinction
between the
possible and
the impossible.

Furthermore, this interpretation makes, according to Lotze, the same mistake as the first; it suggests that the distinction of the impossible from the possible exists independently of God. "Rather must we arrive at such an apprehension of God as makes God himself to be the prime reason for the opposition of the possible and the impossible having any significance at all in the world of actual experience." That is, the ground of distinction between the possible and the impossible lies in God Himself.

But we may add here that, even if we think of God as thinking of "possible worlds," He could only think as theoretically possible those the thoughts of which were consistent with His own mind as the mind of a Rational Being, and He could think as *practically* possible only that one which is the *best* while consistent with His own Being, in which we include His will and purpose. For we cannot separate the will and reason of God. And the thoughts of that divine reason are "entirely rational, systemically connected with each other, and eternal truths which God cannot change because he cannot wish to change them without contradicting himself" (Pfleiderer, *Phil. of Rel.* vol. iii. p. 293 trans.).

God did not find Himself in a universe in which were operative laws independent of Himself, but to which He had to conform. This is a view connected with a position which Lotze frequently

maintains from several points of view. In reference first to natural, physical laws, he emphasises the fact that laws are simply statements of the ways in which matter behaves—a way consistent with its own nature. But “prior to the world, or prior to the first thing that was real, there was no pre-mundane and pre-real reality, in which it would have been possible to make out what would be the rights which, in the event of their coming to be a reality, each element to be employed in its construction could urge for its protection against anything incompatible with its right as a substance, or to which every force might appeal as a justification for refusing functions not imposed upon it by the terms of its original charter” (*Met.* vol. i. § 85). It is the real which, by its being, brings about the appearance of there being a necessity antecedent to it, just as it is the living body that forms within itself the skeleton around which it has the appearance of having grown.

It is true that, given the existent universe, any new thing entering it would find “laws” which would determine it, though even here its own nature would be at least a co-determinant of its mode of action. But such external determination cannot apply to God, in so far as He was, though not the whole of the reality (as Lotze maintained) yet the one on whom all reality depends for its being.

We must in fact *include* the idea of various eternal and necessary laws in the very concept of God. They cannot be separated from Him in reality any more than the attributes of a thing can be separated from the substance. The attempt to think of God’s power apart from its mode of action is doomed to failure. “As there is no motion without velocity and direction, and none which could be endowed with velocity and direction after it had come into existence, so we cannot conceive of any power that has not some mode of procedure, nor of any empty capacity that in its emptiness hits upon definite modes of activity” (*Mic.* ii. p. 696).

The eternal and “necessary” truths, then, are the mode of action of Omnipotence, but not its product. The definite mode of action of this power is not a limitation of its unconditionedness, however. Of course for Lotze it is not so, because he holds that every activity even of the finite differentiations is also the activity of the Absolute. On our modified view, which regards finite beings as partially

“outside” the being of God, must we regard His power as therefore limited?

There seems to be no logical necessity for this conclusion as long as we do not regard a use of means to an end as in itself implying limitation, and as long as we only require that God’s purposes shall *ultimately* be fulfilled. This is all that is really felt to be necessary by the religious consciousness.

For if we take one of the two alternatives which we suggested as possible, viz. that of eternal production, the finite selves are still entirely dependent upon God for their being and nature, and so cannot form obstacles to His will, except in so far as He Himself has willed that they should temporarily be permitted to do so, consistently with the accomplishment of His ultimate purpose, as the opposing efforts of the chess amateur may be even necessary for the fulfilment of the desires of the expert opposed to him, though the former may be continually in opposition.

Or suppose we take the other of our two suggested alternatives and assume the “germs” of finite selves, as we know them, to have been co-eternal with God. Even here, we saw that our present mode of being and its development were partly the outcome of divine activity. If we suppose the original germ of selves or “centres of experience” to have been at a very low stage of development, and that the developed self owes its nature to a greatly preponderating degree to its mode of development rather than to its original mode of existence, then little comparatively may remain which has not been the outcome of divine activity, and even that surplus may be such as to be quite in accord with His will and purpose. Just as a painter may have complete power over his picture, *qua* picture, though he did not make the particles of paint with which he is making it, and has not complete power over them *qua* particles of matter. But their own nature need cause no thwarting of his purpose. Rather does he actually make it the very means to the fulfilment of his purpose.

In a sense, God is theoretically limited on this view, in that the material on which He can work is given. This is a necessary consequence of any view of those who cannot accept a doctrine of creation, but believe in the self-existence of finite selves. But such self-existence may, we repeat, be quite consistent with the complete

accomplishment of God's final purpose. The selves may indeed partake to such a degree of divine nature that they will all, when fully developed, of their own will, co-operate in the divine purpose; and this is in full accord with widely held views both in the sphere of Ethics, in which it is held that when man fully realises his nature he must seek the Good, and in the sphere of Theology, where it is believed that when man "comes to himself" he will find his highest satisfaction in obedience to the will of God.

As we have said, the original co-existence of other beings with God through eternity may be consistent with His complete control over them and their development. And further, on the other hand, the fact that they were created would not necessarily mean that God's power over them was complete. A being might conceivably create something which afterwards got beyond his control. Indeed, there are suggestions of this belief in some views of man's freedom, though generally accompanied by the assertion that God deliberately gave up His power of absolute determination of the individual.

If we take Lotze's view that all beings are included within the one being of God the matter is different, for then it resolves itself into a question of self-determination. For every action of every self is really an action of God. But even with this view relinquished, there seems to be no convincing proof that the original co-existence of other selves with God is necessarily inconsistent with the idea of the Omnipotence of God in the sense demanded by the religious consciousness.

It can scarcely be a reproach against Lotze that he contributes nothing original towards the solution of the problem of evil. He simply criticises the attempt to solve the problem by the assertion that individual evils constitute a good when summed or viewed from a more universal point of view. It is characteristic of him that he clings both to the omnipotence and to the goodness of God, falling back on the idea that here "our finite wisdom has come to the end of its tether" and that we do not understand the solution which yet we believe in. But we may point out that the problem of moral evil is aggravated if one holds, with Lotze, that every volition of man is also a volition of God. Whereas if we give up this view, we may make use of Lotze's interpretation of the omnipotence of God (as modified

The problem
of evil.

by the Eternal-generation view of creation given above) that God's power is not limited by anything outside Himself, except by that which is dependent upon Him for its very existence. Then we may say that such creatures were the best of all possible creations, with a view to God's final purpose. Whilst if we take the view of eternally co-existent finite beings, moral evil may be attributed to them, though this, of course, implies a limitation of God's omnipotence; but this again need not be such as to fail the demands of religion, as we may still believe that God's ultimate purpose shall be attained.

The demands
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ness."

A final word must be added in reference to this argument from religious needs—the demand of the religious consciousness to which we have referred several times.

Lotze varies in his utterances upon this point. One or two of his assertions may seem to justify the extreme views of Ritschl; for example, his assertion that the best we can conceive *must* be true. "It is an immediate certainty that what is greatest, most beautiful, most worthy, is not a mere thought but must be a reality," because it would be "intolerable" to believe of our ideal that it has no existence, no power, and no validity in the world of reality (*Mic.* ii. p. 670). But in the main Lotze merely uses such demands of the soul either as supplying motives for the search for a satisfying truth or as an addition to metaphysical arguments in favour of a particular view; seeing that any philosophy which gives room for and accounts for the religious experience of mankind is by so much the more a complete and rational account of the universe. It is true that Lotze emphasises the fact that the *whole* man, and not the mere intellectual element, is concerned in the search for truth, and that the "judgment according to worth" may reject that which is thinkable if it does not accord with the demands of the heart. But he does not attempt to build merely upon such demands a creed which will satisfy, and he emphatically states that religious beliefs, even if "sprung from revelation" must come under the examination of philosophy. No doubt there are "inner states which are available as data for the acquisition of truth," among which Lotze includes the ethical feelings and also the aesthetic feelings, with the "conviction that what is so fair" must be at least closely related to the creative principle of the world. But these too are only data; the truth of religion must be developed by reflection

upon them. "Our whole theory of the universe," to repeat, "has three starting points, universal laws, experience," and the "instinct" by which we hold to the good, the judgments of worth which gave Ritschl his idea of "value-judgments."

And again, "Though we cannot command the heart to suppress its questionings and longings, we yet hold that it can expect a response to them only as an incidental result of knowledge which starts from a less emotional and therefore a clearer point of view" (*Mic.* Introd. p. vii.).

In short, one great value of Lotze's work lies in the fact that he recognised the importance and legitimacy of endeavouring to maintain the rights of both faith and reason. And this insistence at once divides him emphatically from the one-sided view represented by Ritschl and his school.

In conclusion, it is true that Lotze looks to the conception of the Supreme Good as the ultimate means of interpreting the world. "Genuine Reality in the world (to wit, in the sense that all else is, in relation to it, subordinate, deduced, mere semblance or means to an end) consists alone in this Highest Good personal, which is at the same time the highest good Thing" (*Outline of Met.* p. 151).

But in this teleological view we are nearest to a true understanding of things, truer than if "our cognition copied exactly a world of objects, that has no value in itself"; for thus, to quote again one of Lotze's most illuminating metaphors, we may understand the *meaning* as the spectator understands the meaning of the play, though he does not see the stage mechanism, and would gain nothing if he did.

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